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RAPE BY DRUGS: A STATUTORY OVERVIEW
AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Patricia J. Falk
I. INTRODUCTION
She lost consciousness, and when she came to the accused was
having sexual relations with her.
1
Later, he took the intoxicated victim B to his barracks where she
woke to find him engaged in sexual intercourse with her.
2
He dozed off again and subsequently awoke to find the defendant
performingfellatio on him.3
She was unable to feel anything nor was she able to move. She
again lost consciousness and came round to see the appellant naked
from the waist down with his penis erect. He approached her
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland
State University. J.D., 1983, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Ph.D., 1988, University of
Nebraska-Lincoln. I am grateful to April L. Cherry, David BarnIzer, Phyllis L. Crocker,
Joshua Dressier, Kathleen C. Engel, Peter Garlock, Jack Guttenberg, and Tayyab Mahmud
for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts, and to Dena S. Davis and Joel J. Finer for
helpful discussions about the subject matter of this article. I am also grateful to my research
assistants, Tiffany Anderson, Kristin Karkutt, and Renni Zifferblatt, and to the Cleveland-
Marshall Fund for its financial support.
1. United States v. Carver, 12 M.J. 581, 582 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981); see also
United States v. Willis, 41 M.J. 435, 437 (C.A.A.F. 1995) ("She awoke on appellant's bed,
naked from the waist down, with appellant penetrating her."); Commonwealth v. Walker,
362 A.2d 227, 230 (Pa. 1976) ("Later when the young girl began to regain consciousness,
she became aware that Walker was having sexual relations with her."); State v. Contreras-
Cruz, 765 A.2d 849, 851 (R.I. 2001) ("According to Tess's testimony, she next remembered
being in her bed with someone on top of her, engaging in intercourse with her.").
2. United States v. Buckley, 35 M.J. 262, 262 n.2 (C.M.A. 1992).
3. Commonwealth v. Tatro, 676 N.E.2d 843, 844 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
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grinning. He then penetrated her. When she was next conscious her
underwear had been replaced. The appellant remarked, "Do you
remember that then? Don't worry you won 't...later. A
She testified that she woke up the next morning naked, with male
emissions on her body, leading her to believe that someone had had
sex with her that evening.
5
Complainant's son testified that he was awakened by the shaking of
the bed and saw a man he had never seen before in bed on top of his
mother. He said the man's "private part" was in his mom's "'private
part." His mother was naked and appeared to be asleep. She was
not holding or kissing the man.
6
[S]he was dumped on the lawn in front of her home and was found
by her father in a disoriented state;...she had no memory of the
7incident the night before....
The complainant "blacked out again" and later reawoke to find the
defendant having intercourse with her.... She lost consciousness and
reawoke to find the defendant having intercourse with her again.8
When she became fully conscious again he was engaged in
intercourse with her. When he removed the mask, he told her that
"they were going to get alongJust fine. "9
When he awakened,...[hJe found that his lap had been covered with
a blanket,...[and] when he stood up, he realized his pants, including
his underwear, had been pulled down and that he had ejaculated.10
Ramona passed out in defendant's car and awakened with her pants
pulled partially down and defendant on top of her.1
4. Regina v. Cobb, [2002] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 19 (Crim. App. 2001).
5. United States v. Grier, 53 M.J. 30, 32 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
6. Gallardo v. State, No. 03-99-00653-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3903, at *2
(Tex. App. June 15, 2000).
7. Rapetti v. James, 784 F.2d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 1986).
8. Commonwealth v. Helfant, 496 N.E.2d 433, 437 (Mass. 1986).
9. State v. Oshiro, 696 P.2d 846, 849 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985).
10. State v. Karlen, 589 N.W.2d 594, 606 (S.D. 1999).
11. State v. Quick, 619 P.2d 1347, 1348 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
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The victim testified that the next thing she remembered was waking
up on the floor to find the appellant raping her...while she was on
the floor she could not think of anything to do, could not move, and
was unable to tell appellant to stop.'
2
Momentarily, she became completely unconscious. When she woke,
the Doctor was disrobed, moved her on her back, got in bed with
her, and had intercourse with her. She related that although she was
conscious of all that went on, she had no power of resistance.1 3
"I don't remember. I remember...standing up against the bathroom
wall and Lester was like kissing me, and then all I remember is
really laying on the floor and Lester was having sex with me and he
was saying like, ["]oh, this feels so good["] and things like
that.... 14
The methods by which human beings accomplish nonconsensual sexual
activity with fellow humans are almost limitless.' 5 They use physical force; they
beat, choke, and knock their victims unconscious. They kidnap and restrain them.
They use weapons and threats of immediate force to subdue their quarry. They
come in groups with the superior strength of their number. They exploit the
element of surprise. They coerce, extort, and blackmail others into sexual
submission. They lie, pretend, impersonate, and defraud, trapping the unwary in
webs of deceit. 6 They victimize mentally ill, mentally disabled, physically weak,
and physically incapacitated persons. They abuse their positions of trust and
authority to overcome their patients, clients, students, foster children, and
prisoners. They sexually assault members of their own families. They prey on
children.
Another common method of engaging in nonconsensual sexual activity
can be described generically as rape by drugs or other intoxicants, 17 which actually
encompasses two separate although related offenses. The first offense consists of
administering an intoxicant to the victim, which incapacitates her, and then
12. Yates v. State, No. CACR 98-620, 1999 Ark. App. LEXIS 500, at *3 (Ark.
Ct. App. June 30, 1999).
13. Rhine v. State, 336 P.2d 913, 916 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
14. Howard v. Commonwealth, 465 S.E.2d 142, 143 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
15. See generally STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEx: THE CULTURE OF
INTIMrDATON AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998).
16. See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L.
REv. 39 (1998).
17. I use the term "drugs" in its generic sense to encompass all forms of
intoxicating substances, including alcohol and anesthetics. I use the terms "intoxication" or
"intoxicated" to describe the results of all forms of drugs.
20021
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engaging in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with her (i.e., administration of
intoxicant + incapacity to consent due to intoxicant + nonconsensual sexual
activity). The second offense involves sexually assaulting a victim who has
become incapacitated by alcohol or drugs by self-administration or for reasons
unrelated to the defendant (i.e., incapacity to consent due to intoxicant +
nonconsensual sexual activity). Both methods of sexual imposition are probably as
old as rape law itself; certainly very early formulations of Anglo-American rape
law took them into account.'
8
In several senses, the two offenses are closely allied because they both
involve a common form of victim incapacity to consent and, thus, also share the
nonconsensual nature of the sexual conduct.19 Several courts in comparing these
offenses have emphasized that the cause of the victim's incapacity to consent is
largely irrelevant to a rape law designed to protect victims from unwanted sexual
exploitation. 20 Thus, the argument goes, it matters little whether the victim is
incapable of giving consent because she intoxicated herself, was knocked
unconscious by a blow to the head, was drugged by the defendant, or is insensible
because of a disease. For instance, one might be hard-pressed to determine which
of the passages quoted above involved self-intoxicated victims and which involved
administration of the intoxicant by the defendant. Moreover, the line between
defendant administration and victim ingestion is not particularly bright. Consider
Melton v. State, in which the defendant handed a bottle of whiskey to a sixteen-
year-old young woman and told her to drink down to a particular line.21 Was this a
case of voluntary consumption because no one forced her to drink or a case
involving administration? The state's rape statute required administration by the
defendant,22 but the trial court instructed the jury that the victim's voluntary
18. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 80 Am. Dec. 355, 361, 365-67 (Ohio 1861)
(discussing rape of mentally ill, intoxicated, unconscious, and anesthetized victims);
Commonwealth v. Bakeman, 131 Mass. 577 (1881) (adultery case involving an intoxicated
woman); Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376, 380-81 (1870) (discussing historical
treatment of sexual intercourse with an intoxicated or drugged woman in England and the
United States); Quinn v. State, 142 N.W. 510 (Wis. 1913) (discussing history of rape by
intoxication); Regina v. Camplin, 1 Den. C.C. 89, 94 (1845) ("Of the Judges who were in
favour of the conviction, several thought that the crime of rape is committed by violating a
woman when she is in a state of insensibility and has no power over her will, whether such
state is caused by the man or not, the accused knowing at the time that she is in that state....
But all the ten Judges agreed, that in this case, where the prosecutrix was made insensible
by the act of the prisoner, and that an unlawful act, and when also the prisoner must have
known that the act was against her consent at the last moment that she was capable of
exercising her will, because he had attempted to procure her consent and failed, the offence
of rape was committed."); 3 WHARTON & STiLLE, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE § 597 (4th ed.
1884) (discussing 1860 Ohio case involving doctor and chloroform).
19. See People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315 (Ct. App. 2000), for an
excellent discussion of the incapacity to consent inherent in California's rape by
intoxication statute.
20. See, e.g., State v. Chaney, 5 P.3d 492, 501 (Kan. 2000); Burke, 105 Mass. at
380-81; Stadler v. State, 919 P.2d 439, 443 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996).
21. See Melton v. State, 23 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1930).
22. See id. at 663.
HeinOnline  -- 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 134 2002
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consumption was sufficient.23 The conviction was upheld on appeal despite
defendant's challenge to the instruction. 24 Apparently, administration in some
jurisdictions can consist of merely offering liquor to the victim. 25
Although the two offenses are similar, a number of courts,
26 legislatures,27
and commentators 28 have treated them differently. The primary rationale for
distinguishing them derives from the construction of the force requirement of rape
law. First, some courts have developed the notion of constructive force to cover
situations in which the defendant administers an intoxicant to the victim.
29
23. See id. at 664.
24. See id. at 664 ("This court finds no error in the trial judge's construction of
the statute. The words 'without her consent' modify the verbal phrase 'has carnal
knowledge' and not the verbal noun 'administering.' Both the rules of grammatical
construction and the sense of the context justify the trial court's interpretation.").
25. But see State v. Morris, No. 18321, 2001 Ohio App. 971 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar.
9, 2001) (overturning defendant's rape and attempted rape convictions under Ohio law
because he was found not to have satisfied the administration by force, threat, or deception
requirement when he taught his fourteen-year-old twin daughters to huff glue, provided
them with the glue, and then sexually assaulted them); State v. Morris, No. 17287, 1999
Ohio App. LEXIS 4003 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1999).
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part EII.
28. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRiMrNAL LAw 771-72, 775-77 (3d ed. 2000)
(discussing the administration of drugs or intoxicants as a form of imposition and separately
discussing incapacity as the result of drugs). The Model Penal Code's rape statute contains
only a provision criminalizing the administration of an intoxicant followed by sexual
assault. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(b) (1980) ("A male who has sexual intercourse
with a female not his wife is guilty of rape if...he has substantially impaired her power to
appraise or control her conduct by administering or employing without her knowledge
drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance;"). In rejecting a
rule outlawing sexual intercourse with an intoxicated person absent defendant
administration of the intoxicant, the commentators wrote:
such an approach would be unsatisfactory. For one thing, it fails to take
into account the social context of romance and seduction. Liquor and
drugs may be potent agents of incapacitation, but they are also common
ingredients of the ritual of courtship. The traditional routine of soft
music and wine or the modem variant of loud music and marijuana
implies some relaxation of inhibition. With continued consumption,
relaxation blurs into intoxication and insensibility. Where this
progression occurs in a course of mutual and voluntary behavior, it
would be unrealistic and unfair to assign to the male total responsibility
for the end result.
Id. § 213.1 cmt. at 315.
29. See Drake v. State, 236 S.E.2d 748, 750-51 (Ga. 1977) ("When the victim is
physically or mentally unable to give consent to the act, as when she is intoxicated,
drugged, or mentally incompetent, the requirement of force is found in constructive force,
that is, in the use of such force as is necessary to effect the penetration made by the
defendant.") (quoting 1 WHARTON, CRimnNAL LAWV & PROCEDURE § 307 (1957)); Demetrios
v. State, 541 S.E.2d 83, 86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing notion of constructive force in
cases of intoxicated and drugged victims); see also People v. Lusk, 216 Cal. Rptr. 544 (Ct.
App. 1985) (equating drugging with force in sodomy statute and generally discussing the
HeinOnline  -- 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 135 2002
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Drugging is considered an indirect or internal application of force as opposed to
the more direct or external methods of physical force.30 Alternatively, the
administration of an intoxicant can be considered a battery, thus providing an apt
parallel to the traditional notion of physical battery encompassed by rape law.3'
Third, Texas law emphasized the fraud involved in many administration scenarios
(e.g., a drug is surreptitiously introduced into the victim's drink) and equated that
species of fraud with force. 32 Fourth, as the commentary to the Model Penal Code
points out, the administration of an intoxicant, like the use of physical force,
verifies victim nonconsent.33 No ambiguity exists about the victim's consent to
intercourse when the defendant has deprived her of the ability to give consent by
administering an intoxicating agent. Finally, administration of an intoxicant by the
defendant appears to be more morally blameworthy because it requires planning or
premeditation while the rape of an intoxicated victim may be an opportunistic
administration of drugs as a form of force); Miller v. Commonwealth, 27 S.E.2d 57 (Va.
1943) ("to meet the legal requisite of force to sustain the charge the Commonwealth relied
chiefly on the accusation that the prosecutrix was drugged or doped by the accused, which
rendered her unconscious and insensible and therefore an easy and irresponsible victim for
the accomplishment of his purpose").
The force question is not entirely academic under marital rape provisions that require
the defendant to have used force. See, e.g., Trigg v. State, 759 So. 2d 448 (Miss. Ct. App.
2000).
30. The concept of constructive force became so popular that it was imported to
other substantive criminal areas requiring force, such as robbery. See, e.g., People v. Dreas,
200 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1984) (robbery case discussing notion of constructive force, criminal
law treatises, and Snyder); People v. Cline, 31 P.2d 1095 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934) (grand theft
case involving administration of phenobarbital); State v. Snyder, 172 P. 364 (Nev. 1918)
(robbery case discussing the notion of constructive force in rape law and reviewing old
cases). LaFave writes: "One may also render one's victim helpless by more subtle means, as
by administering intoxicating liquors or drugs in order to produce a state of unconsciousness
or stupefaction; to act in this way is to use force for purposes of robbery." LAFAvE, supra
note 28, at 872; see also ROLLIN M. PERKiNs & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 348 (3d
ed. 1982) ("Just as battery may be committed by the administration of poison, so the force
used to obtain property from a person against his will may be applied internally. It was
robbery, for example, to take money from a cash register, while the one in charge 'was
helpless nearby, having been rendered unconscious by a drug administered for that
purpose." (footnotes omitted)). Similarly, "[j]ust as coercion may be accomplished by force
or threat, it may also be effected by using drugs or intoxicants to render the victim incapable
of resistance." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 316 (1980).
31. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 cmt. at 187 (1962) (non-therapeutic
administration of a drug falls under the Model Penal Code's assault provision).
32. Texas had a statute that defined rape as intercourse secured by force, threat,
or fraud; the statute defined fraud to include "the administration, without the woman's
knowledge or consent of some substance producing unnatural sexual desire or such stupor
as prevents or weakens resistance." See Montoya v. State, 185 S.W. 6 (Tex. Crim. App.
1916); Ford v. State, 53 S.W. 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1899); Milton v. State, 4 S.W. 574
(Tex. Ct. App. 1887); Milton v. State, 6 S.W. 39 (Tex. Ct. App. 1887) (all construing this
provision of Texas's former statute); see also B.K. Carpenter, Annotation, Rape by Fraud
or Impersonation, 91 A.L.R.2d 591, 603-04 (1963) (discussing these cases).
33. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 315-18 (1962).
136 [Vol. 44:1
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crime committed without foresight.34 Thus, based on these alternate rationales,
sexual assault accomplished by the defendant's administration of drugs seems
easier to fit into a rape law paradigm that emphasizes force rather than the sexual
exploitation of an already intoxicated victim.
Rape law, however, has not excluded from protection those who have
voluntarily ingested alcohol or drugs and then have been sexually attacked. While
some courts have drawn parallels between the use of physical force and the
administration of intoxicants, other courts have made analogies between
intoxicated victims and two other traditional categories of victims deserving of
special protection: (1) mentally ill or mentally disabled and (2) sleeping,
unconscious, or physically helpless persons.35 In these cases, rape law essentially
dispenses with the force requirement by finding that the force necessary for sexual
penetration is sufficient.3 6 Within the pantheon of rape offenses, categories
requiring little or no force have always existed alongside forcible rape.37 Thus,
although the administration + incapacity + sexual assault crime and the incapacity
+ sexual assault crime are quite similar, they might be understood as deriving from
different historical or common law traditions.
34. Typical provisions that divide murder into degrees include the use of poison,
for example, as a category of first-degree murder because it shows planning and
premeditation. See LAFAVE, supra note 28, at 696-97.
35. As the Model Penal Code commentary suggests: "In addition to compelled or
coerced sexual intercourse, the law of rape, as has been pointed out above, traditionally
included several forms of intercourse by a male with an incapacitated female." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 315 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
Other courts have used the doctrine of constructive force in cases involving voluntary
ingestion 'by the victim. See, e.g., State v. Lung, 28 P. 235, 236 (Nev. 1891) ("This
constructive force has been held to exist where the defendant had violated the woman's
person after she became insensible from intoxicating liquors given her by him for the
purpose of exciting her,...where [she] was so drunk as to be insensible, although the liquor
was not given her by him, where she was in such deep slumber as to be unconscious of the
act, and where her powers of resistance had been overcome by the administration of ether or
chloroform." (citations omitted)).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Natkie, ACM 31693, 1996 CCA LEXIS 286, at
*11 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 1996) ("When a victim is incapable of consenting
because she is asleep, unconscious, or intoxicated to the extent that she lacks the mental
capacity to consent, then, no greater force is required than that necessary to achieve
penetration."). However, the Model Penal Code commentary argues that when victims are
either unconscious or mentally ill, the defendant is put on notice that the victim is not
capable of consent. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 319-21 (1980). It is more
difficult to determine whether a drunken or drugged victim has reached a similar point of
incapacity to consent. See id. at 318.
37. As one commentator has noted: "Where can be no question that rape, as a
legal category, has long included many forms of nonviolent misconduct." Ernst Wilfred
Puttkammer, Consent in Rape, 19 U. ILL. L. REV. 410, 420 (1925). Similarly, the Model
Penal Code commentary notes: "Thus, rape has traditionally included not only intercourse
by force or threat, but also sexual imposition on an unconscious or otherwise incapacitated
female, intimacy achieved by certain fundamental kinds of deception, and intercourse with a
mentally incompetent or underage female." MODELPENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 301 (1980).
20021 137
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The foregoing discussion is not merely an academic one. Today, almost
every American jurisdiction has either a rape (or more commonly sexual assault)
statute or case precedent that punishes one or both of these offenses. The theories
that first animated rape law with respect to the administration to and sexual
exploitation of intoxicated victims continue to exert influence on modem statutory
formulations. Approximately one-half of American jurisdictions classify drugged
or intoxicated victims with mentally ill or physically helpless persons, implicitly
adopting the rationale of the older cases making similar comparisons. On the other
hand, a considerable number of jurisdictions punish only instances in which the
defendant administers the intoxicant, leaving unprotected victims who have
voluntarily ingested intoxicants unless they fall within alternative categories such
as unconsciousness. The historical and theoretical underpinnings for punishing
criminal actors who administer intoxicants to accomplish rape are also important
in considering provisions that separately punish drugging in the context of
committing a sexual offense or another crime, as an assault or battery, or as
poisoning. If the administration of an intoxicant is already subsumed in the sexual
offense, how can that behavior also be separately punished as another crime?
Part II discusses the extant cases with several goals in mind. Before
considering the statutory schemes devised to combat and punish certain forms of
sexual assault, an examination of the kinds of situations that occur in the real
world is useful. What types of factual patterns lead to prosecution of rape by drugs
or other intoxicants? Part II discloses a relatively broad range of behavior
involving nonconsensual sexual activity between criminal actors and drunken or
drugged victims. The latest phenomenon of rape drugs and the attendant increase
in the occurrence of sexual assault of drugged victims are only one part of this
broader behavioral spectrum. The cases are also useful in understanding the
shortcomings of legal analysis and statutory coverage in these contexts. Finally,
the cases put a human face to the abstractions of legal theory; real women and men
have been sexually assaulted while intoxicated.
Part III provides an overview of American statutory law criminalizing
both types of rape by drugs-situations in which the defendant administers the
intoxicant and situations in which the defendant sexually exploits an incapacitated
victim. The jurisdictions are about equally divided between two general
approaches. Some states include intoxication in their definitions of mental
incapacitation and then outlaw sexual contact with mentally incapacitated persons
as well as mentally ill or physically helpless victims. Other states list sexual
activity with a victim who is intoxicated either by her own hand or through the
agency of the defendant as an enumerated type of sexual assault without separately
defining mental incapacitation. Some states have gone much further. They have
enacted special statutes to combat the latest rage of so-called date-rape drugs
(although why drugging someone constitutes a "date" is beyond explanation). 38
38. According to one news report, "[t]he DEA has also counted 32 GHB-related
deaths since 1995 and 22 sexual assaults since 1996 with GHB as a sedative. That's why
GHB and its main ingredient, GBL, are known as 'date-rape drugs,' but a better term would
simply be 'rape drugs."' Angie Cannon, Sex, Drugs, and Sudden Death: GHB Can Get You
138 [Vol. 44:1
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Part III also considers the criminalization of administering drugs to another,
usually as assault or battery, under statutes that prohibit the use of drugs to commit
a sexual offense or another crime, non-therapeutic drugging, or poisoning. Some of
these provisions date to the late 1800s and are written in terms of drugs such as
chloroform and laudanum, while more modem versions tend to focus on the new
breed of drugs. Finally, Part I considers legal prohibitions on the possession and
distribution of common rape drugs (e.g., gamma hydroxy butyrate (GHB),
flunitrazepam (Rohypnol), and ketamine).39
Part IV offers some suggestions for statutory reform. First, sexual assault
provisions dealing -with drugs or other intoxicants should be explicit. Instead of
relying on case precedent, as three jurisdictions do, or describing various forms of
mental or physical incapacitation of the victim without mentioning drugs, as six
jurisdictions do, states should craft their statutes explicitly to include drugged or
drunken victims. Second, because two-thirds of the jurisdictions explicitly provide
for criminal liability only when the defendant administers the drug as a prelude to
sexual assault, the statutes should be amended to also protect persons who
voluntarily ingest or consume intoxicants and then are sexually assaulted. In this
section, the article also addresses the difficulties of describing the degree of
incapacity that is necessary before a victim is incapable of giving consent to the
sexual conduct. Current formulations are written in terms of the victim's failure to
resist or an inability to appraise or control her conduct. Both approaches are
outdated and inadequate because they deflect attention away from what should be
the central inquiry in any sexual offense-whether the victim has the capacity to
consent and whether she did in fact consent. States should also continue to punish
those who administer intoxicants before a sexual assault either as a higher grade of
sexual offense or in a separate drugging statute in addition to the underlying sexual
crime. Drugging itself represents a significant harm to overall bodily integrity not
encompassed by sexual assault provisions. Finally, courts should take two types of
additional behavior into account when sentencing the defendant: videotaping the
sexual assault and the abuse of a professional relationship in gaining access to the
victim.
High, Turn You into a Rapist's Victim, or Kill You, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 24,
1999, at 73.
39. See Melissa Abramovitz, The Knockout Punch of Date Rape Drugs,
CURRENT HEALTH, Mar. 1, 2001; Nora Fitzgerald & K. Jack Riley, Drug-Facilitated Rape:
Lookingfor the Missing Pieces, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Apr. 2000, at 9; Cheryl Wetzstein,
Club Drugs K.O. the Young, INSIGHT ON NEvs, Jan. 10, 2000; Holly J. Wolcott, Ventura
County News Crime Watch: Cases Involving Date-Rape Drugs Hard to Prove, L.A. TIMEs,
July 31, 2000, at BI; An Overview of Club Drugs, Drug Intelligence Brief, Drug
Enforcement Administration, Feb. 2000, available at
http:/www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel.htm; Gamma Hydroxy Butyrate Use in New York and
Texas, 1995-1996,46 MoRIITrrY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. (1997); U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse & Sexual Assault: When Drugs Are Used for
Rape, D.C. Crisis Center, available at http://www.dcrcc.org/drugs.html.
2002] 139
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II. THE CASES
The facts are difficult to write about. They portray man's ability to
inflict cruelty and degradation upon a fellow human being. As
horrible as these facts are to write, they must have been
unimaginable to live through....4o
This Part reviews almost one hundred appellate cases and news
accounts, 4' involving nonconsensual sexual conduct with intoxicated persons. The
permutations of sexual assault of drunken or drugged victims are almost limitless.
For illustrative purposes, I organize the cases into five broad categories, and
provide one or two paradigmatic examples of each. The categories are: (1) alcohol-
related offenses; (2) drug-induced conduct: (3) professionals as perpetrators; (4)
rape-drug incidents (a special subcategory of the drug-induced conduct cases); and
(5) cases in which the victim died. Not only are these cases helpful in
understanding the variety of behaviors subsumed under rape by drugs, but they
illuminate problems with existing statutes and instances of innovative
prosecutorial theories-for example, charging drugging crimes in addition to the
sexual offenses.
The following case review dispels some possible misconceptions about
the crimes of rape by drugs. Sexual assault under these circumstances is not
confined to nightclubs or fraternity houses on college campuses; nor are these
assaults limited to the young, the poor, or the uneducated. Sexual assault by
intoxicants is a crime that cuts across social, economic, and educational lines. The
perpetrators are doctors, lawyers, dentists, businessmen, and relatives as well as
soldiers, college students, and gang members. Victims encountered their attackers
at the doctor's office, in the emergency room, during therapy, at relatives'
weddings, and in their own homes. All the offenders were male with one
exception;42 most victims were female. Many of the offenders were serial rapists,
employing their modus operandi on multiple victims, and often going without
detection because of the amnesiac quality of the drugs they employed. Some of
these sexual offenses involved violence, not only in the sense of the forcible
administration of a drug against the victim's will, but in the degree of injury
inflicted upon the victim43 and/or in the number of perpetrators who performed
40. Coley v. State, 616 So. 2d 1017, 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Gersten, J.,
dissenting). Perhaps in recognition of the nature of the facts involved, the court's opinion in
People v. Bohannon, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 488 (Ct. App. 2000), for example, omits the factual
summary of the case from publication.
41. Obviously, this set of opinions is not necessarily a representative sample
because appellate cases represent only a partial sample of cases involving drunken or
drugged victims-those that raise issues worthy of consideration by an appellate court.
42. See Coley, 616 So. 2d at 1018.
43. See, e.g., Horowitz v. State, No. 01-93-01022-CR, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS
1080 (Tex. App. Mar. 7, 1996). In that case, the defendant attorney gave a going-away party
for a court bailiff. The victim, a probation officer, became extremely intoxicated and was
sexually assaulted by the defendant. See id. at *3. When the complainant was getting ready
for work the next morning, she realized that she had been severely injured the night before
and went to the hospital. "A hospital examination later that morning revealed severe trauma
140 [Vol. 44:1
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sexual acts on her. Finally, these cases reveal that rape by intoxicants is not a
recent phenomenon. The advent of rape drugs may make the offense more
common or more dangerous, but criminals have plied their victims with alcohol
and other drugs as long as cases have been recorded.
The common denominator in these crimes is a victim who was severely
incapacitated at the time of the sexual assault. Most were either completely
unconscious or regained consciousness sporadically during the rape, while some
victims were substantially impaired without being unconscious. A number had
amnesia about their assaults, especially those to whom the defendants had
administered the new breed of rape drugs. Some victims discovered they had been
assaulted when they awoke with injuries or found blood, semen, or fecal matter on
their bodies. 4 Some, especially in the professional cases, reported that they were
conscious, but paralyzed-unable to move their limbs or to speak. As the expert in
one case involving a rape drug explained, "a person will suffer 'depersonalization,'
a condition where a person is unable to do or say what they want.' '45 Thus, the
perpetrators in these cases render their victims inanimate objects-objects for their
own pleasure-in a way that is the antithesis of humanity and only one step
removed from necrophilia.
46
to the complainant's vagina, cervix, anus, and rectum." Id. at *4. In fact, the state argued
that the severity of her injuries made it extremely unlikely that she would have consented to
the sexual acts causing such injury. See id. at *4-*5.
44. See Gail Abarbanel, Learning from Victims, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Apr. 2000,
at I 1 ("When they regained consciousness, some victims were unsure if they had been
sexually assaulted. Others found signs that they had been: They were undressed; they had
semen stains on their bodies and/or clothing; they had vaginal or anal trauma, such as
soreness and/or lacerations. All of these victims reported significant memory impairment.
Most could not recall what was done to them, who participated, or how many people were
present while they were unconscious. Some could remember brief, intermittent periods of
awakening, during which they were aware of their surroundings but were unable to move or
speak. They felt 'paralyzed."').
45. Yates v. State, No. CACR 98-620, 1999 Ark. App. 500, at *5 (Ark. Ct. App.
June 30, 1999).
46. Martha Nussbaum has identified seven notions of treating another as an
object:
1. Instrumentality. The objectifier treats the object as a tool of his or
her purposes
2. Denial of autonomy. The objectifier treats the object as lacking in
autonomy and self-determination
3. Inertness. The objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency,
and perhaps also in activity
4. Fungibility. The objectifier treats the object as interchangeable
(a) with other objects of the same type and/or (b) with objects of other
types
5. Violability. The objectifier treats the object as lacking in
boundary integrity, as something that it is permissible to break up,
smash, break into
HeinOnline  -- 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 141 2002
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
A. Alcohol-Related Sexual Offenses
What your actions reflect is that you view women as
something other than human beings, and that you can have your way
with a person to satisfy your own needs, and in doing that, to
dehumanize some other human.
It's particularly egregious in this case because of the
intoxication issue, but despite of intoxication, both on your own
behalf and that of the victim, and the fact that she was[,] or during
part of the time [was] passed out, she did say no repeatedly, and you
let your physiological drives overcome your human nature, and in
the process dehumanized another individual.47
Given the ready availability of alcohol-the most common drug in our
society-it is hardly surprising that a substantial number of cases, dating back to
the nineteenth century,48 involve men sexually assaulting intoxicated persons. This
category contains cases involving both the victim's voluntary ingestion and
defendant's administration of alcohol as a prelude to the sexual assault. Many of
the crimes concerning voluntary ingestion were opportunistic; the defendant
exploited the victim's already drunken or unconscious state for the purposes of
engaging in various forms of sexual contact with her or him. The opportunistic
nature of these alcohol-related offenses is underscored by the fact that many of the
perpetrators were related to or knew the victims and, therefore, had easy access to
them. For instance, assailants have been the victim's half-brother,49 former
stepfather,50 cousins' stepfather,51 friend's father,52 brother's friend,53 boyfriend, 4
6. Ownership. The objectifier treats the object as something that is
owned by another, can be bought or sold, etc.
7. Denial of subjectivity. The objectifier treats the object as
something whose experience and feelings (if any) need not be taken into
account
MARTHA C. NuSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 218 (1999). All these categories apply to
cases in which defendants sexually assault intoxicated persons.
47. United States v. Morgan, 164 F.3d 1235, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting
comments of district judge at sentencing).
48. See, e.g., Regina v. Camplin, 1 Den. C.C. 89, 94 (1845).
49. See State v. Contreras-Cruz, 765 A.2d 849 (R.I. 2001).
50. See State v. Johnson, C.A. No. 91CA004991, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 6243
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1991).
51. See State v. Martin, No. CA99-09-026, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3649 (Ohio
Ct. App. Aug. 14,2000).
52. See People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315 (Ct. App. 2000).
53. See State v. Rogers, 772 So. 2d 960 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
54. See People v. Cortez, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 500 (Ct. App. 1994) (multiple
perpetrators, only one of whom was victim's "boyfriend"); State v. Wells, 367 S.W.2d 652
(Mo. 1963) (prosecuted as statutory rape although defendant plied victim with alcohol);
State v. Duffy, No. CA95-03-006, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1305 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 1,
1996).
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date,55 close friend, 56 neighbor,57 co-worker, 58 military co-worker,59 babysitter's
friend,60 fellow churchgoer 6' or partygoer.62 A few cases involved apparently
casual social acquaintances; 63 others provide insufficient facts to ascertain if any
relationship existed between the perpetrator and the complainant. 4 Finally, an
alarming number of these cases, approximately one-half, involved teenaged
victims who were perhaps naYve about the effects of alcohol.65
55. See United States v. Morgan, 164 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Neither
the statutes proscribing the behavior that occurred in this case nor the applicable sentencing
guidelines deem sexual assault less serious just because the perpetrator and victim began the
evening on a 'date."'); United States v. Willis, 41 M.J. 435 (C.A.A.F. 1995); Quinn v. State,
142 N.W. 510 (Wis. 1913).
56. See United States v. Grier, 53 M.J. 30 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (friend and wife of
co-worker); United States v. Salib, No. NMCM 99 01605, 2000 WL 527738 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2000); State v. Farnum, 554 N.W.2d 716 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
57. See Vallejo v. State, No. 05-99-00173-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 859 (Tex.
App. Feb. 7, 2000).
58. See Horowitz v. State, No. 01-93-01022-CR, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 1080
(Tex. App. Mar. 7, 1996).
59. See United States v. Southworth, 50 M.J. 74 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (other victim
was the thirteen-year-old daughter of petty officer); United States v. Natkie, ACM 31693,
1996 CCA LEXIS 286 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 1996); United States v. Buckley, 35
M.J. 262 (C.M.A. 1992) (other victim was a fourteen-year-old civilian); United States v.
Carver, 12 M.J. 581 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981).
60. See State v. Chaney, 5 P.3d 492 (Kan. 2000).
61. See Melton v. State, 23 S.W.2d 662 (Tenn. 1930).
62. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1993); State v. Bryan,
713 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); State v. Galati, 365 N.W.2d 575 (S.D. 1985);
Horowitz v. State, No. 01-93-01022-CR, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 1080 (Tex. App. Mar. 7,
1996); Howard v. Commonwealth, 465 S.E.2d 142 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
63. See People v. O'Brien, 62 P. 297 (Cal. 1900); State v. Porter, 639 So. 2d
1137 (La. 1994); State v. Gafford, 709 So. 2d 1076 (La. Ct. App. 1998); Commonwealth v.
Tatro, 676 N.E.2d 843 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); Hirdes v. Ottawa Circuit Judge, 146 N.W.
646 (Mich. 1914); Commonwealth v. Emey, 698 A.2d 56 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v.
Walker, 362 A.2d 227 (Pa. 1976); Elliott v. State, 858 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993);
State v. Weaver, 382 S.E.2d 327 (W. Va. 1989).
64. See State v. Weiss, 528 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1995); Commonwealth v.
D'Ambrosio, 61 N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1945); Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376 (1870);
Commonwealth v. Odell, 607 N.E.2d 423 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); People v. Cirina, 533
N.Y.S.2d 305 (App. Div. 1988); State v. Aiken, 326 S.E.2d 919 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985);
Stadler v. State, 919 P.2d 439 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996); Regina v. Camplin, 1 Den. C.C. 89
(1845).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Southworth, 50 M.J. 74 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (other
victim was thirteen-year-old); United States v. Natkie, ACM 31693, 1996 CCA LEXIS 286
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 1996) (seventeen-year-old); United States v. Willis, 41 M.J.
435 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (seventeen-year-old); United States v. Buckley, 35 M.J. 262 (C.M.A.
1992) (other victim was a fourteen-year-old civilian); People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d
315 (Ct. App. 2000) (sixteen-year-old); People v. Cortez, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 500 (Ct. App.
1994) (fifteen-year-old); State v. Chancy, 5 P.3d 492 (Kan. 2000) (fourteen-year-old);
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1993) (fifteen-year-old); State v. Gafford,
709 So. 2d 1076 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (thirteen-year-old); Commonwealth v. Tatro, 676
N.E.2d 843 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (fourteen-year-old); Commonwealth v. Odell, 607
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A recent case, State v. Rogers,66 illustrates this genre of offense. In
Rogers, a twenty-one-year-old woman attended her brother's wedding as the maid
of honor. She got drunk by her own efforts and then became ill; her mother and the
bride helped her to bed. 67 When the young woman's mother returned to check on
her, the mother found Rogers (the brother-groom's friend) on top of her
unconscious daughter engaged in sexual intercourse with her.68 Rogers was
convicted of simple rape. 69 Louisiana bifurcates its statutory approach to sexual
conduct accomplished with an intoxicated or drugged person.70 If the defendant
administers the intoxicant and sexually assaults the victim, then he is guilty of
forcible rape. If, however, he engages in sexual intercourse with a drunken victim
without administering the intoxicant, then his crime is simple rape.71 Rogers
unsuccessfully challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.
Rogers highlights one issue in counection with statutes governing the
sexual assault of intoxicated persons, i.e., whether those provisions cover victims
who have intoxicated themselves or only situations in which the defendant
administers the substance. Compare Rogers with a factually similar case, State v.
Galati.72 In Galati, the twenty-five-year-old defendant and sixteen-year-old victim
attended a senior class party. After voluntarily consuming alcohol, the young
woman passed out and was taken to a bedroom; some time later, defendant was
discovered attempting to have sexual intercourse with the unconscious teenager.
73
On appeal, the South Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the case because the state's
rape statute required that the defendant administer the intoxicant and here he had
not. The court saw no reason that the administration requirement should prevent
prosecution of those who sexually assault drunken victims, but it felt bound by the
statutory language.74 Later the same year, South Dakota's legislature amended the
N.E.2d 423 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (teenager); State v. Martin, No. CA99-09-026, 2000
Ohio App. LEXIS 3649 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2000) (fifteen-year-old); State v. Bryan,
713 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (nineteen-year-old); Commonwealth v. Emey, 698
A.2d 56 (Pa. 1997) (fifteen-year-old); Commonwealth v. Walker, 362 A.2d 227 (Pa. 1976)
(fourteen-year-old); State v. Galati, 365 N.W.2d 575 (S.D. 1985) (sixteen-year-old); Melton
v. State, 23 S.W.2d 662 (Tenn. 1930) (sixteen-year-old); Howard v. Commonwealth, 465
S.E.2d 142 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (fifteen-year-old); see also Wendy L. Scott, CSUEmployee
Indicted on Sex, Alcohol Charges, MORNING J., July 31, 2001 (victim was nineteen-year-old
student).
66. 772 So. 2d 960 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
67. See id. at 962.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 963.
70. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 278 (1980) (discussing Louisiana as
first state to divide rape into forcible and simple rape).
71. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:42.1(2) (forcible rape), :43(1) (simple rape)
(West 2000).
72. 365 N.W.2d 575 (S.D. 1985).
73. See id. at 576.
74. See id. at 578 ("We regretfully hold that South Dakota's statutory definition
of rape does not protect persons incapable of consenting to an act of sexual penetration
because of an intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic agent, or because of hypnosis, unless the
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rape statute to include the circumstance "[fif the victim is incapable of giving
consent because of any intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic agent or hypnosis,"
' 5
thus eliminating the administration requirement.
Although most alcohol-related cases concerned the rape of victims who
were voluntarily intoxicated, some involved defendant administration of alcohol to
the victim,76 one of the most egregious examples of which was a case in which the
victim was held down and had beer poured down her throat.77 In People v.
Cortez,78 the defendant and Lorena, his fifteen-year-old girlfriend, went to a
friend's house. While there Lorena consumed alcohol and engaged in consensual
sex with the defendant. Some dispute existed concerning the circumstances of the
drinking; Lorena denied being forced to drink but a witness reported that the
defendant and his cohorts forced or encouraged her to do so. After Lorena passed
out, defendant and two others sexually assaulted her, and she awoke to discover
her body covered with black markings (possibly gang graffiti). Cortez was
convicted of three counts of rape accomplished by administering an intoxicating
substance (one as the principal and two as an accomplice). At the time,
California's statute required that the intoxicant be "administered by or with the
privity of the accused.' 79 Instead of using the statutory language, however, the trial
court instructed the jury that the substance had to be administered by or with the
actual knowledge of the perpetrator.80 The appellate court reversed defendant's
conviction based on error in this jury instruction, concluding that the statute
required more than knowledge.8" In 1994, California amended its rape statute by
eliminating the administration language (including the privity provision). The
statute now simply requires that the victim be intoxicated and the condition be
known or reasonably should be known to the offender.8 2 Other jurisdictions have
struggled with the same issue in both alcohol and drug cases.8 3 The alcohol-related
agent or hypnosis was administered by or with the privity of the accused. We leave it to the
legislature to correct this hiatus." (footnote omitted)).
75. S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 22-22-1(4) (Michie 2001).
76. See, e.g., People v. O'Brien, 62 P. 297, 298 (Cal. 1900) (defendant invited
victim to drink whiskey); Commonwealth v. Tatro, 676 N.E.2d 843, 844 (Mass. App. Ct.
1997) (defendant plied victim with beer and mixed drinks); Commonwealth v. Odell, 607
N.E.2d 423, 424 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (defendant plied victims with alcohol and drugs);
Hirdes v. Ottawa Circuit Judge, 146 N.W. 646, 647 (Mich. 1914) (defendant caused victim
to become intoxicated).
77. See United States v. Southworth, 50 M.J. 74, 75 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
78. 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 500 (Ct. App. 1994).
79. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3) (amended 1994).
80. See Cortez, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508.
81. See id. at 514.
82. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3) (West 2001) ("Where a person is
prevented from resisting by any intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any controlled
substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably should have been known by the
accused.").
83. See People v. Cortez, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 500 (Ct. App. 1994) (discussing
administration language in California's rape statute before it was replaced); State v. Weiss,
528 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1995) (interpreting "unconscious" in sexual abuse statute to include
intoxication); State v. Chaney, 5 P.3d 492 (Kan. 2000) (discussing statutory change from
20021
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cases are important because of the ready accessibility of alcohol in our society and
alcohol's concomitant handiness in facilitating the commission of sexual offenses.
B. Drug-Induced Sexual Assaults
"How can people be so horrible?"
84
A number of appellate opinions involved defendants' use of legal and
illegal drugs to subdue and sexually assault others or situations in which persons
voluntarily ingested drugs and were subsequently assaulted.8 5 These cases differ
from those in Section D below because the perpetrators did not use rape drugs.
Instead, the defendants in these cases used drugs at hand, including:
8 6 codeine,8 7
cocaine, 88 glue, 89 Benadryl and Ambien,90 Percodan,
91 Valium, 92 Halcion, 93
1969 statute requiring administration to 1993 statute requiring victim incapable of consent);
State v. Aiken, 326 S.E.2d 919, 925-26 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (noting North Carolina's
statute does not require the defendant to make the victim mentally incapacitated or
physically helpless); State v. Duffy, No. CA95-03-006, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1305 (Ohio
Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1996) (interpreting "mental or physical condition" in Ohio's former
felonious penetration statute to include unconsciousness by voluntary intoxication because
rape statute uses administering language); Commonwealth v. Emey, 698 A.2d 56 (Pa. 1997)
(discussing definition of "unconscious" for purposes of Pennsylvania's rape statute, which
also had an explicit drug provision dealing with the administration of drugs or intoxicants).
Melton v. State, 23 S.W.2d 662 (Tenn. 1930), is a great example of a case in which the trial
and reviewing courts interpreted the administration requirement so broadly that it was
virtually eliminated. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
84. People v. Rose, 253 N.E.2d 456, 459 (II1. 1969).
85. See United States v. Altman, 901 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1990); Rapetti v. James,
784 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Ibarra, 53 M.J. 616 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
2000); People v. Bohannon, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 488 (Ct. App. 2000); People v. Avila, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 651 (Ct. App. 2000); People v. Lusk, 216 Cal. Rptr. 544 (Ct. App. 1985); People v.
Crosby, 120 P. 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 1911); Coley v. State, 616 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993); People v. Rose, 253 N.E.2d 456 (IIl. 1969); Commonwealth v. Lowe, 76 S.W.
119 (Ky. Ct. App. 1903); Trigg v. State, 759 So. 2d 448 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Morris, No. 18321, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 971 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2001); State v.
Morris, No. 17287, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4003 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1999); State v.
Dillon, No. 79AP-785, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 10876 (Ohio Ct. App. June 24, 1980); State
v. Quick, 619 P.2d 1347 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Karlen, 589 N.W.2d 594 (S.D. 1999);
State v. McCracken, No. 44126-4-4, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 491 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 27,
2000); State v. Lough, 853 P.2d 920 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), affd, 889 P.2d 487 (Wash.
1995); see also Willis v. State, 473 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (assault with intent
to rape); James Walsh, Authorities Hope 9-year Sentence Sends Message on Date-Rape
Drug, A Detroit Lakes Man Was the First to Be Prosecuted Under a Federal Law Against
UsingDrugs in Rape, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Feb. 25, 2000, at 01B.
86. Some cases do not disclose the type of drug used. See, e.g., Rapetti v. James,
784 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1986) (possibly quaaludes); People v. Bohannon, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 488
(Ct. App. 2000); People v. Crosby, 120 P. 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 1911); People v. Rose, 253
N.E.2d 456 (Ill. 1969); Commonwealth v. Lowe, 76 S.W. 119 (Ky. Ct. App. 1903); State v.
Quick, 619 P.2d 1347 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
87. See State v. Karlen, 589 N.W.2d 594 (S.D. 1999).
88. See Coley v. State, 616 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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amphetamines,94 barbiturates,95 and anti-depressants.9 6 Two old cases involved
cantharides, which were thought at one time to excite sexual desire. 7
In one case concerning an illegal drug, although not a rape drug, and the
only case involving a female perpetrator discovered in this research, Coley v. State,
the defendant was convicted of sexual battery and conspiracy to commit sexual
battery.98 The victim, a fifteen-year-old runaway, fell in with a group of older
persons and consumed alcohol and cocaine with them.99 On the day in question,
the victim voluntarily snorted cocaine, and was tied to a bed with her consent,
where Coley engaged in two counts of oral sexual contact with her.1 0 0 Florida's
statute did not explicitly provide criminal liability for those who sexually assaulted
victims who had voluntarily ingested alcohol or drugs.' 0' Therefore, the
prosecution proceeded on a theory that the victim had been physically helpless, a
separate provision in Florida's sexual battery statute.1
0 2
The appellate court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence on the issue
of physical helplessness, which Florida's statute defined as a person who is asleep,
unconscious, or physically unable to communicate an unwillingness to an act.'0 3
The court concluded that the victim was physically able to communicate-in fact,
she expressed unwillingness to engage in some of the acts performed upon her-
and dismissed the convictions of Coley and one of her alleged co-conspirators. As
is often the case, a sharp difference of opinion existed between the majority and
dissenting opinions regarding the factual context in which the crime occurred. The
majority emphasized the initial willingness of the young woman to engage in
89. See State v. Morris, No. 18321, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 971 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 9, 2001); State v. Morris, No. 17287, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4003 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 27, 1999).
90. See People v. Avila, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 651, 652 (Ct. App. 2000); Walsh, supra
note 85, at 01B.
91. See People v. Mack, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 195 (Ct. App. 1992).
92. See State v. Dillon, No. 79AP-785, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 10876, at *1
(Ohio Ct. App. June 24, 1980); see also People v. Lusk, 216 Cal. Rptr. 544 (Ct. App. 1985)
(possibly Valium, cocaine, codeine, or soma).
93. See State v. Lough, 853 P.2d 920 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), affd, 889 P.2d 487
(Wash. 1995).
94. See United States v. Altman, 901 F.2d 1161, 1162 (2d Cir. 1990).
95. See Willis v. State, 473 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); State v.
McCracken, No. 44126-4-I, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 491, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 27,
2000).
96. See Trigg v. State, 759 So. 2d 448 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
97. See Bechtelheimer v. State, 54 Ind. 128, 130 (1876); State v. Lung, 28 P. 235
(Nev. 1891).
98. See Coley v. State, 616 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
99. See id. at 1020.
100. See id.
101. See also State v. Morris, No. 17287, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4003 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 27, 1999) (defendant's rape and attempted rape convictions for sexually
assaulting his twin daughters thrown out because he had not administered the glue).
102. See Coley, 616 So. 2d at 1020.
103. SeeFIA. STAT. ch. 794.011(1)(e), (4)(a) (2001).
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various sexual acts) °4 The dissent stressed the facts that the victim was given
additional drugs during the sexual episode (a plate of cocaine was placed under her
face), passed out several times, and expressed her unwillingness to continue. 0 5
The dissenting judge wrote:
The majority opinions hold that the victim consented to waking up
in a bed covered with blood and fecal stained sheets; stripped of
dignity, upset, afraid and abandoned. I cannot agree. While these
facts are much more complex, this case comes down to one simple
point: in my view, a consent to kiss, is not a consent to rape. I
therefore respectfully dissent and would affirm the convictions that
each majority reverses. 0 6
Coley illustrates not only the issues that arise when statutes criminalize rape by
administering drugs and not rape following self-ingestion of drugs, but also the
problems associated with trying to fit drug-induced sexual conduct into categories
such as physical helplessness, rather than dealing more straightforwardly with the
problem of reduced capacity to consent based on intoxication.
State v. Morris0 7 raises similar issues. In that case, the defendant's
fourteen-year-old twin daughters came to live with him. Defendant allowed the
young women to smoke pot and drink at his home. He also taught them to huff
glue, which he acquired from his remodeling business. 08 When the daughters were
high from the glue, defendant raped one of them and attempted to rape the other. 0 9
The state charged Morris with rape, attempted rape, and corrupting another with
drugs (based on the marijuana, not the glue)." 0 Morris was convicted but
successfully appealed, arguing that the state had failed to prove that he had
administered the drug "by force, threat, or deception," a requirement of Ohio's
rape statute."' The state filed new charges against Morris for sexual battery and
attempted sexual battery, provisions that punish an offender who is a parent of the
victim." 2 He unsuccessfully challenged the new charges on double jeopardy
grounds.13 The number and variety of sexual assault cases involving drugs
emphasize the need to combat multiple forms of drug-induced conduct, not only
the situations when that conduct occurs as the result of the new rape drugs.
104. See Coley, 616 So. 2d at 1021.
105. See id. at 1033-35.
106. See id. at 1036.
107. No. 17287, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4003 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1999).
108. See id. at *2.
109. See id. at *3.
110. Seeid. at*1.
11I. OIO Rv. CODEANN. § 2907.02(A)(1) (Anderson 2001).
112. See id. § 2907.03(A)(5) ("No person shall engage in sexual conduct with
another, not the spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply:...(5) The offender
is the other person's natural or adoptive parent, or stepparent, or guardian, custodian, or
person in loco parentis of the other person.").
113. See State v. Morris, No. 18321, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 971 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 9, 2001).
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C. Professionals as Perpetrators
Another paradigmatic type of rape or sexual assault by intoxicants
involves professionals, a category of offenders who has ready access to drugs.
Sadly, but perhaps not surprisingly, doctors,'
14 dentists,115 psychotherapists, 1 6
114. See Dubria v. Smith, 197 F.3d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1999), affd, 224 F.3d 995
(9th Cir. 2000); Snyder v. Major, 789 F. Supp. 646, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (civil action
involving same doctor); Frank v. People, 770 P.2d 1119, 1120 (Cal. 1989); People v. Ing,
422 P.2d 590, 592 (Cal. 1967); Ballard v. People, 410 P.2d 838, 840 (Cal. 1966); People v.
Ragen, 262 Cal. App. 2d 392, 396 (Ct. App. 1968); People v. Wojahn, 337 P.2d 192, 194
(Cal. Ct. App. 1959); Middeleton v. Clayton, 470 N.E.2d 1271, 1272 (111. App. Ct. 1984)
(licensure case involving same doctor); People v. Middleton, 350 N.E.2d 223, 225 (Il. App.
Ct. 1976); State v. Porter, 11 N.W. 644, 645 (Iowa 1882); Copithome v. Framingham Union
Hospital, 520 N.E.2d 139, 140 (Mass. 1988) (civil case by one of Helfant's victims);
Commonwealth v. Helfant, 496 N.E.2d 433 (Mass. 1986); People v. Major, 545 N.Y.S.2d
923, 923 (App. Div. 1989); Rhine v. State, 336 P.2d 913 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959); State v.
Still, 202 N.W. 479, 479 (S.D. 1925); Morton Mintz, High Court Asked to Rule on Evidence
in Physician-Rape Case, WASH. POsT, Oct. 30, 1977, at A7; Linnet Myers, 25 Patients of
Suspect in Sex-Abuse Case Fear They're Victims, CI. Tam., Apr. 3, 1986, at C7; see also
People v. Avila, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 651, 652 (2000) (curandero, healer of witch diseases,
sodomized two boys after drugging them); People v. Royal, 53 Cal. 62, 62 (1878) (doctor
practiced some sort of manipulation on victim and then had carnal connection with her);
Shea v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 146 Cal. Rptr. 653, 656 (1978).
115. See, e.g., People v. Dayan, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 392 (Ct. App. 1995);
McIlwain v. State, 402 So. 2d 1194, 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Oshiro, 696
P.2d 846 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1992); People v.
Yankowitz, 564 N.Y.S.2d 488 (App. Div. 1991); People v. Teicher, 425 N.Y.S.2d 315
(App. Div. 1980), affd, 422 N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1981); State v. Baden, Trial No. B-840408,
1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 8538 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1985); State v. Leuin, No. CA 774,
1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 13985 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1983). A number of civil cases
encompass the same type of behavior. See, e.g., Sciola v. Shemow, 577 A.2d 1081 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1990); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Shernow, No. 088197, 1991 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 533 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 1991), aff'd, 610 A.2d 1281 (Conn. 1992);
Lindheimer v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co, No. 92-2254, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 10935
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1993), affd on reh'g, 643 So. 2d 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994); In re McCollough, 431 S.E.2d 816 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v.
Blakeslee, 771 P.2d 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Steven G. v. Herget, 505 N.W.2d 422
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
116. See Demetrios v. State, 541 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (therapist alleged
to have stolen medication from hospital); see also DiLeo v. Nugent, 592 A.2d 1126 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (civil case involving sexual contact between therapist and client under
influence of drugs).
A few cases exist in which therapists used hypnosis to subdue their patients to achieve
sexual contact with them. See, e.g., State v. Remsen, C.C.A. No. 01CO1-9204-CR-00122,
1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 86 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 1993) (victim could only
account for twenty to thirty minutes of three-hour therapy session); Accused of Misconduct,
Doctor Gives up License, ORLANDO SENTINAL TRm., Jan. 11, 1992, at A12; Doctor, 75,
Quits Practice in Hypnosis-sex Investigation, CHI. TRIn., Jan. 10, 1992, at 4; Michael
Durham, Hypnotherapist Hotline Set up in Assault Case, INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Apr. 10,
1993, at 3 ("Officers who raided the man's home found 30 home-made videotapes, some
showing women apparently under hypnosis allegedly being subject to sexual assaults. Some
women appeared to have taken drink or drugs."); Yung Kim, Hypnotist Arrested in Assault,
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male nurses, 117 paramedics," 8 and pharmacists" 9 have used drugs to sedate their
patients, either while rendering professional services or while socializing with
them, for purposes of sexually assaulting them. The cases involving sexual assault
in professional settings merit separate consideration because they involve special
issues, notably the abuse of a professional, trust-based relationship and the fact that
the victim often consented to the administration of drugs. Some sexual offense
provisions require victim nonconsent to the administration of the intoxicant.
120
Another notable characteristic of the cases in this category is that many involved
serial rapists.121
A classic example of this category of crime, one that illustrates both a
doctrinal problem and an evidentiary issue, is Commonwealth v. Helfant,122 which
involved a fifty-one-year-old neurosurgeon convicted of both rape and drugging a
person for unlawful sexual intercourse. The defendant injected a young woman,
his patient, co-worker, and former girlfriend, with Valium after she complained to
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1998, at B2; Larry King, When Sex Therapy Becomes Sexual Abuse,
LARRY KING LivE, May 8, 1991, Transcript # 297; Women Raped by Hypnotist with Black
Box QC Tells Court, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 27, 1988, at 3.
117. See Doe v. Young, 656 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing
Young's guilty pleas to seven incidents of sexually battering female patients under
anesthesia); State v. Raines, 324 S.E.2d 279 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (insufficient evidence of
physical or constructive force in case involving alleged rape of a female patient by a male
nurse); Regina v. Cobb, [2002] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 19 (Crim. App. 2001); Renne Madeleine
Horn, Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1986: V. Criminal Law: State v.
Moorman: Can Sex with a Sleeping Woman Constitute Forcible Rape?, 65 N.C. L. REV.
1246 (1987) (discussing Raines); Male Nurse Accused in Rape of 4 Unconscious Patients,
L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 1994, at A22; Jamal Thalji, Police Lose Sex Crime Specialist to County,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 30, 1997, at 1.
118. See State v. Lough, 853 P.2d 920, 922 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 889
P.2d 487 (Wash. 1995); see also United States v. Ibarra, 53 MJ. 616, 616 (N-M. Ct. Crim.
App. 2000) (defendant was a Navy hospitalman).
119. See People v. Lombardi, 229 N.E.2d 206 (N.Y. 1967); Primmer v. Vrable,
No. 95APE07-936, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1049 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1996) (civil case
discussing pharmacist's guilty plea to rape and corrupting another with drugs charges).
120. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(1)(c) (2001) (narcotic...administered
without his or her consent). But see OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(A)(3) (Anderson
2001) ("The offender knows that the judgment or control of the other person...is
substantially impaired as a result of the influence of any drug or intoxicant administered to
the other person with the other person's consent for the purpose of any kind of medical or
dental examination, treatment, or surgery.").
121. See, e.g., Frank v. People, 770 P.2d 1119 (Cal. 1989); People v. Ing, 422
P.2d 590 (Cal. 1967); People v. Dayan, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391 (Ct. App. 1995); People v.
Ragen, 262 Cal. App. 2d 392 (Ct. App. 1968); People v. Wojahn, 337 P.2d 192 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1959); Demetrios v. State, 541 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Middleton,
350 N.E.2d 223 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); Commonwealth v. Helfant, 496 N.E.2d 433 (Mass.
1986); State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1992); People v. Yankowitz, 564 N.Y.S.2d
488 (App. Div. 1991); People v. Teicher, 425 N.Y.S.2d 315 (App. Div. 1980), aff'd, 422
N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1981); Rhine v. State, 336 P.2d 913 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
122. Commonwealth v. Helfant, 496 N.E.2d 433 (Mass. 1986).
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him of back pain.' a She passed out almost immediately and awoke to discover the
defendant having intercourse with her. The victim lost consciousness again and
when she regained it, the defendant was repeating his sexual assault of her.
24
With respect to rape doctrine, Helfant argued that the sexual assault of his
patient did not fall within the state's rape statute because he used no force, which
is required on the face of the provision.1 25 Massachusetts did not have an explicit
drug provision in its rape statute, although the state had a separate crime for
drugging with the intent of committing a sexual offense. 26 Relying on an 1870
case, the court found that the force required for penetration was sufficient for rape
in cases in which the victim was rendered unconscious.1 27 In terms of evidence
law, one issue on appeal was the admissibility of prior misconduct by the
defendant. Two other women testified that Helfant came to their apartments,
injected them with drugs, and sexually assaulted them. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts ultimately upheld the admission of the testimony with
respect to only the drugging, but not the rape charge, reasoning that the drugging
statute required an intent to overpower for the purpose of having unlawful sexual
intercourse.1 28 Thus, the testimony by the other women helped show a distinctive
pattern of conduct and was relevant to show the defendant's intent.
In Regina v. Cobb,129 an English case, the defendant worked as a male
nurse in the emergency department of a hospital. He injected three patients with
Midazolam, a drug that causes memory loss, and had sexual intercourse with two
of them while they were sedated.130 When officials investigated further, they
learned that one of Cobb's fellow nursing students had died three years earlier
under suspicious circumstances. Apparently, the defendant had given her a fatal
overdose by mixing the same drug with alcohol.13' When the court sentenced Cobb
to life in prison, he appealed arguing his sentence was too long. The court upheld
the sentence, noting:
A particularly serious feature to which the judge drew attention in
passing the life sentence was the fact that having administered the
drug to the nurse and caused her death, three years later, in
123. See id. at 436-37.
124. See id.
125. See MASS. GEN. LAWs cl. 265, § 22 (2001).
126. See id. ch. 272, § 3; see also infra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
127. See Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376, 380-81 (1870) ("[T]he crime,
which the evidence in this case tended to prove, of a man's having carnal intercourse with a
woman, without her consent, while she was, as he knew, wholly insensible so as to be
incapable of consenting, and with such force as was necessary to accomplish the purpose,
was rape.").
128. See Helfant, 496 N.E.2d at 442.
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circumstances which were quite shocking, he used the drug again
three times on three separate women raping two of them.
1 32
In affirming Cobb's lengthy imprisonment, the court also noted the obligation of
the courts to protect other women from this type of sexual exploitation. 33 The
cases involving professional perpetrators who sexually exploited their patients
underscore the importance of crafting provisions that vindicate the multiple harms
to victims, including the abuse of a trust-based professional relationship.
D. Rape Drugs and Videotaping
Rape drugs make it relatively easy for rapists to gain control of their
victims. Perpetrators do not have to overcome any form of
resistance. They do not have to use physical force. They do not have
to threaten to harm the victim to get compliance. Nor do they have
to be concerned about a victim's screams attracting attention. The
drugs they administer immobilize and silence the victim.
134
The three foregoing categories of cases have long and checkered
histories dating from the time when cases were first recorded. Unfortunately,
advances in science and technology have made rape by drugs more common,1
3s
more virulent, and more invasive of victims' privacy interests because offenders
can now videotape their sexual assaults. A number of recent cases involve the new
breed of rape drugs (e.g., GHB, Rohypnol, and ketamine) 136 and/or videotaping or
photographs. 37 In Sera v. State, 138 a case illustrating the greater availability of
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Abarbanel, supra note 44, at 11.
135. Cannon, supra note 38, at 73 (reporting that DEA has documented twenty-
two sexual assaults since 1996 involving GHIB).
136. In Yates v. State, No. CACR 98-620, 1999 Ark. App. LEXIS 500 (Ark. Ct.
App. June 30, 1999), the defendant was convicted of rape and the introduction of a
controlled substance, Rohypnol, into the victim's person. Evidence at trial revealed that the
defendant had also drugged and sexually assaulted or attempted to assault three other
women. The appellate court upheld the admission of three other women's testimony on the
theory that it showed "his intent, plan, motive, and knowledge of and access to Rohypnol or
a similar substance." In Gallardo v. State, No. 03-99-00653-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS
3903 (Tex. App. June 15, 2000), defendant was convicted of sexual assault on an
unconscious woman. Rohypnol was suspected. "One Broward County man who pleaded
guilty to 'roofie rape' in a 1993 case-Mark Anthony Perez-told authorities he had used
the drug to rape as many as 20 women." The Date Rape Drug: The Difficulty of Obtaining
Convictions, PROSECUTOR, March/April 1997, at 28; see also People v. Puff, 724 N.Y.S.2d
247 (2001) (defendant participated in gang rape and sexual abuse of young woman who lost
consciousness after taking Ecstasy provided her by defendant); Ben Schmitt, Brothers
Convicted in Date Rape Drug Case Win Bid for New Trial, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
June 25, 1999, at 1.
137. In People v. Lusk, 216 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1985), the defendant wrestling coach
sexually assaulted two boys after he drugged them and videotaped his assaults. See also
United States v. Altman, 901 F.2d 1161, 1162 (2d Cir. 1990) (defendant gave victims
amphetamines, had intercourse with them, and took sexually explicit photographs); United
152 [Vol. 44:1
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Rohypnol and the use of technology, a Texas businessman drugged three women
in three states (including his college-age sister-in-law) with Rohypnol, had sexual
intercourse with them, and made videotapes of the sexual assaults. He
unsuccessfully attempted to repeat his crime with a fourth viCtim.
139
Sera's use of Rohypnol, with its powerful amnesiac effect,140 meant that
the women had very little memory of the sexual assaults. The Arkansas victim
"testified that she did not recall any of the 100-mile trip home to Warren, and that
the next time she was aware, she was waking up in bed with Sera the next
morning.....'141 The Texas victim reported "that she drank one glass of wine at the
game, and started another glass, but began to feel bad. She testified that she
remembered leaving the game, but that her next memory is waking-up the next
morning, and seeing Sera walk into her bedroom."'142 The Mississippi victim, the
defendant's sister-in-law, "testified that when she left the hotel with Sera to go
back to her dormitory, she saw a tripod in the back seat of the car, and remembered
seeing a camera or a red dot."' 43 Ironically, Sera's crimes were discovered when
his wife found the videotape of the assaults. Arkansas authorities charged Sera
with eight criminal violations, including administering a controlled substance,
sexual assault, and kidnapping for the purpose of having sexual intercourse.
144
Sera appealed his convictions on a number of grounds, including
sufficiency of the evidence and other evidentiary issues. In discussing the
sufficiency of the evidence, the court noted that expert witnesses at Sera's trial had
testified to the amnesiac qualities of Rohypnol, which "prevents victims from
recalling most or all events once the drug takes effect."'145 The effect of the drug
makes prosecutions of this kind more difficult. In Sera's case, enough other
evidence existed, notably the videotape. The court also upheld the trial court's
admission of the prior-similar-act evidence, explaining that the evidence
demonstrated his modus operandi, which included ending each taped sexual
encounter with "a similar degrading sex act." 146 Presumably Sera is subject to
prosecution in Texas and Mississippi for his other offenses. Like the professional-
States v. Fogg, No. 96 01958, 1998 WL 238588 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 1998), aff'd,
52 M.J. 144 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (videotape seized depicting defendant raping teenaged,
unconscious girl, and son sexually molesting two other teenagers); United States v. Natkie,
ACM 31693, 1996 CCA LEXIS 286 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 1996) (three servicemen
videotaped the unconscious intoxicated victim in the nude; afterwards she was sexually
assaulted by one of them); Trigg v. State, 759 So. 2d 448 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (husband
drugged wife and made videotape of his sexual assault on her); Myers, supra note 114, at
C7 (doctor anesthetized victims, sexually assaulted them, and took photographs).
138. 17 S.W.3d 61 (Ark. 2000).
139. See id. at 64-72.
140. See The Date Rape Drug, supra note 136, at 28 (One prosecutor noted that
prosecutions are difficult because the drug impairs victim's ability to recall sexual assault.).
141. Sera, 17 S.W.3d at 65.
142. Id. at 68.
143. Id. at 71.
144. See id. at 70.
145. Id. at 75.
146. Id. at 77.
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perpetrator cases which implicate the abuse of trust, the cases concerning persons
who have been drugged, sexually assaulted, and videotaped demonstrate the
incursion on a different type of interest-here, the privacy interests of the victim.
E. Cases Involving Victims Who Died
147
The only thing that Hillory Janean Farias is known to have drunk
that night was a couple of soda pops. Still, she came home from the
dance club near her hometown of La Porte, Texas with nausea and a
severe headache. Within 24 hours the 17-year-old varsity volleyball
player was dead.
148
Samantha Reid, 15, was "scooped." That's what they say on the
street when someone slips GHB, an odorless, colorless drug, into a
woman's drink. The drug knocks the victim out by depressing her
central nervous system; often she is raped. What happened to Reid
was worse. She lost consciousness after sipping a spiked Mountain
Dew at a suburban Detroit party and died the next day.
149
Unfortunately, a growing number of cases exist in which the victim died
in connection with rape by drugs or other intoxicants. I consider these cases
separately because they illustrate not only the dangerousness of all sexual assaults
but also the greater risk of bodily harm to a victim when enough alcohol or drugs
are administered to render the victim unconscious or immobile. The deaths in these
cases were attributable to one of two causes: either the perpetrator killed the victim
to silence her or he accidentally overdosed her. Cases involving death come from
the previous four categories. For instance, two cases involved severely drunken
victims 150 and one concerned a drugged woman'' that resulted in their deaths
when the assailants killed to silence them. Two professional cases' 52 and two cases
147. Apparently, Wisconsin is the only state that has a homicide statute crafted in
light of rape drugs. First-degree reckless homicide includes when the actor causes the death
of another by either the manufacture, distribution, or delivery of a controlled substance or
administering or assisting in administering such substance, including specified rape drugs.
See Wis. STAT. § 940.02 (2000). New Hampshire makes those who manufacture, sell, or
dispense various controlled substances strictly liable for any death caused. See N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 318-B:26IX (2000). Its statute also provides: "Nothing in this section shall be
construed to preclude or limit any prosecution for homicide. A conviction arising under this
section shall not merge with a conviction of one as a drug enterprise leader or for any other
offense defined in this chapter." Id. § 318-B:261X(b)(2).
148. Christine Gorman & Deborah Fowler, Liquid X a Club Drug Called GHB
May be a Fatal Aphrodisiac, TIME, Sept. 30, 1996, at 64.
149. Cannon, supra note 38, at 73; see also Four Convicted in Date-Rape Case,
AP, Mar. 14, 2000, available at 2000 WL 16859056 (discussing Reid case).
150. See State v. Duffy, No. CA95-03-006, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1305 (Ohio
Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1996); Elliott v. State, 858 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
151. See People v. Medina, 116 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Ct. App. 1974).
152. See Dubria v. Smith, 197 F.3d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1999), aff'd, 224 F.3d 995
(9th Cir. 2000); Regina v. Cobb, [2002] 1 Cr. App. R- (S.) 19 (Crim. App. 2001).
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involving non-rape drugs 53 led to the victims' deaths -when the defendants
accidentally overdosed their victims. The cases of Farias and Reid, the two persons
for whom the federal legislation on rape drugs was named, died in rape-drug
cases.
15 4
A tragic example of a case in this category is Dubria v. Smith, a federal
habeas opinion. 55 Dubria, a resident physician, persuaded Klapper, who worked in
a medical library, to accompany him on a trip to California. Klapper told Dubria
that she had a boyfriend and was not interested in a sexual relationship with him;
she also told him "that if he expected to have a physical relationship with her while
on the trip, she would have to cancel her plans to go."15 6 Police later discovered
Kapper, after a 911 call by Dubria, dead in a hotel room. 57 An autopsy revealed
that she had been sexually assaulted and had died from a lethal reaction to
choroform.155 Dubria was convicted in California of first-degree murder, rape by
drugs, and administering a drug to commit a felony; he was sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole. He filed a federal habeas petition claiming
various errors, including insufficient evidence (i.e., an absence of evidence that he
had administered the chloroform or raped Klapper), the admission of other
evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. 59 The Ninth Circuit, en bane,
affirmed the denial of the petition because it found no merit in Dubria's grounds
for appeal.' 60 This final category of cases, those involving victim death,
emphasizes the dangers inherent in what might otherwise be considered a
nonviolent method of sexual exploitation.
F. Conclusion
The foregoing review of cases involving the sexual assault of victims who
have been intoxicated by alcohol or drugs, either by their own efforts or at the
hands of defendants, displays some common and disturbing patterns. Many of the
crimes, especially those involving alcohol, appeared to be opportunistic.
Perpetrators took advantage of the weakened or unconscious condition of the
victims to sexually exploit them; sometimes more than one defendant participated
in the assault. Cases with street, prescription, or rape drugs, that more often
involved administration, revealed defendants who had planned their criminal
activity and had executed their premeditated sexual assaults on more than one
153. See People v. Mack, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 196 (Ct. App. 1992);
Bechtelheimer v. State, 54 Ind. 128, 129-30 (1876).
154. See sources cited in notes 148-49.
155. See Dubria v. Smith, 197 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1999), affd, 224 F.3d 995 (9th
Cir. 2000).
156. Id. at 394-95.
157. See id. at 395.
158. See id. at 396.
159. See id. at 397-98.
160. See Dubria, 224 F.3d at 1004. For two fascinating articles about the
imposition of the death penalty in cases of rape and murder, see Phyllis L. Crocker, Is the
Death Penalty Good for Women?, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 917 (2001), and Phyllis L.
Crocker, Rape-Murder and the Death Penalty, 26 O oN.U. L. RPv. 689 (2000).
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victim. These cases also illustrate some of the problems encountered in
prosecuting cases involving drugged or intoxicated persons. Now, I turn to an
examination of how criminal statutes in American jurisdictions treat these
offenses.
III. STATUTORY OVERVIEW
"Mentally incapacitated" means a victim who, due to the influence
of a drug, narcotic or intoxicating substance, or due to any act
committed upon the victim without the victim's consent or
awareness, is rendered substantially incapable of either appraising
the nature of his or her conduct, or resisting the act of vaginal
intercourse, a sexual act, or sexual contact.
16 1
A person commits [rape] when he or she engages in sexual
intercourse with a complainant:...Where the person has substantially
impaired the complainant's power to appraise or control his or her
conduct by administering or employing, without knowledge of the
complainant, drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of
preventing resistance.
162
Whoever applies, administers to or causes to be taken any drug, matter or
thing with intent to stupefy or overpower such person so as to thereby enable any
person to have sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with such person
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of
years not less than ten years.
63
This Part reviews the statutes in fifty-six jurisdictions-the fifty states,
the District of Columbia, three territories (Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands), the federal system, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice-with
respect to the criminalization of sexual intercourse or contact accomplished by
means of drugs or other intoxicants. No dearth of enactments exists. Almost all
jurisdictions have an explicit provision outlawing the use of intoxicants to
accomplish sexual activity.' 64 In addition, many states have provisions dealing
161. MD. ANN. CODE of 1957, CRIMES & PuN. § 461(c) (2001).
162. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121(A)(4) (2000).
163. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 3 (2001).
164. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(b)(2) (2001); ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-60(6), -6-61(a)(2),
-6-63(a)(2), -6-66(a)(2), -6-70(c)(3) (2001); ARIZ. REv. STAT. §§ 13-1401(5)(b), -1404(A), -
1406(A) (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-101(4), -102(d), -103(a)(1)(B), -125(a)(2)
(Michie 2001); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261(a)(3), 262(a)(2), 286(i), 288a(i), 289(e), 243.4(b),
(f)(4) (West 2001); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-3-402(4)(d), -404(1)(d) (2000); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 53a-65(5), -67(a), -70(a)(4), -73a(a)(1)(B) (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 761(h)(5), 767, 770(a)(3)a., 772(a)(2)b.2., 773(a)(2)b. (2000); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-
3002(a)(4), -3004(4) (2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(l)(c), (4)(d) (2001); 9 GUAM CODE
ANN. §§ 25.10(a)(5), .15(a)(4)(i), (a)(7), .20(a)(4)(i), (a)(7), .25(a)(3), .30(a)(2) (2000);
HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 707-700, -731(1)(b), -732(1)(d) (2001); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6101(4), -
6108(4) (Michie 2000); 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/12-14(a)(7), -16(a)(7) (2001); IND. CODE
§§ 35-42-4-1(b)(4), -2(b)(4), -3(a)(4), -5(a)(1)(B), -8(b)(3), -9(a)(2), (b)(2) (2001); IOWA
CODE §§709.1(1)-(2), .1A(1), .4(2)(a), .4(3)-(4) (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§21-
156 [Vol. 44:1
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with sexual conduct with physically helpless persons without mentioning
intoxicating agents.' 65 Although some overlap exists, American jurisdictions fall
into four general categories depending on where in the sexual offense provisions
the language regarding drugs is located. The first group consists of jurisdictions
that integrate language regarding intoxicants into definitions of mental
incapacitation and then use mental-incapacitation phraseology in the substantive
sexual offense provisions. The second group of states includes intoxicant language
in the definitions of "without consent;" the third group defines force to include
intoxicants. The fourth category incorporates intoxicant language directly into
specific sexual offense provisions, bypassing the definitional approaches of the
three other groups. A fifth category contains jurisdictions with case precedent
rather than statutory law. Jurisdictions vary not only in the location of their
intoxication language but also in terms of three critical issues: (1) the requirement
that the defendant administer the intoxicant, (2) the defendant's mens rea
regarding the victim's incapacity, and (3) the relationship between the victim's
intoxication and consent.
As many of the cases illustrate, a consideration of two additional types of
criminal statutes is necessary in order to gain a complete understanding of the
prosecution of drug-related sexual offenses. The first category encompasses
provisions that outlaw the administration of drugs as a crime, separate and apart
from the sexual offense, usually classified as a form of assault or battery.
3502(a)(1)(C), -3506(a)(3)(C), -3518(a)(3) (2000); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.010(5),
.020(3)(c), .030, .060(1)(a), .090(1)(a), .120(1)(a) (Michie 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14:42.1(A)(2), :43(A)(1), :89.1(A)(5), :93.5(A)(2) (West 2001); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
fit. 17-A, §§ 253(2)(A), (3) (West 2000); M. ANN. CODE of 1957, CRIMEs & PuN.
§§ 461(c), 463(a)(2), 464A(a)(2), 464B(a)(2) (2001); MICH. COM. LAws §§ 750.520a(g),
b(1)(d)(i), c(1)(d)(i), (g), d(1)(c), e(1)(c) (2000); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.341(7), .342(I)(e)(ii),
.343(1)(e)(ii), .344(l)(d), .345(1)(d) (2000); Mass. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-65(3)(a), -3-
95(1)(b), -3-97(c), -5-23(1) (2001); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 566.020(1), .030(1), .060(1),
.061(5)(a)-(b), (13) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101(40), -2-211(2)(b), -5-
501(1)(b)(i), -5-502(1), -5-503(1) (2000); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2.I(f), 626.6(MI)
(2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:14-1(i), -2(a)(7) (West 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 130.00(6), .05(2)(b), (3)(c), .10, .30(2), .45(2) (Consol. 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 12.1-20-03(l)(b), -07(1)(c) (2000); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(A)(1)(a),
.05(A)(2)-(3) (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(4) (2000); OI. REv. STAT.
§§ 163.305(4), .315(1)(c), .325(3), .375(1)(d), .405(1)(d), .411(1)(c), .427(1)(a)(C) (1999);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3121(A)(4), 3123(A)(4), 3125(5), 3126(5) (2000); 33 P.L LAWs
ANN. §§ 4061(c), 4065(b), 4067(b) (1998); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-37-1(5), -2(1), -4(1)
(2001); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-651(f), -652(1)(c), -654(1)(b) (Law. Co-op. 2000); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWs § 22-22-1(4) (Michie 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-501(4), -
502(a)(3)(B), -503(a)(3), -504(a)(3)(B), -505(a)(3), -522(c) (2001); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 22.01 1(b)(6), .021(a)(2)(A)(vi), (c) (Vernon 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-402(1), -
402.2, -403(2), -404(l), -406(8) (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(2) (2001); 14 V.I.
CODE ANN. §§ 1701(4), 1708(5) (2001); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.010(4), .050(1)(b),
100(l)(b) (2001); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8B-1(4), -2(c)(3), -5(a)(1), -8(a), -12(a) (2001); Wis.
STAT. § 940.225(2)(cm), (5)(ai) (2000); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-303(a)(iii), -304(a)(iii)
(Michie 2000).
165. See infra notes 173-77, 204, 213-14, 225 and accompanying text.
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Approximately one-half of American jurisdictions have various types of drugging
statutes on their books; some jurisdictions also take drugging into account in terms
of grading the severity of the sexual offense or in determining the length of
sentence an offender should receive. These provisions fall into five groups: (1)
drugging to accomplish a sexual offense, (2) drugging to commit any crime, (3)
non-therapeutic drugging, (4) poisoning, and (5) grading and sentencing provisions
based on drugging. The second category of related statutes consists of controlled
substances provisions outlawing the possession and distribution of rape drugs.
A. Sexual Offense Provisions: Statutes Outlawing Rape by Drugs
1. Mental-Incapacitation Provisions
In one of the most common approaches to the problem of drug-induced
sexual conduct, twenty-three jurisdictions organize their sexual offenses by first
providing a separate definitional section and then following it with the substantive
provisions. The important characteristic of this general approach, for present
purposes, is that twenty of these jurisdictions define the term "mentally
incapacitated" to include the situation in which the victim is drugged. These
definitions explicitly mention drugs, narcotics, intoxicants, controlled substances,
anesthetics, or, more simply, substances. 66 Two additional states, North Carolina
166. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(6) (2001) (narcotic or intoxicating substance);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(4) (Michie 2001) (controlled or intoxicating substance); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53a-65(5) (2001) (drug or intoxicating substance); FLA. STAT. ch.
794.01 l(l)(c) (2000) (narcotic, anesthetic, or intoxicating substance); 9 GUAM CODE ANN.
§ 25.10(a)(5) (2000) (narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance); HAW. Rnv. STAT. § 707-700
(2000) (substance); IOWA CODE § 709.IA(1) (2001) (narcotic, anesthetic, or intoxicating
substance); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(5) (Michie 2001) (controlled or intoxicating
substance); MD. ANN. CODE of 1957, CRIMEs & PuN. § 461 (c) (2001) (drug, narcotic, or
intoxicating substance); MIcH. CoMp. LAws § 750.520a(g) (2000) (narcotic, anesthetic, or
other substance); MN. STAT. § 609.341(7) (2000) (narcotic, anesthetic, or any substance);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97(c) (2001) (drug, narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(i) (West 2001) (narcotic, anesthetic, intoxicant, or other substance);
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.00(6) (Consol. 2001) (narcotic or intoxicating substance); OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.305(4) (1999) (controlled or other intoxicating substance); R.I. GEN. LAWs
§ 11-37-1(5) (2001) (narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
651(f) (Law. Co-op. 2000) (substance); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(4) (2001) (narcotic,
anesthetic, or other substance); WAsH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010(4) (2001) (substance); W.
VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(4) (2001) (controlled or intoxicating substance).
One state in this category explicitly mentions a common rape drug. Iowa's third-degree
sexual abuse statute makes it a crime to perform a sex act:
while the other person is under the influence of a controlled substance,
which may include but is not limited to flunitrazeparn, and all of the
following are true: (a) The controlled substance, which may include but
is not limited to flunitrazepam, prevents the other person from
consenting to the act. (b) The person performing the act knows or
reasonably should have known that the other person was under the
influence of the controlled substance, which may include but is not
limited to flunitrazepam.
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and Virginia, define mental incapacitation without referring to intoxicants but
arguably include drugged victims; 167 Alaska defines incapacitated to include both
mental and physical impairments, also without reference to drugs.
168
A typical definition of mentally incapacitated, this one from New Jersey,
reads:
"Mentally incapacitated" means that condition in which a person is
rendered temporarily incapable of understanding or controlling his
conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, intoxicant, or
other substance administered to that person without his prior
knowledge or consent, or due to any other act committed upon that
person which rendered that person incapable of appraising or
controlling his conduct.
169
Most states use similar language in describing mental incapacitation-the victim is
rendered incapable of appraising or controlling her conduct. A few emphasize that
the person is prevented from understanding the nature or consequence of the
sexual act;170 some add the requirement that the victim is incapable of resisting the
act. 71 Minnesota takes a different approach in stressing the effect of drugs on
capacity to consent by defining "mentally incapacitated" as someone "under the
influence of alcohol, a narcotic, anesthetic, or any other substance, administered to
that person without the person's agreement, [who] lacks the judgment to give a
reasoned consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration."'
172
The twenty-three jurisdictions following this general approach also define
"physically helpless" and "mentally defective." Twenty-two define "physically
helpless;"'173 the remaining state, Alaska, combines both mental and physical
IOWA CODE § 709.4(3) (2001).
167. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(2) (2000) ("due to any act committed upon
the victim is rendered substantially incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct,
or resisting the act of vaginal intercourse or a sexual act"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(3)
(Michie 2000) (condition of victim that prevents her from understanding nature or
consequences of sexual act). Virginia's definition more closely resembles the definition of
mentally defective persons used in other states. See infra notes 178-80.
168. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(2) (Michie 2001) (victim incapable of
appraising her conduct or physically unable to express unwillingness to act).
169. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(i) (West 2001).
170. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(3) (Michie 2000); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 9A.44.010(4) (2001).
171. See MD. ANN. CODE of 1957, CRIMEs & PuN. § 461 (c) (2001); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-97(c) (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(2) (2000).
172. MiNN. STAT. § 609.341(7) (2000).
173. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(7) (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(5) (Michie
2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-65(6) (2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 794.01 1(1)(e) (2000); 9 GuAM
CODE ANN. § 25.10(a)(6) (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (2000); IOWA CODE
§ 709.IA(2) (2001); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(6) (Michie 2001); MD. ANN. CODE of
1957, CRPiS & PuN. § 461(d) (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWs § 750.520a(i) (2000); MiNN.
STAT. § 609.341(9) (2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97(d) (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:14-I(g) (West 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(7) (Consol. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§14-27.1(3) (2000); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.305(5) (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1(6)
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impairments in one provision. 74 A typical definition of "physically helpless," this
one from West Virginia, describes the condition as one in which a person is
"unconscious or for any reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness
to act.' 175 All states (except Alaska) include the condition of "unconsciousness";
almost all add physically unable to communicate an unwillingness to act. 176 Three
states incorporate consent language in their definitions; for instance, Minnesota's
statute defines a physically helpless person as someone unable to withhold or
withdraw consent, or to communicate nonconsent.
177
Twenty jurisdictions define mentally defective, mentally retarded,
mentally disabled, mentally incapable, or mentally impaired individuals; 178 three
states have only one mental-impairment provision.179 Alabama provides a typical
definition of "mentally defective" as a person who "suffers from a mental disease
or defect which renders him incapable of appraising the nature of his conduct."'
80
(2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(g) (Law. Co-op. 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
501(5) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(4) (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.44.010(5) (2001); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(5) (2001).
Two states provide a separate definition of physically incapacitated. See FLA. STAT. ch.
794.01 1)(.j) (2000) ("bodily impaired or handicapped and substantially limited in ability to
resist or flee"); IOWA CODE § 709.1A(3) (2001) (same).
174. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(2) (Michie 2001). Alaska combines mental
and physical incapacitation in its definition of "incapacitated" and separately defines
"mentally incapable." Alaska defines "without consent" as a person who "is incapacitated as
a result of an act of the defendanf' and defines "incapacitated" as "temporarily incapable of
appraising the nature of one's own conduct or physically unable to express unwillingness to
act." ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.470(2), (4), (8)(b) (Michie 2001) (definitions of incapacitated,
mentally incapable, and without consent, respectively).
175. W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(5) (2001).
176. Several states add language to the basic definition. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:14-1(i) (West 2001) (physically unable to flee); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(2) (2000)
(physically unable to resist); see also FLA. STAT. ch. 794.01 1(1)(e), (1)G) (2000) (defining
both physically helpless and physically incapacitated, the latter including the inability to
resist or flee); IOWA CODE § 709.1A (2001) (same).
177. See MINN. STAT. § 609.341(7) (2000); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-
101(5) (Michie 2001) ("physically unable to communicate lack of consent"); MD. ANN.
CODE of 1957, CRImEs & PUN. § 461(c) (2001) (does not consent and is physically unable to
resist).
178. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(5) (2001); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.470(4)
(Michie 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(3) (Michie 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
65(4) (2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(1)(b) (2000); 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 25.10(a)(4)
(2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(4) (Michie
2001); MD. ANN. CODE of 1957, CRImEs & PUN. § 461(c) (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.520a(e)-(f) (2000); MINN. STAT. § 609.341(6) (2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97(b)
(2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(h) (West 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.00(5) (Consol.
2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-27.1(2) (2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305(3) (1999); R.I. GEN.
LAWs § 11-37-1(4) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(e) (Law. Co-op. 2000); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(3) (2001); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(4) (2001); see also IOWA CODE
§ 709.1(2) (2001) (person with mental defect).
179. See IOwA CODE § 709.1(2) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(3) (Michie
2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010(4) (2001).
180. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(5) (2001).
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Notably, the language in many of the mentally defective definitions is very similar
to that in the mental incapacitation provisions, although the former provisions tend
to describe more permanent mental impairments, insanity or mental retardation,
while the latter refer to more transient conditions such as being intoxicated.
Most of the jurisdictions combine all three conditions in the operative
language of their sexual offense provisions. Thus, for instance, New Jersey defines
sexual assault to include the circumstance when "[t]he victim is one whom the
actor knew or should have known was physically helpless, mentally defective or
mentally incapacitated."'' States tend to treat the three categories equally, but
three punish the sexual exploitation of physically helpless individuals more
severely than the same behavior with mentally incapacitated or mentally disabled
people, 182 and one punishes sexual assault of mentally defective persons less
severely.'83
a. Administration of the Intoxicant
Although the mental-incapacitation provisions appear to equate
intoxicated persons with mentally ill or physically helpless victims-two
categories of persons deemed incapable of consent and for whom the traditional
force requirement is eliminated-sixteen of these jurisdictions also require the
defendant to administer the intoxicant before the victim is deemed mentally
incapacitated. 'm A typical provision requires the intoxicant be "administered to
that person without his prior knowledge or consent."' 85 The remaining six mental-
incapacitation states focus exclusively on the victim's condition without requiring
181. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(a)(7) (West 2001).
182. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.040(l)(b)(1), .060(1)(a) (Michie 2001)
(first-degree rape for physically helpless victims, third-degree rape for mentally
incapacitated victims and similar schemes for sodomy and sexual abuse under KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 510.070, .090, .110, .120 (Michie 2001)); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.35(2),
.30(2) (Consol. 2001) (first-degree rape when victim physically helpless and second-degree
rape when victim mentally incapacitated; similar scheme in other sex offenses); W. VA.
CODE §§ 61-8B-4(a)(2), -5(a)(1) (2001) (second-degree sexual assault for physically
helpless victims, third-degree sexual assault for mentally incapacitated victims and same
general scheme for sexual abuse).
183. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62(a)(2), -6-64(a)(2) (2001) (first-degree rape for
physically helpless and mentally incapacitated victims and second-degree rape for mentally
defective victims; same for sodomy).
184. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(6) (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-65(5)
(2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 794.01 1(1)(c) (2000); 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 25.10(a)(5) (2000);
HAW. REv. STAT. § 707-700 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(5) (Michie 2001);
MICH. COMP. LAWs § 750.520a(g) (2000); MiNN. STAT. § 609.341(7) (2000); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-97(c) (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14.1(i) (West 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.00(6) (Consol. 2001); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.305(4) (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 11-37-
1(5) (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(4) (2001); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(4) (2001);
see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(2) (2000) ("due to any act committed upon the
victim"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652(1)(c) (Law. Co-op. 2000) (actor causes victim to
become mentally incapacitated in one criminal sexual conduct provision).
185. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(i) (West 2001).
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that the defendant have administered the intoxicant; 186 Arkansas appears to provide
for either administration or victim unawareness. 8 7 For instance, South Carolina
defines mentally incapacitated as "rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or
controlling his or her conduct whether this condition is produced by illness, defect,
the influence of a substance or from some other cause."'188 Washington's statute is
very similar except that it describes the impairment as being unable to understand
the nature or consequences of the act of sexual intercourse.
189
b. The Defendant's Mens Rea
The twenty-three jurisdictions in the mental-incapacitation category differ
on the defendant's mens rea regarding the victim's mental incapacitation. Most
require that the defendant know, have reason to know, or should have known of
the victim's incapacity' 90 or that he knowingly engaged in sexual activity with an
incapacitated person.' 9' Six states remain silent on mens rea in the substantive
sexual offense provisions, but provide an affirmative defense with respect to
knowledge of the victim's incapacitated condition.' 92 For instance, Arkansas
186. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.470(2) (Michie 2001); IoWA CODE § 709.1A(l)
(2001); MD. ANN. CODE of 1957, CRiMEs & PUN. § 461 (c) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
651(f) (Law. Co-op. 2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010(4) (2001); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-67.10(3) (Michie 2000).
187. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(4) (Michie 2001).
188. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(f) (Law. Co-op. 2000).
189. See WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.010(4) (2001).
190. See ALAsKA STAT. §§ 1l.41.420(a)(3)(B), .425(a)(1)(B) (Michie 2001)
(knows); 9 GuAM CODE ANN. §§ 25.15(a)(4)(i), (a)(7), .20(a)(4)(i), (a)(7), .25(a)(3),
.30(a)(2) (2000) (knows or has reason to know); IOWA CODE § 709.4(3)(b) (2001) (knows or
reasonably should have known); MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957, CRIMES & PUN. §§ 463(a)(2),
464A(a)(2), 464B(a)(2) (2001) (knows or should reasonably know); MICH. CoMi'. LAws
§§ 750.520b(1)(d)(i), c(l)(d)(i), d(c), e(c) (2000) (knows or has reason to know); MNIN.
STAT. §§ 609.342(1)(e)(ii), .343(1)(e)(ii), .344(l)(d), .345(l)(d) (2000) (knows or has
reason to know); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(a)(7) (West 2001) (knew or should have
known); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-37-2(1), -4(l) (2001) (knows or has reason to knov); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-654(1)(b) (Law. Co-op. 2000) (knows or has reason to know); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-502(a)(3)(B), -503(a)(3), -504(a)(3)(B), -505(a)(3) (2001) (knows or
has reason to know).
191. See HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 707-731(l)(b), -732(1)(c) (2000) (knowingly
subjects); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9A.44.050(l)(b), .100(1)(b) (2001) (knowingly causes);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61(A), -67.3(A)(2), -67.1(A)(2), -67.2(A)(2), -67.4(A)(i) (Michie
2000) (through use of mental incapacity).
192. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-102(d) (Michie 2001) (affinative defense if
reasonably believed victim capable of consent); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-67 (2001)
(affirmative defense if did not know victim mentally incapacitated); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.030 (Michie 2001) (defense if did not know of facts/conditions responsible for
incapacity to consent); N.Y. PENALLAW § 130.10 (Consol. 2001) (affirmative defense if did
not know facts/conditions responsible for incapacity to consent); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 163.325(3) (1999) (affirmative defense if did not know facts/conditions responsible for
incapacity to consent); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-12 (2001) (affirmative defense if did not
know facts/conditions for incapacity to consent, unless reckless in failing to know such
facts/conditions).
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provides a defense if the actor reasonably believed the victim was capable of
consent.1 93 West Virginia's statute offers an affirmative defense if the defendant
did not know of the facts or conditions responsible for the victim's incapacity
unless the actor is reckless in failing to know such facts or conditions.
1 94
c. Consent
With respect to the relationship between victim incapacity and consent,
eight jurisdictions in this category explicitly provide that mentally incapacitated,
physically helpless, or mentally disabled persons are incapable of consent.
95
Minnesota's definitions of mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, and
physically helpless draw a direct connection between these conditions and the
inability of the victim to give reasoned consent, to withhold or withdraw consent,




Five states approach the problem of rape by drugs by including
intoxication in the consent provisions of their sexual assault statutes and then
incorporating the term "without consent" or lack of consent language into their
substantive sexual offenses. 198 All five states explicitly mention drugs or
193. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-102(d) (Michie 2001).
194. SeeW. VA. CODE § 61-SB-12(a) (2001).
195. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-61, -63, -70 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-
103(a)(1)(B), -125(a)(2) (Michie 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-70, -73a (2001); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.020(3), .060, .090, .120 (Michie 2001); MD. ANN. CODE of 1957,
CRIES & PUN. § 461(c) (2001); N.y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3), .30, .45 (Consol. 2001); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 163.315, .375, .405, .411, .427 (1999); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9A.44.050,
.44.100 (2001); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-2 (2001).
196. See MNN. STAT. § 609.341(6)-(9) (2000).
197. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(B) (Michie 2001) (defining "Without
consent" to include person "incapacitated as a result of an act of the defendant"); IOWA
CODE § 709.1(1) (2001) (providing that "if the [sex] act is done while the other is under the
influence of a drug inducing sleep or is otherwise in a state of unconsciousness, the act is
done against the will of the other").
198. See ARiz. REv. STAT. §§ 13-1401(5) (definition of without consent), -
1404(A) (sexual abuse); -1406(A) (sexual assault) (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 761(h)(2), (3), (5) (definition of without consent includes physically helpless, mentally
defective, and mentally incapacitated), 767, 770(a)(3)a., 772(a)(2)b.2., 773(a)(2)b. (2000);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(39), (40), (57) (definitions of mentally defective, mentally
incapacitated, and physically helpless, respectively), -5-501 (definition of without consent),
-5-502(1), -5-503(1) (2001); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(3)-(6) (Vernon 2000)
(without consent includes physically helpless, mental defective, unaware, and mentally
incapacitated); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-406(5), (6), (8) (definition of without consent to
include physically helplessness, mental defects, and mental incapacitation), -402(1), -402.2,
-403(2), -404(1) (2000).
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intoxicants in their lack-of-consent definitions. 99 For instance, Arizona defines
"without consent" to include when "[t]he victim is incapable of consent by reason
of mental disorder, mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep or any similar impairment
of cognition.... 200 Delaware defines "without consent" to include when "the
defendant had substantially impaired the victim's power to appraise or control the
victim's conduct by administering or employing without the other person's
knowledge or against the other person's will, drugs, intoxicants or other means for
the purpose of preventing resistance."20 1 Utah's definition is: "the actor
intentionally impaired the power of the victim to appraise or control his or her
conduct by administering any substance without the victim's knowledge.... 20 2
Texas's definition, which is very similar to Utah's, appears in its sexual assault
statute and is then incorporated into its aggravated sexual assault statute.20 3
This approach is essentially a variant of the mental-incapacitation
provisions because the definitions of "without consent" mirror the language of the
definitions of mentally incapacitated. Moreover, all five states include the three
categories of impairment-mental incapacitation, physical helplessness, and
mental disability-in their definitions of without consent.204 The major difference
is that the substantive sexual offense provisions employ consent rather than
mental-incapacitation language. The similarity of approach is reinforced by the
fact that many of the mental-incapacitation provisions also emphasize consent.
20 5
Three states in the lack-of-consent category require the defendant to
administer the intoxicant before criminal liability attaches.20 6 The other two focus
only on the victim's incapacity to consent or to appraise her conduct.20 7 On the
question of mens rea, one state, Arizona, provides for criminal punishment of
199. See ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-1401(5)(b) (2000) (drugs or alcohol); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 761 (h)(5) (2000) (drugs, intoxicants or other means); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-2-101(40) (2001) (intoxicating substance); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (b)(6)
(Vernon 2000) (substance); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(8) (2000) (substance).
200. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-1401(5) (2000).
201. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(h)(5) (2000) (definition of without consent).
202. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-406(8) (definition of without consent), -402(1), -
402.2, -403(2), -404(1) (2000).
203. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01 l(b), .021(c) (Vernon 2000).
204. See ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-1401(5) (2000) (without consent definition
combining all three conditions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(h)(2), (3), (5) (2000)
(without consent definition separately listing three conditions); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-
101(39), (40), (57), -5-501 (2000) (without consent definition listing three conditions); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 1(b)(3)-(6) (Vernon 2000) (defining without consent for one type
of sexual assault as when a victim is physically helpless, mentally defective, unaware, and
mentally incapacitated); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(5), (6), (8) (2000) (listing three
conditions among others as a circumstance of without consent).
205. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
206. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(h)(5) (2000) (administers or employs);
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.011(b)(6), .021(a)(2)(A)(vi) (Vernon 2000) (administers or
provides); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(8) (2000) (administers).
207. See ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-1401(5) (2000) (incapable of consent); MONT.
CODEANN. § 45-2-101(40) (2001) (incapable of appreciating or controlling conduct).
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sexual assault if the drugged condition of the victim was known or should have
been known by the defendant.208 Montana outlaws a defendant knowingly
engaging in sexual intercourse or contact without consent.209 Texas and Utah
require that the actor intentionally impair the victim,2 1 0 implicitly requiring
knowledge that the victim is impaired.2 1
3. Force Provisions
Two states, Missouri and New Mexico, arguably include the
administration of drugs in their definitions of force. Missouri outlaws rape and
sodomy accomplished by forcible compulsion, which "includes the use of a
substance administered without a victim's knowledge or consent which renders the
victim physically or mentally impaired so as to be incapable of making an
informed consent to sexual intercourse."212 New Mexico defines "force or
coercion," inter alia, as "when the perpetrator knows or has reason to know that the
victim is unconscious, asleep or otherwise physically helpless or suffers from a
mental condition that renders the victim incapable of understanding the nature or
consequences of the act.... 2 13 Although New Mexico's provision fails to mention
intoxicants, the language suggests that the statute would cover drugged victims
who were physically helpless 214 and those with a drug-induced mental condition
who did not understand the nature of their conduct. No other jurisdictions define
force as including mental incapacitation, physical helplessness, or mental defect,
but some states appear to equate the use of force with the administration of drugs,
thereby implicitly adopting the same rationale.1 Notably, the three jurisdictions
208. See Amiz. REV. STAT. § 13-1401(5)(b) (2000).
209. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502(1), -503(1) (2000).
210. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (b)(6) (Vernon 2000) (intentionally
impaired); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(8) (2000) (intentionally impaired).
211. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(h)(5) (2000) (requiring that
defendant impair victim).
212. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 566.030(1), .060(1) (2000).
213. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(4) (Michie 2000). This definition resembles
the physical helplessness and mental defect definitions used in the mental-incapacitation
states. It is possible that drugging is not included in Nev Mexico.
214. Missouri also includes physically helpless persons in its definition of
incapacitated. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.061(13) (2000).
215. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 11l(A)(4) (2000) ("Where the victim is
intoxicated by a narcotic or anesthetic agent, administered by or with the privity of the
accused as a means of forcing the victim to submit;..."); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Michie
2000) (using language "by force, threat or intimidation of or against the complaining
witness or another person, or through the use of the complaining witness's mental
incapacity or physical helplessness" in number of sexual offenses); 33 P.R. LAws ANN.
§§ 4061(c), 4065(b), 4067(b) (1998) (compelled to act by use of irresistible physical force
or threats of grave and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of
execution; or by overcoming or diminishing her capacity to resist substantially, without her
knowledge, by means of hypnosis, narcotics, depressant or stimulant drugs or similar
substances or means); see also IND. CODE §§ 35-42-4-1(b)(4), -2(b)(4), -3(a)(4), -5(a)(2)(B),
-8(b)(3) (2000) (equating the use of deadly force or being armed with a dangerous weapon
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that rely on case precedent fit rape by drugs under the force requirements of their
sexual offense provisions.1 6
The two states in the force-provision category differ with respect to the
issues of administration, mens rea, and consent. Missouri requires defendant
administration of the intoxicant;217 New Mexico does not. New Mexico's statute
requires a mens rea of "knows or has reason to know" of the victim's incapacity. 218
Missouri's statute is silent on intent, but provides a defense if the actor reasonably
believed that the victim was not incapacitated and reasonably believed the victim
consented. The defendant has the burden of injecting the issue of belief regarding
capacity and consent.219 Finally, Missouri's statute explicitly connects the effects
of incapacitation with consent (i.e., the victim is incapable of informed consent)220
while New Mexico describes incapacity as the inability to understand the nature or
consequences of the act.2 2
4. The Non-Definitional Approach-Enumerated Sexual Offense
Provisions
Twenty-one jurisdictions (and the Model Penal Code) 222 explicitly
include sexual conduct with intoxicated persons as a species of rape or sexual
with administration of drugs without victim's knowledge in sentence enhancement scheme).
In Stadler v. State, 919 P.2d 439 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996), the court wrote:
It seems inconsistent to allow a person to use overt force to overcome a
victim's will and call that first degree rape, yet let that same person by
deceit and the use of an intoxicant or narcotic overcome a victim's will,
and call that second-degree rape. Still, it is the job of the Legislature, not
this Court, to determine crimes and punishments.
Id. at 443.
216. See infra notes 248-54 and accompanying text.
217. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 556.030, .060 (2000) (use of a substance).
218. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(4) (Michie 2000).
219. See Mo. Rav. STAT. § 566.020(1) (2000); see also ME. R V. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 253(3) (West 2000) (defense if victim voluntarily consumed or allowed
administration of substance).
220. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 566.030(1), .060(1) (2000) (incapable of informed
consent).
221. SeeN.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(4) (Michie 2000).
222. The Model Penal Code's rape statute provides: "A male who has sexual
intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of rape if:...(b) he has substantially impaired
her power to appraise or control her conduct by administering or employing without her
knowledge drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance...."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1962). The Model Penal Code's sexual assault statute
provides:
A person who has sexual contact with another not his spouse, or causes
such other to have sexual conduct with him, is guilty of sexual assault, a
misdemeanor, if:...(5) he has substantially impaired the other person's
power to appraise or control his or her conduct, by administering or
HeinOnline  -- 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 166 2002
20021 RAPE BY DRUGS 167
assault without separately defining mental incapacitation, lack of consent, or force
to include intoxication or drugging.223 Two additional states, Nebraska and
Nevada, do not mention intoxicants in their rape statutes, but describe the same
types of mental and physical incapacitation that other states have defined as
resulting from the ingestion of drugs in their various sexual offenses. 224 In addition
to provisions regarding intoxicated persons, most jurisdictions that follow the non-
definitional approach also criminalize sexual conduct with unconscious, physically
helpless, or mentally disabled persons although they describe these conditions
differently.22'
employing without the other's knowledge drugs, intoxicants, or other
means for the purpose of preventing resistance;...
Id. § 213.4.
223. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(b)(2) (2001) (drug, intoxicant, or other similar
substance); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261(a)(3), 262(a)(2), 286(i), 288a(i), 289(e), 243.4(b),
243(f)(4) (West 2001) (intoxicating or anesthetic substance or controlled substance); COLO.
REv. STAT. §§ 18-3-402(4)(d), -404(1)(d) (2000) (drug, intoxicant, or other means); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 22-3002(a)(4), -3004(4) (2000) (drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance);
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6101(4), -6108(4) (Michie 2000) (intoxicating, narcotic, or anaesthetic
substance); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-14(a)(7), -16(a)(7) (2001) (controlled substance);
IND. CODE §§ 35-42-4-1(b)(4), -2(b)(4), -3(a)(4), -5(a)(1)(B), -8(b)(3), -9(a)(2), (b)(2)
(2000) (drug or controlled substance); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3502(a)(1)(C), -
3506(a)(3)(C), -35 18(a)(3) (2000) (alcoholic liquor, narcotic, drug, or other substance); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:42.1(A)(2), :43(A)(1) (narcotic or anesthetic agent or other
controlled dangerous substance), :89.1(A)(5) (narcotic or anesthetic agent), :93.5(A)(2)
(intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic agent) (West 2000); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 253(2)(A) (West 2000) (drugs, intoxicants, or other similar means); N.H. RPv. STAT.
ANN. § 632-A:2(l)(f) (2000) (intoxicating substance); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-
03(l)(b), -07(1)(c) (2000) (intoxicants, a controlled substance, or other means); OHIO RaV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a), .05(A)(2) (Anderson 2001) (drug, intoxicant, or controlled
substance); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 111 (A)(4) (2000) (narcotic or anesthetic agent); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. §§ 3121(A)(4), 3123(A)(4), 3125(5), 3126(5) (2000) (drugs, intoxicants, or
other means); 33 P.R. LAWs ANN. §§ 4061(c), 4065(b), 4067(b) (1998) (hypnosis, narcotics,
depressant or stimulant drugs or similar substances or means); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 22-
22-1(4) (Michie 2001) (intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic agent or hypnosis); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(2) (2001) (drugs or intoxicants); 14 V.I. CODE ANN. §§ 1701(4),
1708(5) (2001) (intoxicating, narcotic, or anaesthetic agent); WIs. STAT. § 940.225(2)(cm)
(2000) (intoxicant); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(iii) (Michie 2000) (substance).
Two states specifically include hypnosis in their "intoxication" provisions. See 33 P.R.
LAws ANN. §§ 4061(c), 4065(b), 4067(b) (1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-22-1(4)
(Michie 2001).
224. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319(1), -320(1) (2001) ("victim was mentally or
physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of his or her conduct"); NEV. REv.
STAT. 200.366(1) (2001) ("victim was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or
understanding the nature of his conduct"). Interestingly, Nevada also has two separate
crimes punishing the administration of drugs for the purpose of committing a crime. See
NEv. REv. STAT. 200.405, .408 (2001).
225. See 18 U.S.C. §2241(b)(1) (2001) (unconscious); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 261(a)(4), 262(a)(3), 286(f), 288a(f), 289(d), 243A(b), (f)(4) (West 2001) (unconscious
of the nature of the act); COLO. RaV. STAT. §§ 18-3-401(3), -403(4)(e), -404(1)(c)
(physically helpless), -401(3), -404(1)(b) (2000) (incapable of appraising conduct); D.C.
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Maine provides a typical statutory passage: "[a] person is guilty of gross
sexual assault if that person engages in a sexual act with another person and: A.
The actor has substantially impaired the other person's power to appraise or
control the other person's sexual acts by administering or employing drugs,
intoxicants or other similar means.... '' 2 6 California outlaws a host of sexual
offenses and incorporates the following provision into each statute: "[w]here a
person is prevented from resisting by any intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or
any controlled substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably should have
been known by the accused.
' '227
a. Administration of the Intoxicant
Sixteen jurisdictions in this category (and the Model Penal Code)22
require that the defendant administer the drugs before criminal liability attaches, at
least for some grades of the offense.229 Louisiana has simple and forcible rape
CODE ANN. §§ 22-3002(a)(3), -3004(3) (unconscious), -3003(2), -3005(2) (mental and
physical incapacitation) (2001); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6101(2), -6108(1) (unsoundness of
mind), -6101(5), -6108(5) (unconscious of nature of act) (Michie 2000); 720 ILL. COMp.
STAT. 5/12-13(a)(2), -15(a)(2) (unable to understand nature of act or give knowing consent),
-14(a)(6), -16(a)(4) (physically handicapped) (2001); IND. CODE §§ 35-42-4-1(a)(2)-(3), -
2(a)(2)-(3), -8(a)(2) (2001) (unaware or mentally diabled or deficient); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 21-3502(a)(1)(B), -3506(a)(3)(B), -3518(a)(2) (2000) (unconscious or physically
powerless); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:43(A)(2), :89.1(A)(4), :93.5(A)(1) (physically
incapable), :93.5(A)(4) (unsoundness of mind) (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 253(2)(C)-(D), 255(1)(B), (D) (West 2000) (mental disability, unconscious, physically
incapable of resisting); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-319(1), -320(1) (2001) (mentally or
physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of conduct); NEV. REV. STAT.
200.366(1) (2001) (mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding nature of
conduct); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(l)(b) (2000) (physically helpless); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 12.1-20-03(1)(c), (e), -07(1)(b) (2000) (mental disease or defect, unaware); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (mental or physical condition), .03(A)(2)-(3)
(impaired ability to appraise or control conduct, unaware), .05(A)(5) (mental or physical
condition) (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 111 l(A)(2), (5) (2000) (mental illness or
unsoundness of mind, unconscious of nature of act); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3121(A)(3), (5),
3123(A)(3), (5), 3125(4), (6), 3126(4), (6) (2000) (unconscious, mental disability); 33 P.R.
LAws ANN. §§ 4061(b), (d), 4067(c) (illness or unsoundness of mind, unaware of its nature),
4065(c) (mental deficiency) (1998); S.D. CODiFED LAWs §§ 22-22-1(3), -7.2 (Michie 2001)
(physical or mental incapacity); 14 V.I. CODE ANN. §§ 1701(1), (5) (unsoundness of mind,
mental or physical weakness, unconsciousness), 1708(6) (unconscious, physically helpless,
mental defect) (2001); Wis. STAT. § 940.225(2)(c), (d) (mental illness or deficiency,
unconscious), (4) (mental illness or defect, unconscious) (2000); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-
301(a)(iii) (physically helpless), -302(a)(iii)-(iv) (physically helpless, mental illness, mental
deficiency, or developmental disability) (Michie 2000).
226. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(2)(A) (West 2001).
227. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261(a)(3), 262(a)(2), 286(i), 288a(i), 289(e), 243.4(b),
(f)(4) (West 2001).
228. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.1(b), 213.4(5) (1962).
229. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(b)(2) (2001) (administers); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-3-
402(4)(d), -404(1)(d) (2000) (employing); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3002, -3004 (2001)
(administering); FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(4)(d) (2001) (administers or knows someone else
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statutes; the forcible version requires administration while simple rape does not.230
Some jurisdictions require that the administration be without knowledge or against
the will of the victim.231 To reach a broader spectrum of potential offenders,
several states have expanded the administration requirement to include not only
the person who actually administers the drug but also those who act in privity with
him232 or who know that someone else has drugged the victim.2 33 Illinois's statute
uses the term "delivered," which is defined to mean "by injection, inhalation,
ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means... ."234 Indiana uses the term
"furnishing." 35  Eight jurisdictions do not require administration by the
administering); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6101(4), -6108(4) (Michie 2000) (administered by or
with privity); 720 ILL. COMiP. STAT. 5/12-14(a)(7), -16(a)(7) (2001) (delivered drug); IND.
CODE §§ 35-42-4-1(b)(4), -2(b)(4), -3(a)(4), -5(a)(1)(B), -8(b)(3), -9(b)(2) (2001)
(furnishing drug); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:42.1(A)(2) (administered), :89.1(A)(5)
(administered by or with privity), :93.5(A)(2) (same) (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 253(2)(A) (administering or employing), (3) (defense if other person voluntarily
consumed or allowed administration of substance) (West 2001); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 632-A:2(l)(f) (2000) (administers or knows of another administering); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 12.1-20-03(l)(b)-(c), -07(1)(c) (2000) (person or someone with person's knowledge
administering or employing); OHuo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(A)(1)(a), .05(A)(2)
(Anderson 2001) (administering); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § llll(A)(4) (2000) (administered
by or with privity); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3121(A)(4), 3123(A)(4), 3125(5), 3126(5)
(2000) (administering or employing); 33 P.R. LAws ANN. § 4061(c) (1998) (victim
overcome by means of drugs, etc.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(2) (2001)
(administering or employing); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(iii) (Michie 2000)
(administers or knows that someone administered).
230. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. Illinois punishes as sexual
assault an act when the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or unable to give
knowing consent, while punishing as aggravated sexual assault an act when the accused
delivered any controlled substance to the victim. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13(a)(2), -
14(a)(7) (2001). Indiana makes it a Class B felony to have sexual intercourse with a person
so mentally disabled or deficient that consent cannot be given and a Class A felony when
the offense is facilitated by furnishing the victim with a drug or controlled substance. See
IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1(a)(3), (b)(4) (2001).
231. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3002, -3004 (2001) (by force, threat, or
without knowledge or permission); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-14(a)(7), -16(a)(7) (2001)
(without consent or by threat, deception); Orno REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(A)(1)(a),
.05(A)(2) (Anderson 2001) (by force, threat of force, or deception); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 3252(a)(2) (2001) (without knowledge or against will).
232. See IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6101(4), -6108(4) (Michie 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit
21, § I111(A)(4) (2000).
233. See FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011(4)(d) (2001) (offender administers or has
knowledge of someone else administering); IND. CODE §§ 35-42-4-1(b)(4), -2(b)(4), -
3(a)(4), -5(a)(2)(B), -8(b)(3), -9(a)(2) (2001) (offense facilitated by furnishing victim drug
or knowing that victim was furnished drug); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2(1)(f) (2000)
(administers or has knowledge of another administering); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-
03(l)(b)-(c), -07(I)(c) (2000) (person or someone with person's knowledge substantially
impaired by administering or employing); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(iii) (Michie 2000)
(defendant administers or know that someone administered).
234. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-14(a)(7), -16(a)(7) (2001).
235. IND. CODE §§ 35-42-4-1(b)(4), -2(b)(4), -3(a)(4), -5(a)(2)(B), -8(b)(3), -
9(b)(2) (2001).
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defendant. 6 Within the last sixteen years, three states in this category, South
Dakota (in 1985), Kansas (in 1993), and California (in 1994), have amended their
rape statutes to eliminate the administration element.
237
Many of the jurisdictions requiring administration stress the fact that the
victim is prevented from resistance by the introduction of the drug,238 while others
speak of submission.239 A few provisions are written in terms of the inability of the
victim to appraise or control her conduce4 (phraseology common to the mental-
incapacitation provisions) or to consent to the sexual acts.241 As discussed in more
detail below, the resistance language in these provisions is particularly unfortunate
because such language harkens back to a time when resistance to the utmost was
an important lynchpin of rape law.242
236. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261(a)(3), 262(a)(2), 286(i), 288a(i), 289(e),
243.4(b), 243(f)(4) (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3502(a)(1)(C), -3506(a)(3)(C), -
3518(a)(3) (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43(A)(1) (West 2001); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 28-319(1), -320(1) (2001); NEV. REv. STAT. 200.366(1) (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAvS
§ 22-22-1(4) (Michie 2001); 14 V.I. CODE ANN. §§ 1701(4), 1708(5) (2001); Wis. STAT.
§ 940.225(2)(cm) (2000).
237. See supra notes 75, 82 and infra note 402 and accompanying text.
238. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261(a)(3), 262(a)(2), 286(i); 288a(i), 289(e) (West
2001) ("prevented from resisting"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(h)(5) (2000) (for purpose
of preventing resistance); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6101(4), -6108(4) (Michie 2000) ("prevented
from resistance"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:42.1(A)(2), :43(A)(1), :89.1(A)(5),
:93.5(A)(2) (West 2001) ("incapable of resisting or of understanding"); NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 28-319(1), -320(1) (2001) ("incapable of resisting or appraising"); NEv. REv. STAT.
200.366(1) (2001) ("incapable of resisting or understanding"); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-
20-03(1)(b), -07(1)(c) (2000) ("with intent to prevent resistance"); Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 2907.02(A)(1)(a), .05(A)(2) (Anderson 2001) ("For the purpose of preventing
resistance..."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3121(A)(4), 3123(A)(4), 3125(5), 3126(5) (2000)
("for the purpose of preventing resistance"); 33 P.R. LAws ANN. §§ 4061(c), 4065(b),
4067(b) (1998) (overcoming or diminishing her/his capacity/will to resist substantially); 14
V.I. CODE ANN. §§ 1701(4) ("when the person's resistance is prevented"), 1708(5) ("when
the other person's ability to consent to or resist") (2001); see also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 253(2)(D) (West 2000) (retaining resistance language in physical helplessness
provision); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2(1)(b) (2000) (same); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.01 1(b)(3) (Vernon 2000) (same).
239. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-3-402(4)(d), -404(1)(d) (2000) ("for the purpose
of causing submission"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 111 l(A)(4) (2000) ("as a means of forcing
the victim to submit").
240. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(b)(2)(A) (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3002(a)(4), -
3004(4) (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a)(2) (2001); Wis. STAT. § 940.225(2)(cm)
(2000); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(iii) (Michie 2000).
241. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13(a)(2), -15(a)(2) (2001) (unable to give
knowing consent); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3502(a)(1)(C), -3506(a)(3)(C), -3518(a)(3)
(2000) ("incapable of giving consent'); S.D. CODIFMED LAws § 22-22-1(4) (Michie 2001)
("incapable of giving consent").
242. See infra notes 372-81 and accompanying text.
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b. The Defendant's Mens Rea
Like the mental-incapacitation provisions, a large number of jurisdictions
in the non-definitional category impose a knowledge or negligence mens rea
requirement on the defendant regarding the victim's incapacity.243 None of the
jurisdictions in this category provide a statutory defense that the defendant
reasonably believed that the victim was capable of consenting. California has case
precedent allowing for a reasonable-mistake defense regarding the victim's
capacity to give consent.244
c. Consent
Only a few jurisdictions in this category draw an explicit connection
between intoxication and consent.245 A few additional states provide a more global
definition of consent in the context of their sexual offense provisions 246 or for
criminal offenses in general.247
5. Statutory Silence and the Common Law
Two states, Georgia and Massachusetts, and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, do not fall into any of the previous four categories because their
rape statutes do not include drugs or use language describing various forms of
victim incapacitation. Instead, these jurisdictions rely on case precedent for
coverage of cases involving the sexual assault of intoxicated persons. Georgia's
243. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261(a)(3), 262(a)(2), 286(i), 288a(i); 289(e) (West
2001) (known or reasonably should have been known); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3003(2), -
3005(2) (2001) (knows or has reason to know); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3502(a)(1)(C), -
3506(a)(3)(C), -3518(a)(3) (2000) (known or reasonably apparent); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14:43(A)(1), :89.1(A)(5) (West 2001) (knew or should have known of victim's
incapacity); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-319(1), -320(1) (2001) (knew or should have known);
NEV. REv. STAT. 200.366(1) (2001) (knows or should know); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 626.6(11") (2000) (known to be unable to exercise reasonable judgment); N.C. GIN. STAT.
§§ 14-27.3(a)(2), -.5(a)(2) (2000) (knows or should reasonably know); 14 V.I. CODE ANN.
§ 1701(4) (2001) (known to be in stupor); WIs. STAT. § 940.225(2)(cm) (2000) (knows such
condition).
244. See People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315 (Ct. App. 2000) (honest and
reasonable mistake that sexual partner is not too intoxicated to give legal consent is
defense).
245. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13(a)(2), -15(a)(2) (2001) (unable to give
knowing consent); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3502(a)(1)(C), -3506(a)(3)(C), -3518(a)(3)
(2000) (incapable of giving consent); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 22-22-1(4) (Michie 2001)
(incapable of giving consent); see also IND. CODE §§ 35-42-4-1(a)(3), -2(a)(3), -8(a)(2)
(2001) (person so mentally disabled or deficient that consent cannot be given).
246. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2001) (defining consent in sexual
offense provisions); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-401(1.5) (2000) (defining consent in
unlawful sexual behavior provisions).
247. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 109 (West 2000) (defining consent in
general); N.H. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 626.6 (2000) (defining consent in general); Wis. STAT.
§ 939.22(48)(c) (2000) (defining without consent).
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sexual offense statutes are completely silent on the issue of intoxicants; they do not
contain language dealing with mental incapacitation, consent, or force with respect
to alcohol or drugs. However, in Drake v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court held:
When the victim is physically or mentally unable to give consent to
the act, as when she is intoxicated, drugged, or mentally
incompetent, the requirement of force is found in constructive force,
that is, in the use of force as is necessary to effect the penetration
made by the defendant.
248
Thus, the court provided a judicial gloss to Georgia's rape statute.
Massachusetts also has case precedent, dating from 1870, holding that
sexual intercourse with an intoxicated or drugged victim is rape.249 In
Commonwealth v. Burke, a case in which the defendant took advantage of an
intoxicated woman without having made her drunk beforehand, the court wrote:
We, are therefore, unanimously of the opinion that the crime, which
the evidence in this case tended to prove, of a man's having carnal
intercourse with a woman, without her consent, while she was, as he
knew, wholly insensible so as to be incapable of consenting, and
with such force as was necessary to accomplish the purpose, was
rape. If it were otherwise, any woman in a state of utter
stupefaction, whether caused by drunkenness, sudden disease, the
blow of a third person, or drugs which she had been persuaded to
take even by the defendant himself, would be unprotected from
personal dishonor. The law is not open to such reproach.250
In addition, Massachusetts has a separate crime for drugging, discussed below.
Although not the only jurisdiction with a separate drug statute, Massachusetts is
the only state with such a law that has no reference to intoxicants in its sexual
offense provisions.
Finally, the Uniform Code of Military Justice also has a rape and carnal
knowledge provision that is silent about drugs and other intoxicants.25 1 This
absence is particularly unfortunate because a large number of these cases involve
248. Drake v. State, 236 S.E.2d 748, 750-51 (Ga. 1977) (quoting I WHARTON,
CRvMNAL LAw & PROCEDURE § 307 (1957)); see also Demetrios v. State, 541 S.E.2d 83, 86
(Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing notion of constructive force in cases of intoxicated and
drugged victims).
249. See Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376 (1870); see also PERKINS &
BOYCE, supra note 30, at 212 (characterizing Burke as "one of the leading American cases
on the law of rape...").
250. Burke, 105 Mass. at 380-81; see also Commonwealth v. Helfant, 496 N.E.2d
433 (Mass. 1986) (reaffirming the holding in Burke). But see Commonwealth v. Tatro, 676
N.E.2d 843, 846 (Mass. 1997) (where jury asked "whether intoxication or accompanying
inability to consent constituted force" within the meaning of Massachusetts's child rape
statute).
251. See 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2001).
172 [Vol. 44:1
HeinOnline  -- 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 172 2002
2002] RAPE BY DRUGS 173
military personnel, both as victims and perpetrators.252 However, several cases
have held that sexual activity with an intoxicated or drugged victim constitutes
rape under military law.253 A standard jury instruction reads:
An act of sexual intercourse occurs "by force" when the accused
uses physical violence or power to compel the victim to submit
against her will. When a victim is incapable of consenting because
she is asleep, unconscious, or intoxicated to the extent that she lacks
the mental capacity to consent, then, no greater force is required
than that necessary to achieve penetration.25
Thus, courts in Georgia, Massachusetts, and the military have interpreted their
traditional rape provisions to subsume sexual assault of intoxicated or drugged
victims under the rubric of the force requirement in their statutes. None of these
jurisdictions appear to limit criminal liability to cases in which the defendant
administered the intoxicant.
In summary, forty-seven of the fifty-six American jurisdictions reviewed
here explicitly include rape of intoxicated or drugged victims in their sexual
offenses. Three jurisdictions, Georgia, Massachusetts, and the military, rely on
case law; six states protect mentally or physically incapacitated person without
mentioning drugs or other intoxicants. Approximately two-thirds of these
jurisdictions require that the defendant administer the intoxicant before criminal
liability attaches. The remaining states focus instead on the inability of the victim
to appraise the sexual nature of the conduct or to consent. The most common
approach to the defendant's mens rea with respect to the incapacitated condition of
the victim is to require knowledge that the victim is incapacitated. 5 About twenty
percent of the jurisdictions emphasize the central question of consent and the
connection between consent and victim incapacity in one form or another.
252. See, e.g., United States v. Southwvorth, 50 M.J. 74 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (other
victim thirteen-year-old daughter of petty officer); United States v. Carver, 12 M.J. 581
(A.F.C.M.R. 1981); United States v. Buckley, 35 M.J. 262 (C.M.A. 1992) (other victim
fourteen-year-old civilian); United States v. Natkie, ACM 31693, 1996 CCA LEXIS 286
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 1996).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Baron, 22 M.J. 265, 266 (C.M.A. 1986); United
States v. Short, 16 C.M.R. 11, 15 (C.M.A. 1954).
254. United States v. Natdie, ACM 31693, 1996 CCA LEXIS 286, at *11 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 1996) (citing United States v. Palmer, 33 M.J. 7,9 (C.M.A. 1991)).
255. A few cases raise a mistake of fact defense in cases involving intoxicated
victims-two with respect to the issue of consent. See United States v. Willis, 41 M.J. 435
(C.A.A.F. 1995) (honest and reasonable mistake as to consent is defense); United States v.
Buckley, 35 M.S 262 (C.M.A. 1992). One raises such a defense with respect to the issue of
intoxication. See People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315 (Ct. App. 2000) (honest and
reasonable mistake that sexual partner is not too intoxicated to give legal consent is defense
to rape).
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B. Criminal Drugging Provisions
In addition to sexual offense enactments, approximately one-half of
American jurisdictions separately criminalize the administration of drugs or other
intoxicants, usually as a type of assault or battery. 6 Obviously, these statutes are
only relevant to cases in which the defendant administers the intoxicant. While
some of these statutes may be recent legislation in reaction to the increased
incidence of sexual assault with rape drugs,2 7 some of these provisions are quite
old. For instance, California enacted a law making it illegal to drug a person for
the purpose of committing a felony in 1872.258 Because drugging can be a
medically necessary or an otherwise legal act, statutes that criminalize the
administration of intoxicants must demarcate lawful from unlawful behavior.
Some statutes accomplish this line drawing by emphasizing criminal intent, others
by punishing non-therapeutic drugging, and some by prohibiting the administration
of harmful substances such as poisons. These drugging provisions are organized
into four groups: (1) drugging to accomplish a sexual offense, (2) drugging to
commit a crime, (3) non-therapeutic drugging, and (4) poisoning. Some
jurisdictions have provisions in more than one of these categories.259 Collectively,
by providing for separate criminal liability, the criminal drugging provisions
demonstrate the legislative judgment that drugging is a separate harm; they also
increase the penalty for offenders using drugs to commit sexual assault by making
the defendants liable for more than one offense. This section also considers
grading strategies and sentence enhancement schemes based on the use of
intoxicants. While not providing for separate criminal liability, these statutes share
the characteristic of enhancing the penalty based on the use of intoxicants.
1. Drugging to Accomplish a Sexual Offense
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana outlaw the
administration of drugs in the exclusive context of committing sexual offenses.260
256. These offenses more closely resemble the common law crime of battery in
that they require the application of a substance to a person rather than an attempted battery
or an intentional scaring type of assault. However, it appears that modem assault statutes,
like the Model Penal Code, essentially subsume both battery and assault in one provision
bearing the label assault.
257. Colorado recently enacted a statute that prohibits the administration of
gamma hydroxybutyrate or ketamine. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-13-123 (2001); see also
NEV. REv. STAT. 200.408(1) (2001) (outlawing the administration flunitrazepam and GIB
to aid in the commission of a crime of violence); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(f) (Law. Co-
op. 2000) (outlawing the distribution of GHB or other controlled substance with intent to
commit various crimes).
258. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 222 (West 2001).
259. For instance, New York outlaws drugging to commit a sexual offense, N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 130.90(1) (McKinney 2001) and non-therapeutic drugging, N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 120.05(5) (McKinney 2001).
260. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:969 (West 2000); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 272,
§ 3 (2001); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.90(1) (McKinney 2001); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 2714
(2000).
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Additionally, Kansas, in a unique provision, prohibits furnishing alcohol to minors
for purposes of engaging in incest.261 England has a similar statute, entitled
"Administering Drugs to Obtain or Facilitate Intercourse." 262 These statutes are
noteworthy because they create new substantive offenses for using drugs to
accomplish sexual intercourse. The five states differ in their classifications of their
drugging crimes.263 All require a heightened intent or mens rea for commission of
the offenses as described below.
The Massachusetts statute provides that "[w]hoever applies, administers
to or causes to be taken any drug, matter or thing with intent to stupefy or
overpower such person so as to thereby enable any person to have sexual
intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with such person shall be
punished..... 264 This provision is noteworthy because Massachusetts's rape statute
does not address the circumstance when the victim is incapacitated by drugs,
2 65
although case precedent covers those instances. 6 Yet, Massachusetts makes it a
separate crime to administer drugs to accomplish sexual intercourse. All other
states in this category explicitly mention intoxicants in their sexual offense
provisions.
New York also has a separate statute, entitled "Facilitating a sex offense
with a controlled substance," which provides for criminal liability when a person
"knowingly and unlawfully possesses a controlled substance and administers such
substance to another person without such person's consent and with intent to
commit against such person conduct constituting a felony defined in this
article.... 267 Pennsylvania prohibits the unauthorized administration of an
intoxicant
when, with intent to commit an offense under...[the rape,
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault,
indecent assault statutes] he or she substantially impairs the
complainant's power to appraise or control his or her conduct by
261. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3610b (2000) (furnishing alcoholic beverages to
minors to commit incest).
262. Sexual Offences Act, 1956, c. 69, § 4 (Eng.) ("It is an offence for a person to
apply or administer to, or cause to be taken by, a woman any drug, matter or thing with
intent to stupefy or overpower her so as thereby to enable any man to have unlawful sexual
intercourse with her.").
263. Massachusetts classifies its crime as a crimes against chastity, morality,
decency and good order, New York puts its provisions under sex offenses, Pennsylvania
classifies its crime under the assault chapter, Louisiana classifies its crime as a drug offense,
and Kansas classifies its very specific offense as one affecting family relationships and
children.
264. MAss. GEN. LAvs ch. 272, § 3 (2001). For a case involving both
Massachusetts's rape and drugging statute, see Commonwealth v. Helfant, 496 N.E.2d 433
(Mass. 1986).
265. See MAss. GEN. LAWs ch. 265, § 22 (2001).
266. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
267. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.90(1) (McKirmey 2001).
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administering, without the knowledge of the complainant, drugs or
other intoxicants.
268
Louisiana makes the use of intoxicants for the purposes of committing a sexual
offense a controlled substance crime. The statute provides that "[w]hoever, with
the intent to commit a crime of violence as defined in R.S. 14:2(13)0) [forcible
rape] against an individual, violates Subsection A of this Section by administering
a controlled dangerous substance to a person who is unaware that the controlled
dangerous substance has been or is being administered to him, shall be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment...."
269
Finally, one additional state, Arkansas, makes it an assault crime to
introduce a controlled substance into the body of another without necessarily
requiring that the defendant also intend to commit a sexual offense.270 However,
the statute grades this assault crime more severely if the drugging occurred in
connection with a sexual offense:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, any
person who violates this section by introducing a controlled
substance into the body of another person without their knowledge
or consent with the purpose of committing any felonious sexual
offense...or... any unlawful sexual act...or sexual contact...or any act
involving a child engaging in sexual explicit conduct...is guilty of a
Class Y felony.
271
Criminal actors in Arkansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Kansas, then, would be responsible for these separate drugging-for-sexual-
assault crimes in addition to the attendant sexual offense. For instance, in Helfant,
Massachusetts authorities prosecuted the defendant for both drugging the victim
and raping her.272 In Regina v. Cobb, the British case involving a male nurse, the
defendant was prosecuted for murder, rape, and administering a stupefying drug.273
2. Drugging to Commit a Crime
Unlike the statutes criminalizing the use of intoxicants in accomplishing
exclusively sexual offenses, nine jurisdictions have statutes that make it unlawful
to drug a person for the purpose of committing any crime. 274 Two states
268. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2714 (2000).
269. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:969(D) (West 2001).
270. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(a) (Michie 2001) ("It is unlawful for any
person to inject any controlled substance...into the human body of another person....");
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(b) (Michie 2001) ("It is unlawful for any person to administer
or cause to be ingested, inhaled, or otherwise introduced into the human body of another
person a controlled substance....").
271. ARK. CODEANN. § 5-13-210(f) (Michie 2001).
272. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
273. See Regina v. Cobb, [2002] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 19 (Crim. App. 2001).
274. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 222 (West 2001) (administering drugs with intent to
commit felony); IDAHO CODE § 18-913 (Michie 2000) (felonious administering of drugs);
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specifically include sexual offenses as falling within this larger category of
felonies,275 and one identifies a commonly used rape drug.2 76 Most of these statutes
aie classified as assault crimes. All require the intent to commit another felony or
crime.
California's statute, enacted in 1872, provides: "Every person guilty of
administering to another any chloroform, ether, laudanum, or any controlled
substance, anaesthetic, or intoxicating agent, with intent thereby to enable or assist
himself or herself or any other person to commit a felony, is guilty of a felony."
277
The provisions in Idaho, Minnesota, Nevada, the Virgin Islands, and Wisconsin
are essentially the same;278 Vermont's law is limited to anesthetics. 279 Maryland's
statute provides that "[a] person may not administer a controlled dangerous
substance or other drug to another person without that person's knowledge and
commit against that person: (1) A crime of violence...; or (2) A sexual offense in
the third degree..... 280 Nevada has two provisions; one appears to be modeled after
California's statute,28 1 and the other is similar to Maryland's:
A person who causes to be administered to another any controlled
substance without that person's knowledge and with the intent
thereby to enable or assist himself or any other person to commit a
MD. ANN. CODE of 1957, CRiMEs & PUN. § 287c (2001) (drug-induced crime of violence or
sexual offense); MINN. STAT. § 609.235 (2000) (use of drugs to injure or facilitate crime);
NEV. REv. STAT. 200.405 (2001) (administration of drugs to aid commission of crime of
violence); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(f) (Law. Co-op. 2000) (narcotics offense to use
drugs to commit sexual offenses, kidnapping, larceny); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 13, § 12 (2000)
(criminal use of anesthetics); 14 V.I. CODE ANN. § 300 (2000) (administration of narcotic
with intent to commit felony); WIs. STAT. § 941.32 (2000) (administering drugs to facilitate
commission of crime); see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:38.1 (West 2000) ("mingling
harmful substances is the intentional mingling of any harmful substance or matter with any
food, drink, or medicine with intent that the same shall be taken by any human being to his
injury").
275. See MD. ANN. CODE of 1957, CRIMEs & PUN. § 287(c) (2001) (drug-induced
crime of violence or sexual offense); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(f) (Law. Co-op. 2000)
(narcotics and controlled substances offense to use drugs to commit sexual offenses,
kidnapping, or larceny).
276. SeeNEv. REv. STAT. 200.408(a) (2001).
277. CAL. PENAL CODE § 222 (West 2001); see also id. §§ 12022.75
(enhancement for administration of controlled substances against victim's will), 667.61
(specified sex offenses subject to life imprisonment).
278. See IDAHO CODE § 18-913 (Michie 2000); MINN. STAT. § 609.235 (2000);
NEv. REV. STAT. 200.405 (2001) (administration of drugs to aid commission of crime of
violence); 14 V.I. CODE ANN. § 300 (2000) (administration of narcotic with intent to
commit felony); WIs. STAT. § 941.32 (2000) (administering drugs to facilitate commission
of crime).
279. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit 13, § 12 (2000) (criminal use of anesthetics).
280. MD. ANN. CODE of 1957, CRIMES & PUN. § 287(c) (2001).
281. See NEv. REv. STAT. 200.405 (2001) ("a person who administers to another
person any chloroform, ether, laudanum, or any controlled substance, anesthetic, or
intoxicating or emetic agent, with the intent thereby to enable or assist himself or any other
person to commit a felony, is guilty of a category B felony...").
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crime of violence against that person or the property of that person
is guilty of a category B felony.... 282
The statute also defines "controlled substances" to include those commonly
associated with sexual offenses (i.e., the rape drugs flunitrazepam and gamma-
hydroxybutyrate). 213
South Carolina takes a slightly different approach by embedding its
drugging provision in the narcotics and controlled substances article rather than the
assault law. The statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for a person to administer, distribute, deliver, or
aid, abet, attempt, or conspire to administer, distribute, dispense, or
deliver a controlled substance or gamma hydroxy butyrate to an
individual with the intent to commit one of the following crimes
against that individual:...[inter alia] criminal sexual conduct in the
first, second or third degree...
294
Thus, in South Carolina, the administration of a substance to aid in the commission
of another specified crime, including various sexual crimes, is a drug offense.
2 8 5
3. Non-Therapeutic Drugging
Ten jurisdictions make it an assault or battery crime to administer
intoxicants without the additional requirement that the drugging occur for the
purpose of committing either a sexual offense or another crime,286 although
282. Id. 200.408(1).
283. Id. 200.408(2)(a).
284. S.C. CODEANN. § 44-53-370(f) (Law. Co-op. 2000).
285. As noted above, Louisiana makes it a controlled substance offense to
administer drugs to another to commit a sexual offense. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:969(D) (West 2001).
286. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-21(a)(6) (2001); ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-1205(A)
(2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210 (Michie 2001) ("It is unlawful for any person to inject
any controlled substance...into the human body of another person....'); COLO. REv. STAT.
§§ 18-3-203(l)(e) ("For a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he
intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness, or other physical or mental impairment or
injury to another person by administering to him, without his consent, a drug, substance, or
preparation capable of producing the intended harm"), -13-123(3) (outlawing the unlawful
administration of gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB) or ketamine) (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 53a-60(a)(4) (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 625 ("A person is guilty of unlawfully
administering drugs when, for a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment,
the person intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness or other alteration of the physical or
mental condition of another person by administering to the other person, without consent, a
drug."), 626 (similar provision for controlled substance, counterfeit substance, or narcotic
drug) (2000); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4(c) (2001) ("A person who administers to an
individual or causes him to take, without his consent or by threat or deception, and for other
than medical purposes, any intoxicating, poisonous, stupefying, narcotic, anesthetic, or
controlled substance commits aggravated battery."); IOWA CODE § 708.5 (2001) ("Any
person who administers to another...any poisonous, stupefying, stimulating, [etc.] substance
in sufficient quantity to have such effect..."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(5) (McKinney
HeinOnline  -- 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 178 2002
20021 RAPE BY DRUGS 179
Arkansas grades the crime more severely if the drugging occurred to commit a
sexual offense. 287 Instead of requiring intent to commit a sexual offense or other
crime, these statutes require that the administration be done for other than medical
or therapeutic purposes28 and without the victim's consent2 89 or knowledge 290 or
by threat or deception.291 Arizona has a typical statute, which provides that a
person commits an assault "if, for a purpose other than lawful medical or
therapeutic treatment, such person knowingly introduces or causes to be
introduced into the body of another person, without such other person's consent,
intoxicating liquors, a narcotic drug or dangerous drug., 292 Thus, these statutes
demarcate legal from illegal drugging based on the lack of medical necessity rather
than the defendant's felonious intent. The approach of these statutes is similar to
the Model Penal Code's combined assault and battery offense with one difference.
That provision is written in terms of bodily injury,293 which is defined as "physical
pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition,"294 and which includes,
2001) ("For a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally
causes stupor, unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person by
administering to him, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of
producing same...'); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 13, § 1024(a)(3) (2000) ("for a purpose other than
lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness, or
other physical or mental impairment or injury to another person by administering to him,
without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of producing the intended
harm..."); see also COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-18-416, -5-116 (2000) (inducing consumption
of controlled substances by fraudulent means). At least one jurisdiction had such a statute
but it was repealed. See WASH. REv. CODE § 9.11.020 (repealed) (second-degree assault to
administer drug with intent to commit any crime).
287. Arkansas's provision specifically refers to sexual offenses. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-13-210(f) (Michie 2001); see also Sera v. State, 17 S.W.3d 61 (Ark. 2000)
(discussing Arkansas's administration provision).
288. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-21(a)(6) (2001) (other than lawful medical or
therapeutic teratment); Aiuz. R-v. STAT. § 13-1205(A) (2000) (same); CoLo. REv. STAT.
§ 18-3-203(1)(e) (2000) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-60(a)(4) (2001) (same); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 625, 626 (2000) (same); 720 ILL. COMi. STAT. 5/12-4(c) (2001) (other
than medical purposes); IOWA CODE § 708.5 (2001) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(5)
(McKinney 2001) (other than lawful medical or therapeutic teratment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit
13, § 1024(a)(3) (2000) (same).
289. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-21(a)(6) (2001); ARIz. Rnv. STAT. § 13-1205(A)
(2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(1) (Michie 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-203(1)(e)
(2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-60(a)(4) (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 625, 626
(2000); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4(c) (2001); IOWA CODE § 708.5 (2001); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 120.05(5) (McKinney 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 13, § 1024(a)(3) (2000).
290. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210 (Michie 2001) (without knowledge or
consent).
291. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4(c) (2001) (without consent or by threat or
deception); IOWA CODE § 708.5 (2001) (same). Ohio's rape and gross sexual imposition
statutes provide that the "offender substantially impairs the other person's judgment or
control by administering any drug,...surreptitiously or by force, threat of force, or
deception." Omo REv. CODEANN. §§ 2907.02(A)(1)(a), .05(A)(2) (Anderson 2001).
292. A~iz. REv. STAT. §13-1205(A) (2001).
293. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1962).
294. Id. § 210.0(2).
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according to the commentary, "non-therapeutic administration of a drug or
narcotic., 295 Interestingly, the commentary also notes that "[i]t is therefore
unnecessary to make special provision for occasioning these harms, as some
existing statutes have done.' 296 In addition to its assault statute, Colorado
specifically outlaws the unlawful administration of GHB and ketamine in a
separate statute,297 and has two controlled substances provisions that make it a
crime to induce consumption of controlled substances by fraudulent means.293
Less clear is the question of whether these non-therapeutic drugging
statutes are intended as anticipatory or inchoate crimes, which would merge with
the completed sexual assault, or as independent offenses worthy of punishment in
addition to the sexual offense. Arkansas's statute explicitly addresses this problem:
"The provisions of this section and the criminal penalties provided for this section
shall be in addition to all other criminal penalties a person is subjected to under
provisions of the Arkansas Criminal Code and the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act..... 29 9 Notably, in Sera, Arkansas prosecuted the defendant, who drugged,
sexually assaulted, and videotaped the assaults of his three victims, for both the
sexual and drugging offenses. 300 Delaware also makes an explicit connection
between one of its two drugging statutes30' and sexual assault offenses, auguring in
favor of the view that both offenses are punishable. Delaware's first- and second-
degree rape statutes provide:
The sexual intercourse [or penetration] occurs without the victim's
consent and [] was facilitated by or occurred during the course of
the commission or attempted commission of: 1. Any felony; or 2.
295. Id. § 211.1 cmt. at 187; see also IDAHO CODE § 18-907(d) (Michie 2000)
(defining aggravated battery to include "[u]ses any poison or other noxious or destructive
substance or liquid"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:33 (West 2001) ("Battery is the intentional
use of force or violence upon the person of another; or the intentional administration of a
poison or other noxious liquid or substance to another."); LA FAVE, supra note 28, at 738
n.11.
296. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 cmt. at 187-88 (1980) (footnote omitted). The
omitted footnote cites some of the very provisions discussed in this section.
297. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-13-123(3) (2001) ("it shall be unlawful for any
person to knowingly cause or attempt to cause any other person to unknowingly consume or
receive the direct administration of gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB) or ketamine or the
immediate chemical precursors or chemical analogs for either of such substances").
298. See COLO. Rav. STAT. §§ 18-18-416(1), -5-116 (2000) ("It is unlawful for
any person, surreptitiously or by means of fraud, misrepresentation, suppression of truth,
deception, or subterfuge, to cause any other person to unknowingly consume or receive the
direct administration of any controlled substance....").
299. ARK. CODEANN. § 5-13-210(d) (Michie 2001).
300. See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
301. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 625 (2000) ("when, for a purpose other than
lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, the person intentionally causes stupor,
unconsciousness or other alteration of the physical or mental condition of another person by
administering to the other person, without consent; a drug").
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Any of the following misdemeanors:..unlawfully administering
drugs...
3 02
Three states, Arizona, Delaware, and Iowa, have stand-alone drugging provisions,
rather than embedding them in larger assault or battery statutes, which may be
suggestive of treating them as completed crimes rather than anticipatory
offenses. 3  Finally, one additional state, Ohio, has a unique provision entitled
"corrupting another with drugs" which prohibits various forms of administration of
drugs to another.304 Several cases in Ohio have been brought charging defendants
with both the rape and drug crimes.
305
4. Poisoning Statutes
Fifteen jurisdictions criminalize the administration of a poison or other
noxious substances with the intent to kill or injure the victim.30 6 Most jurisdictions
treat poisoning in miscellaneous or unique criminal provisions; four jurisdictions
include poisoning in battery or assault crimes. 7 While it may be a stretch to
prosecute criminals who administer intoxicants to victims under these poisoning
statutes, at least one case has. In State v. Weaver, the defendant got an eight-year-
302. Id. §§ 772(a)(2)(b), 773(a)(2).
303. See ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-1205(A) (2000) (unlawfully administering
intoxicating liquors, narcotic or dangerous drug); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. §§ 625, 626 (2000)
(unlawfully administering drugs, controlled or counterfeit substances, narcotic drugs); IowA
CODE § 708.5 (2001) (administering harmful substances).
304. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.02 (Anderson 2001). It provides, in part,
[n]o person shall knowingly...(1) By force, threat, or deception,
administer to another or induce or cause another to use a controlled
substance; (2) By any means, administer or furnish to another or induce
or cause another to use a controlled substance with purpose to cause
serious physical harm to the other person, or with purpose to cause the
other person to become drug dependent; (3) By any means, administer or
furnish to another or induce or cause another to use a controlled
substance, and thereby cause serious physical harm to the other person,
or cause the other person to become drug dependent....
Id.
305. See, e.g., State v. Dillon, No. 79AP-785, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 10876
(Ohio Ct. App. June 24, 1980).
306. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 347 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 859.01 (2000);
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-907(d), -5501 (Michie 2000); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:33, :38.1
(West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 265, § 28 (2001); MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.436
(2001); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-61, -63 (2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 832 (2000); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 11-16-5 (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-20-23 (Michie 2001); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 2306 (2001); VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-54.1 (Michie 2001); 14 V.I. CODE ANN.
§§ 295(2), 296 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.40.030, 9A.36.011(1)(b), 9A.36.021(1)(d)
(2001); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-7 (2001).
307. See IDAHO CODE § 18-907(d) (Miechie 2000) (aggravated battery); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 14:33 (West 2000) (battery); 14 V.I. CODE ANN. §§ 295(2), 296 (2001) (first-
and second-degree assault, respectively); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9A.36.011(l)(b), .021(1)(d)
(2001) (same).
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old girl severely drunk and was discovered by authorities with his head between
her unclothed legs.308 The child suffered cardiac arrest, as a result of the excessive
amount of alcohol in her system, and had to be resuscitated. 0 9 West Virginia
prosecuted Weaver for sexual assault and separately for the administration of
alcohol under the state's attempt-to-kill-or-injure-by-poison statute.310 Weaver
argued that alcohol did not constitute a poison within the meaning of the statute.
The appellate court rejected his contention, noting that one definition of poison is
"[a]ny agent which, introduced...into an organism, may chemically produce an
injurious or deadly effect..... 311 Thus, in jurisdictions with poisoning statutes,
actors may incur additional liability for the administration of intoxicants as a
prelude to sexual assault, especially in cases involving rape drugs that pose
considerably more danger than alcohol.
In summary, then, twenty-two jurisdictions criminalize the administration
of an intoxicant to another person, although these provisions vary considerably in
scope, and fifteen jurisdictions outlaw various forms of poisoning. These statutes
are significant because they recognize that a separate harm befalls victims when
drugs are introduced into their systems irrespective of any subsequent harm, such
as sexual assault. Thus, in states with drug-related assault or poisoning statutes,
perpetrators of sexual assault accomplished by drugs or other intoxicants can be
prosecuted for both the sexual offenses and the separate assault or poisoning
charges. Indeed, as a number of cases in Part II demonstrate, authorities did just
that.312 Furthermore, offenders in these jurisdictions may be punished more
severely because they have committed two, not one, criminal acts, although the
possibility of concurrent sentences must be considered. Finally, in cases where the
defendant has intoxicated the victim but has not succeeded in accomplishing the
sexual assault, he may be prosecuted for any of these drugging crimes or,
alternatively, for another type of assault crime-assault with intent to rape.31
3
308. See State v. Weaver, 382 S.E.2d 327, 329 (W. Va. 1989).
309. See id.
310. See id. at 329-30 (referring to W. VA. CODE § 61-2-7 (2001)).
311. Id. at 330.
312. In State v. Karlen, 589 N.W.2d 594 (S.D. 1999), the defendant drugged
several male victims and had sexual contact with them. He was prosecuted for the sexual
offenses and unauthorized distribution of a substance.
313. Seven states punish the crime of assault with the intent to commit rape or
other types of sexual offenses. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 220 (West 2001) (assault to
commit mayhem or specified sex offenses); IDAHO CODE § 18-909 (Michie 2000) (assault
with intent to commit a serious felony including rape); MASS. GEN. LAWs ch. 265, §§ 24,
24B (2001) (assault with intent to commit rape and assault on child under sixteen with
intent to commit rape, respectively); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-71 (2001) (assault with intent
to ravish); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-3 (Michie 2000) (assault with intent to commit violent
felony including criminal sexual penetration); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-8 (2001) (assault
with intent to commit first-degree sexual assault); 14 V.1. CODE ANN. § 295 (2001) (first-
degree assault includes assault with intent to commit rape, etc.). Other jurisdictions have
repealed similar statutes. Historically these crimes were intended to cover cases in which an
act of sexual penetration had not occurred and therefore the defendant could not be held
criminally liable for the underlying sexual offense because it had not been completed. Thus,
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5. Grading and Sentence Enhancement Provisions Involving the Use of
Drugs
A number of jurisdictions address the problem of drug-induced sexual
assaults by (1) grading sexual offenses committed with intoxicants as higher
crimes, (2) enhancing the penalty for the use of drugs, (3) including victim
incapacity as an aggravating factor in sentencing guidelines, or (4) crafting sexual
predator laws to encompass perpetrators who use intoxicants.314 Conceptually,
these approaches express legislative condemnation for conduct involving the
administration of drugs to facilitate the commission of a sexual offense. Also, the
increased penalties in these statutes recognize that the victim has experienced more
than the sexual harm.
First, several states grade their sexual offenses more highly when the
crime is committed by the administration of an intoxicant. For instance, Indiana
makes it a higher level of felony to commit the sexual offense if it "is facilitated by
furnishing the victim, without the victim's knowledge, with a drug...or controlled
substance...or knowing that the victim was furnished with a drug or a controlled
substance."315 Louisiana punishes the sexual assault of an intoxicated victim as
simple assault, but punishes the same conduct as forcible rape when the defendant
has administered the intoxicant.316 Texas outlaws the use of drugs in its sexual
assault statute, but if the criminal actor uses rape drugs (i.e., "administers or
provides flunitrazepam, otherwise known as rohypnol, or gamma hydroxybutyrate
to the victim of the offense with the intent of facilitating the commission of the
offense...."), 31 7 the offense becomes aggravated sexual assault.318
An example of a sentence enhancement scheme can be found in
Arizona's sexual assault statute, which provides that if the crime "involved the
assault with intent to commit rape was understood as a lesser included offense of rape and
that conviction for both the assault and the completed crime would be barred. This may also
explain why several states have abolished this offense after they criminalized sexual
conduct not involving penetration as a lesser form of sexual offense. One old case, Quinn v.
State, 142 N.W. 510 (Wis. 1913), discusses the introduction of intoxicants to a victim for
the purposes of committing a sexual assault upon her as an assault to commit rape. The
court explained that if the defendant had the felonious intent at the time he administered the
liquor, then he committed an assault, but if he administered the liquor only for the purpose
of inducing her to submit, then no assault occurred.
314. See ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-1406(B) (2001); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12022.75,
667.61 (West 2001); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 666.7(f)(11) (West 2001); IND. CODE
§§ 35-42-4-1(b)(4), -2(b)(4), -3(a)(4), -5(a)(2)(B), -8(b)(3) (2000); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-
3-65 (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503(c), -505(d), -522(c) (2001); see also ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-13-210 (Michie 2001) (making it a more severe form of assault and battery
to use drugs to commit sexual offense).
315. IND. CODE §§ 35-42-4-1(b)(4), -2(b)(4), -3(a)(4), -5(a)(2)(B), -8(b)(3)
(2000).
316. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:42.1(A)(2) (forcible rape), :43(A)(1) (simple
rape) (West 2001).
317. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(2)(A)(vi) (Vernon 2000).
318. Compare TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 1(b)(6) (Vernon 2000), with TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(2)(A)(vi) (Vernon 2000).
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intentional or knowing administration of flunitrazepam, gamma hydroxy butyrate
or ketamine hydrochloride without the victim's knowledge, the presumptive,
minimum and maximum sentence for the offense shall be increased three years."
319
Similarly, Tennessee's rape, sexual battery, and child rape statutes provide that
"the court shall consider as an enhancement factor that the defendant caused the
victim to be mentally incapacitated or physically helpless by use of a controlled
substance., 320 Mississippi provides for possible life imprisonment. 321 One of
California' sentence enhancement provisions reads:
Any person who, for the purpose of committing a felony,
administers by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other means,
any controlled substance...against the victim's will by means of
force, violence, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to
the victim or another person, shall, in addition and consecutive to
the penalty provided for the felony or attempted felony of which he
or she is convicted, be punished by an additional term of three
years.
3 22
California also has a penalty enhancement scheme for sex offenses. If the
defendant accomplishes various specified sexual offenses by administering a
controlled substance to the victim by "force, violence, or fear" and another
circumstance, then he or she is eligible for life imprisonment and is not eligible for
parole for twenty-five years.323
Michigan's sentencing guidelines take into account the degree of the
offender's exploitation of victim vulnerability. The offender receives five points if
he or she "exploit[s] a victim by his or her difference in size or strength, or both, or
exploit[s] a victim who was intoxicated, under the influence of drugs, asleep, or
,,324
unconscious. Similarly, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines incorporate victim
319. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-140603) (2001).
320. TENN. CoDEANN. §§ 39-13-503(c), -505(d), -522(c) (2001).
321. See Miss. CODEANN. § 97-3-65 (2001) (enhanced penalty for forcible sexual
intercourse or statutory rape by administering substances).
Every person who shall have forcible sexual intercourse with any person,
or who shall have sexual intercourse not constituting forcible sexual
intercourse or statutory rape with any person without that person's
consent by administering to such person any substance or liquid which
shall produce such stupor or such imbecility of mind or weakness of
body as to prevent effectual resistance, upon conviction shall be
imprisoned for life...[or] any term as the court, in its discretion, may
determine.
Id.
322. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.75 (West 2001).
323. Id. § 667.6; see also id. § 666.7(f(1 1) (listing current sentence enhancement
provisions); People v. Bohannon, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 488 (Ct. App. 2000) (recently
interpreting 667.6(c)).
324. MiCH. COMP. LAWs § 777A0(c) (2000). For an interesting case involving the
application of the Guidelines to a sexual assault case not involving drugs, but concerning
184 - [Vol. 44:1
HeinOnline  -- 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 184 2002
RAPE BY DRUGS
vulnerability as an aggravating factor.325 Finally, a number ofjurisdictions include
individuals who have committed their sexual offenses through the agency of drugs
or other intoxicants within the purview of their sexual predator schemes.326
C. Controlled Substances Provisions Regarding Rape Drugs
In 2000, Congress passed the Hillory J. Farias and Samantha Reid Date-
Rape Drug Prohibition Act.327 The act makes gamma hydroxybutyric acid a
schedule I chemical, which is subject to the strictest type of controlled substances
regulation. Congress made the following finding, among others: "At least 20 States
have scheduled such drug in their drug laws and law enforcement officials have
been experiencing an increased presence of the drug in driving under the influence,
sexual assault, and overdose cases especially at night clubs and parties. 328 Some
states outlaw the possession and/or distribution of certain controlled substances,
including those commonly used to commit sexual offenses:329 gamma hydroxy
the rape of defendant's fourteen-year-old cousin, see People v. Houston, 532 N.W.2d 508
(Mich. 1995). The majority of the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the trial court's upward
departure from the guidelines in sentencing the defendant to a substantial term of
imprisonment.
325. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2A3.1(b)(1) (providing a
four-leVel enhancement for administering drug, intoxicant, or similar substance among other
means), 3A1.l(b)(1) (providing for a two-level enhancement for vulnerable victims) (2001);
see also United States v. Morgan, 164 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the federal
sentencing guidelines to a case involving the sexual assault of an intoxicated victim); United
States v. Altman, 901 F.2d 1161, 1165 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying federal sentencing
guidelines in case involving drugged victim); Jay Dyckman, Note, Brightening the Line:
Properly Identifying a Vulnerable Victim for Purposes of Section 3A1.1 of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 98 CoLUM. L. REV. 1960 (1998) (discussing the vulnerable-victim
provision).
326. See, e.g., State v. Stimmel, No. 99AP-629, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1473
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2000) (discussing Ohio's sexual predator law); State v. Sunnycalb,
No. CA97-05-100, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 28 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1998) (same). In two
cases, rape by drugs was the basis for deportation. See Castro-Baez v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1057
(9th Cir. 2000); Ourk v. INS, No. 00-35645 (Sept. 18, 2000) (described in Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
327. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
328. Id. § 812 (2000).
329. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-201 (Michie 2001) (GHB); CoLO. REv.
STAT. § 18-18-203 (G-B), -405(2.5) (flunitrazepam) (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 4714(e) (2000) (GHB); FLA. STAT. ch. 893.03(l)(a)(30), (1)(d)(3) (2001) (flunitrazepam
and GHB, respectively); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-30(l) (2000) (flunitrazepam); HAw. REv.
STAT. § 329-14(d)(17) (2000) (GEIB); IDAHO CODE § 37-2705(e)(1)-(2) (Michie 2000)
(GHB, flunitrazepam); IND. CODE § 35-48-2-4(e) (2001) (GHB); IOWA CODE § 126.23
(2001) (outlawing possession and distribution of gamma hydroxybutyrate); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1102(2)(L)-(M) (West 2001) (GHB and ketamine); MAss. GEN. LAws ch.
94C, § 31 (flunitrazepam. GHB, ketamine); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-113(e) (2001)
(GHB); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-405(f) (2001) (GHB); NEv. REv. STAT. 453.336, .337 (2001)
(flunitrazepam, GHB); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 318-B:1-c (flunitrazepam, GHIB,
ketamine), :26 (flunitrazepam) (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:35-5.3 (outlawing
manufacture, distribution, and possession of flunitrazepam), -10.2 (outlawing obtaining or
20021 185
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butyrate, flunitrazepam, and ketamine. Six states also refer to these substances in
other criminal provisions dealing with sexual assault330 or drugging.331 Two states
place prohibitions on the use of intoxicants to commit sexual offenses in their
controlled substances codes rather than in their sexual assault statutes. 332
D. Summary and Conclusion
The foregoing review of American statutory law reveals that collectively
federal and state legislatures have done a fairly good job of punishing many
aspects of sexual assault by drugs. A host of provisions from almost every
jurisdiction specifically criminalize rape by drugs or other intoxicants. Defendants
who administer drugs and then sexually assault victims are subject to punishment
almost everywhere they commit the crime in the United States. In fewer
jurisdictions, those who opportunistically take advantage of persons who have
voluntarily ingested alcohol or drugs face criminal liability. In total, these statutes
protect and vindicate the right of all citizens to be free of nonconsensual sexual
exploitation.
In addition to the sexual offenses, more than one-half of the jurisdictions
separately punish the administration of an intoxicant. Whether to prohibit the
commission of a sexual offense or other felony, to protect against non-therapeutic
drugging, or to guard against injurious poisoning, all these offenses recognize that
drugging may constitute a criminal harm in its own right, separate and apart from
the nonconsensual sexual activity that the drugging may precede. That recognition
is echoed in those grading and sentencing provisions that give added weight to the
administration of intoxicants in sexual assault cases beyond the sexual harm.
Finally, changes are occurring with respect to the treatment of common
rape drugs, such as GHB, flunitrazepam, and ketamine. The federal system and a
considerable number of states have changed their narcotics and controlled
substances provisions to treat these drugs as the dangerous substances they are,
whether voluntarily ingested or administered as a prelude to rape. Collectively,
possessing gamma hydroxybutyrate without prescription) (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
89(4)c (2000) (GHB); Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 3719.41 (Anderson 2001) (GHB); 35 PA.
CoNs. STAT. § 780-113 (2001) (GHB); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370 (Law. Co-op. 2000)
(flunitrazepam, GHB); VA. CODEANN. §§ 18.2-251.2 (flunitrazepam), 54.1-3446(4) (GHB)
(Michie 2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.515 (2000) (flunitrazepam); Wis. STAT.
§ 961.14(5)(ag) (2000) (GIB); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1014(e)(iii) (Michie 2001)
(GHB); see also 2001 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 841 (Deering) (reclassifying GHB as a
schedule I controlled substance); FLA. STAT. ch. 893.135(1)(g)-(h) (2000) (providing for
mandatory sentences for trafficking in flunitrazepam and GHB, respectively); 2001 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 251 (Vernon) (classifying flunitrazepam and GHB in one penalty group and
ketamine in another).
330. See ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-1406(B) (2000); IOwA CODE § 709.4(3)(a)-(b)
(2001); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(2)(A)(vi) (Vernon 2000).
331. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-13-123(3) (2001); NEv. REv. STAT.
200.408(2)(a) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(f) (Law. Co-op. 2000).
332. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:969(D) (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-
53-370(f) (Law. Co-op. 2000).
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these three sets of provisions go a long way toward combating the abuses
witnessed in the cases excerpted at the beginning of the Article and discussed in
more detail in Section I.
On the other hand, the statutory schemes in place for the control and
punishment of rape by drugs and other intoxicants would benefit from some forms
of statutory reform in terms of coverage, language, and general approach. The last
section of this article makes suggestions for statutory reform, arguing for the
incorporation of many of the good aspects of existing statutory schemes across the
board. This will ensure the maximum criminal coverage for those who commit
rape by drugs and will provide a measure of uniformity in approach across the
jurisdictions in the United States.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR STATUTORY REFORM
As these authorities make clear, the fundamental wrong at which the
law of rape is aimed is not the application of physical force that
causes physical harm. Rather, the law of rape primarily guards the
integrity of a woman's will and the privacy of her sexuality from an
act of intercourse undertaken without her consent. Because the
fundamental wrong is the violation of a woman's will and sexuality,
the law of rape does not require that "force" cause physical harm.
Rather, in this scenario, "force" plays merely a supporting
evidentiary role, as necessary only to ensure an act of intercourse
has been undertaken against a victim's will.
333
Criminal sexual offense statutes should protect citizens from unwanted,
nonconsensual sexual activity by whatever means it is achieved, be it force, threat,
coercion, power, fraud, or drugs. As many commentators have observed, the
central value protected by sexual offense provisions is sexual autonomy or sexual
integrity,334 the violation of which represents a unique, not readily comparable,
type of harm to the victim.3 35 In one sense, it should be irrelevant to rape law how
the victim became incapable of giving consent-whether intoxicated by her own
333. People v. Cicero, 204 Cal. Rptr. 582, 590 (1984).
334. The New Jersey Supreme Court wrote:
Today the law of sexual assault is indispensable to the system of legal
rules that assures each of us the right to decide who may touch our
bodies, when, and under what circumstances. The decision to engage in
sexual relations with another person is one of the most private and
intimate decisions a person can make. Each person has the right not only
to decide whether to engage in sexual contact with another, but also to
control the circumstances and character of that contact.
State of New Jersey in Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992).
335. See Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond
Rape, 93 CoLurM. L. REV. 1442, 1448 (1993) ("spiritual murder"); Lynne N. Henderson,
What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 193 (1987-88) ("negation of
existence"); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion)
("ultimate violation of self").
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efforts or by those of the defendant. Thus, at a minimum, every jurisdiction should
have an explicit statutory provision that covers those individuals who are too drunk
or otherwise too intoxicated to give informed or knowing consent to sexual
activity. These provisions should be explicit; reliance on case precedent or mental
or physical incapacitation provisions that are silent with respect to intoxicants is
inadequate. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the description of the
victim's incapacity should not be written in terms of the victim's ability to "resist,"
"appraise or control her conduct," or "understand the nature or consequences of
the act," but rather whether the victim is capable of giving informed or knowing
consent.
In addition to outlawing nonconsensual sexual activity with intoxicated
persons, every jurisdiction should continue to criminalize the administration of
intoxicants as a prelude to rape either by grading this conduct as an aggravated
form of sexual assault or by punishing it as a separate criminal offense. The
administration of drugs poses such a substantial risk to human life and bodily
integrity, over and above the drug's use to subdue the victim to accomplish sexual
assault, that separate criminalization is appropriate. Treating administration of an
intoxicant as a separate criminal offense is hardly radical in light of the host of
assault statutes that already do so and the considerable number of cases in which
defendants have been prosecuted for both offenses. Moreover, disaggregating
drugging from sexual assault emphasizes that force is not necessarily required for
all types of sexual crimes.
Third, every jurisdiction should follow the lead of Congress by
scheduling frequently used rape drugs as the most serious type of controlled
substances and provide appropriate penalties for the possession and distribution of
those substances. Such legislation will reinforce the restraints already present in
the rape and drugging statutes and complete an all-fronts attack on rape by drugs
and other intoxicants. Finally, courts should take into account at sentencing two
aggravating circumstances, videotaping or photographing the sexual assault as well
as the abuse of a position of professional trust, because they demonstrate either the
defendant's extraordinary moral blameworthiness or produce substantial additional
harms not adequately addressed by the basic criminal sexual offense. The focus on
sentencing is particularly apt at a time when an increasing number of states are
passing sentencing guidelines or sentence enhancement provisions.
A. Explicit Reference to the Intoxicants in Sexual Offense Provisions
Of the fifty-six jurisdictions in the United States, forty-seven explicitly
mention drugs or other intoxicants in one or more of their sexual offenses. 3 6 The
exceptions are Georgia, Massachusetts, the military, Alaska, North Carolina,
Virginia, New Mexico, Nebraska, and Nevada. The first three jurisdictions have
common law case precedent interpreting their rape statutes to include the
circumstance where the victim is drugged or intoxicated.337 The remaining six
336. See supra Part I and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 248-54 and accompanying text.
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states use language in their sexual offense provisions that might arguably include
intoxicated persons, often employing phraseology common to definitions of
mentally incapacitated, physically helpless, or mentally disabled persons but
omitting intoxicants. 338 The omission of explicit statutory references to alcohol,
drugs, and other intoxicants is undesirable for a number of reasons, as the next
section discusses.
1. Problems with Relying on Case Precedent
The problems associated with relying on case precedent for the
imposition of criminal liability for sexual assault of an intoxicated person are
beautifully illustrated by cases coming from the three jurisdictions that rely on case
precedent: Massachusetts, Georgia, and the military. In the Massachusetts case of
Commonwealth v. Tatro, the defendant was tried for child rape and drugging for
sexual intercourse.3 39 During its deliberations, the jury asked "whether intoxication
or accompanying inability to consent constituted force," 340 an explicit requirement
of Massachusetts's rape statute.341 Instead of answering in the affirmative based on
case law, the court gave an erroneous and non-responsive answer. 342 Thus even if
case law in Massachusetts covers these instances, how would juries know? Juries
(and perhaps judges) are confused by statutory language and jury instructions that
do not mention intoxicants.
A second example of confusion comes from a military case; the military's
rape code has no explicit provision relating to drugs or intoxication, although
military courts adopt the rule that nonconsensual intercourse with an intoxicated
person is rape. 43 In United States v. Grier,344 the defendant related the following
in an interview with investigating authorities: "At the time this happened, I did not
know if a woman is not capable of giving consent, it is rape. Now, I know it is
rape. ' 345 Thus, Grier illustrates the problem that citizens and defendants may not
be able to ascertain the contours of rape law in their jurisdictions, and the
importance in phrasing statutory language in a way that focuses on the victim's
inability to consent.
A recent case from Georgia, reported in a newspaper article, provides a
third illustration of the problems that arise when states do not have explicit
statutory provisions governing the sexual assault of intoxicated victims.346 Two
brothers, who were also fraternity brothers, allegedly drugged a Georgia State co-
338. See supra notes 167-68, 213-14, 224 and accompanying text.
339. See Commonwealth v. Tatro, 676 N.E.2d 843 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
340. Id. at 846.
341. See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 265, § 22 (2001).
342. The court responded, erroneously, that consent was not an issue in the case
because of the victim's age; this error was held to be harmless on appeal. See Tatro, 676
N.E.2d at 846.
343. See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
344. 53 M.J. 30 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
345. Id. at 33.
346. See Schmitt, supra note 136, at 1.
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ed and sexually assaulted her.347 Although Georgia's rape statute is silent on
drugging, case precedent brings these cases within the statute's purview under the
constructive force doctrine.34 However, instead of relying on this precedent, the
prosecution proceeded on a theory that the victim was "mentally incapable" of
expressing nonconsent because of her drugged condition.3 49 Unfortunately, the
convictions were overturned because the appellate court found that the category of
"mentally incapable" is limited to mentally retarded or defective persons, not those
who are drugged.350 The victim's father opined: "'Of course, we think [the judge
is] wrong,' he says. 'I just feel sorry for the women of Georgia-that advances
made over the years are now moving backwards.'
351
Thus, juries, judges, defendants, and even prosecutors may have a
difficult time ascertaining the law in states with no explicit sexual assault provision
mentioning intoxicants. Basic constitutional principles of notice and fairness
require that states inform citizens of what is criminally proscribed conduct.352 If
precedent already exists in these three jurisdictions regarding the rape of drunken
or drugged victims, then it should be a fairly simple matter to codify the precedent;
no new law is created. The need seems particularly acute in Massachusetts because
of that jurisdiction's separate statute outlawing drugging for the purpose of sexual
intercourse and in the military in light of the large number of cases involving
members of the armed services.
347. See id.
348. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
349. Schmitt, supra note 136, at 1.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. In Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952), the United
States Supreme Court explained: "[a] criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give
notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties, and to guide the judge
in its application and the lawyer in defending one charged with its violation." Id. at 340.
In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), the Court wrote:
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume
that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist
that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented,
laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague
law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges,
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.
Id. at 108-09.
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2. Problems with Using Mental Incapacitation or Physical Helplessness
Language Without Referring to Intoxicants
Six states, Alaska, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, and
Virginia, also do not mention drugs or other intoxicants in any of their sexual
offense provisions. But unlike Georgia, Massachusetts, and the military, these
states describe various forms of victim incapacitation that may trigger criminal
liability in their statutes, such as the inability to appraise or understand conduct or
the inability to resist.3 53 The problem with these provisions is ambiguity. Are
persons who have become self-intoxicated or intoxicated with the defendant's help
protected under these statutes? One possible interpretation is that these statutes fail
to specify drugs or other intoxicants because they are equating incapacitation from
all possible sources (e.g., beating, medical illness, retardation, intoxicants) and
thus choose not to limit their provisions to only intoxicants. Alternatively, the
absence of intoxicant language may be evidence of a legislative judgment that only
mentally ill and physically helpless, but not intoxicated, persons are protected from
sexual predation. For all the reasons noted in the previous section, it is incumbent
on these states to articulate unambiguously the scope of their sexual assault
statutes. The paucity of the published cases from these jurisdictions involving
sexual assault by intoxicants may also underscore the ambiguity of these
statutes."5 4
3. Description of the Intoxicants
Modem sexual assault statutes should utilize language, describing the
types of intoxicants subsumed under their auspices, that is broad enough to cover
the range of such substances. Of particular importance is the question whether
alcohol is included in the list. Wisconsin's choice to specifically exclude alcohol
353. Alaska combines mental and physical incapacitation in its definition of
"incapacitated" and separately defines mentally incapable. Alaska defines incapacitated as
"temporarily incapable of appraising the nature of one's own conduct or physically unable
to express unwillingness to act." ALAsKA STAT. §§ 11.41.470(2) (Michie 2001). In
Nebraska, the description is as follows: "the victim was mentally or physically incapable of
resisting or appraising the nature of his or her conduct..." NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-319(1), -
320(1) (2001). Nevada's statute provides: "the victim was mentally or physically incapable
of resisting or understanding the nature of his conduct..." NEv. Rv. STAT. 200.366(1)
(2001). New Mexico defines "force or coercion," inter alia, as "when the perpetrator knows
or has reason to know that the victim is unconscious, asleep or otherwise physically helpless
or suffers from a mental condition that renders the victim incapable of understanding the
nature or consequences of the act...." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(4) (Michie 2000).
North Carolina's provision states: "due to any act committed upon the victim is rendered
substantially incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct, or resisting the act of
vaginal intercourse or a sexual act." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(2) (2000). Finally,
Virginia's statute describes the condition of the victim as one that prevents her from
understanding nature or consequences of the sexual act. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(3)
(Michie 2000).
354. But see State v. Aiken, 326 S.E.2d 919 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Raines,
324 S.E.2d 279 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); Miller v. Commonwealth, 27 S.E.2d 57 (Va. 1943);
Howard v. Commonwealth, 465 S.E.2d 142, 143 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
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from its definition of intoxicant 55 seems problematic because of the large number
of cases in which victims were severely intoxicated by alcohol and then raped.
35 6
Other statutes merely speak of "substances. 357 The better practice would be to
provide some description of the critical quality of those substances-their narcotic,
anesthetic, or otherwise intoxicating effects. No harm exists in also listing
commonly used rape drugs as long as the list is not exhaustive. 358 Finally, two
states include hypnosis, 359 a laudable addition because hypnosis may have the
same effect as drugs and because it has been used in the commission of sexual
offenses.360
B. Criminalizing Multiple Harms: Sexual Assault and Administration/Drugging
1. Sexual Assault of Intoxicated Victims: Ingestion versus Administration
ofIntoxicants
The most significant shortcoming of modem sexual offense statutes in
terms of criminalizing rape by drugs is that approximately two-thirds of the
jurisdictions explicitly provide for liability only when the defendant administers
the intoxicant. Criminal liability for sexual conduct with intoxicated victims
should not be limited to those actors who administer a substance as a prelude to
sexual assault but should encompass all whom sexually prey on persons too
intoxicated to give informed consent. In other words, modem statutes should also
protect all citizens, even those who voluntarily ingest alcohol or drugs, from sexual
assault. Strong public policy reasons exist for such an approach. As the court in
State v. Duffy wrote, "[u]nder appellant's interpretation, any person who
intoxicated herself to the point of unconsciousness or impaired ability to resist
would be fair game for any attacker who would commit violent, felonious sexual
acts against her. We cannot find that the legislature intended such a result.
' 361
355. See Wis. STAT. § 940.225(5)(ai) (2000).
356. See supra notes 47-83 and accompanying text.
357. See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 707-700 (2000).
358. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 709.4(3) (2001); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.021 (a)(2)(A)(vi) (Vernon 2000).
359. See supra note 223.
360. See supra note 116.
361. State v. Duffy, No. CA95-03-006, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1305, at *22
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1996). See also Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376 (1870),
where the court wrote more than a century ago:
If it were otherwise, any woman in a state of utter stupefaction, whether
caused by drunkenness, sudden disease, the blow of a third person, or
drugs which she had been persuaded to take even by the defendant
himself, would be unprotected from personal dishonor. The law is not
open to such reproach.
Id. at 380-81; see also Commonwealth v. Helfant, 496 N.E.2d 433 (Mass. 1986)
(reaffirming the holding in Burke). In Stadler v. State, 919 P.2d 439 (Okla. Crim. App.
1996), the court wrote:
In other words, the Court's concern was that the victim be unconscious
of the nature of the act, whether by drugs, sleep, or as here, intoxication.
[Vol. 44:1
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Thus, whether the victim passed out at her brother's wedding because she drank
too much or because someone slipped GHB into her soda, she should be protected
from nonconsensual sexual acts.
The central harm protected by sexual offenses is the same in both
situations-sexual acts to which the victim has not consented because she lacks the
capacity to give informed consent. As many commentators have pointed out,
sexual offenses protect citizens against a serious and unique harm-a violation of
their sexual autonomy or integrity-that is, the freedom to choose with whom and
under what circumstances to engage in sexual activity.362 Statutes that explicitly
criminalize only administration followed by sexual assault conflate the two harms
in these cases-the drugging harm and the separate sexual autonomy harm.
The mechanism of victim incapacitation is legally irrelevant to
vindicating the right to be free of nonconsensual sexual predation.363 It does not
From this, I am forced to conclude that it is of no apparent consequence
how the victim came to be unconscious of the nature of the act.
Id. at 443. In State v. Chaney, 5 P.3d 492 (Kan. 2000), the dissenting judge quotes from the
legislative history changing the statute from one requiring administration to one that does
not:
'It seems when a victim is incapable of giving consent because of the
effect of any alcoholic liquor or drug, it is rather immaterial who has
administered the substance. A rapist should not be able to hide behind
the fact that he didn't administer the drugs or he didn't know they had
been administered when it is obvious that the victim cannot give consent
for some reason.' Testimony of Senator Lillian Papay, Senate Judiciary
Committee (Feb. 18, 1993).
Id. at 501.
Compare these statements with the Model Penal Code Commentary:
Some of these [non-administration] statutes may well achieve
excessively broad coverage. It seems extravagant to assign felony
sanctions to the male who, without force or threat, engages in sexual
intercourse with a decidedly and obviously intoxicated woman without at
least knowledge that drugs had involuntarily been administered. From
the actor's perception, at least, the situation is exceedingly difficult to
identify and perilously close to a common kind of social interaction.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 318 (1980). The notion that sexual intercourse with a
"decidely and obviously intoxicated" person is a "common kind of social interaction" seems
highly suspect. Statements like this give credence to feminists' arguments that much of
what passes for consensual sexual relations in our society is really the result of various
forms of coercion. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DiscousEs ON LIFE AND LAW 88 (1987).
362. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously, Rape
Law and Beyond, 11 LAw & PHIL. 35 (1992).
363. Even the Model Penal Code observes:
Hypothetically, at least, it might be possible to condemn as rape
intercourse with any female who lacks substantial capacity to appraise or
control her conduct. At a wholly conceptual level, that position would
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matter whether victims are beaten into unconsciousness, exist in persistent
vegetative states, or pass out because they consume too much alcohol. The
permanence or genesis of victim incapacitation is not important vis-A-vis the harm
of nonconsensual sex. Those jurisdictions that currently punish sexual offenses
involving self-intoxicated or drugged victims tend to equate these persons with the
traditional categories worthy of special protection under rape law-the mentally ill
and the physically helpless.
Moreover, no notion of consent to intoxication can be stretched to include
consent to subsequent sexual conduct. When a person voluntarily consumes
alcohol or drugs, he has not thrown open the doors to all manner of unwanted
criminal conduct, be it murder, assault, robbery, or sexual offenses; rather, the
criminal law protects drunken or drugged persons from these harms. Contributory
negligence, here in the form of becoming intoxicated, is not recognized as a
defense to criminal liability.36 Finally, the notion of blaming the victim because of
her conduct in precipitating a sexual crime is particularly problematic in light of
the history of similar abuses in rape law.365
By insisting on the administration of the intoxicant for all forms of sexual
assault, states perpetuate the notion that force is the critical consideration in rape
law rather than nonconsent. 366 The administration of an intoxicant can be
considered a type of force (i.e., constructive force)367 or simply comparable to
accord with the underlying premise that the law of rape and related
offenses should protect against non-consensual intimacy.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 315 (1980). Elsewhere the commentators write: "The
unifying principle among this diversity of conduct is the idea of meaningful consent." Id. at
301. The writers then go on to argue that such a rule would be unsatisfactory because of the
role that alcohol and drugs play in normal courtship activities. See id. at 315, 318.
364. LaFave observes that the contributory negligence defense "has no place in
the criminal law": "Negligence by the victim, just as with criminal conduct by the victim,
'does not bar an action against another for the wrong which he has committed against the
peace and dignity of the state."' LAFAVE, supra note 28, at 520 (footnote omitted).
365. For a brief overview of the phenomenon of blaming the victim in rape cases,
see JOSHUA DREssLER, UNDERSTANDING CRiMINAL LAw 536-37 (2d ed. 1995). See also
SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 311-13 (1975)
(discussing the she-was-asking-for-it phenomenon); Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's
Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 26 n.163 (1977) (quoting
a mock examination of a mugging victim).
366. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 301-02 (1980) (describing the
ancient definition of rape as based on consent, not force); see also State of New Jersey in
Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1270 (N.J. 1992) ("Under the common law, rape was
defined as 'carnal knowledge of a woman against her will.' American jurisdictions
generally adopted the English view, but over time states added the requirement that the
carnal knowledge have been forcible, apparently in order to prove that the act was against
the victim's will." (citation omitted)); Schulhofer, supra note 362, at 60 (1992) (suggesting
that force was not part of the original common law definition of rape, which was described
as "unlawful sexual intercourse with a female person without her consent").
367. In defending the choice to include only defendant administration of the
intoxicant followed by sexual assault in its version of rape, the Model Penal Code
commentators observe: "Where these conditions obtain, the actor's conduct amounts to
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force, and is certainly blameworthy in its own right, but need not be an
indispensable element of all types of sexual offenses involving intoxicated victims.
Legislatures should recognize that categories of non-forcible rape have always
existed, notably the two types which are highly comparable in terms of victim
incapacitation: mentally ill and physically helpless persons. Furthermore, many
modem forms of sexual assault crimes do not require force, such as the abuse of
authority, coercion, or fraud, in securing sexual compliance. Thus, the
criminalization of rape by drugs only when the defendant administers, and not
when the victim voluntarily ingests, the intoxicant is a throwback to the time when
rape statutes focused more on force than nonconsent.
Analogizing rape law to theft offenses, 368 one way of thinking about the
crimes of sexual assault of an intoxicated victim and administration of drugs
followed by sexual assault is to liken the first to larceny (the nonconsensual taking
of property) and the second to robbery (the forcible and nonconsensual taking of
property). Failure to explicitly criminalize sexual assault of self-intoxicated
persons means that only the robbery-like or forcible offense is being punished. As
Schulhofer has argued in another context, "[t]hese cases make clear that one thing
missing in the law of rape is some way to punish sexual misconduct that is not
physically violent. It is as if we had a law against armed robbery but no law
against theft." 369 Sexual crimes should encompass both types of offenses because
they share the central harm to sexual integrity.
370
2. Tests of Victim Incapacity
Of course, the critical question is how to describe the degree of
intoxication, or more accurately incapacity due to intoxication, that a victim must
suffer before sexual activity with her is nonconsensual and worthy of criminal
punishment. The most common test currently employed is that the person is so
incapacitated as to be unable to appraise or control her conduct.37' Other
provisions focus on the victim's ability to resist the sexual acts; the physical
coercion and may be assimilated to the paradigm case of forcible rape for purposes of
liability and grading." MODELPENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 317 (1980).
368. Many commentators are strongly opposed to such an analogy on the grounds
that sexual offenses and property offenses are not in the least comparable. See, e.g.,
Henderson, supra note 335, at 219 n.97; West, supra note 335, at 1148.
369. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 2151, 2184 (1995).
370. Finally, the line between ingestion and administration can be a difficult one
at times. If the actor is liable regardless of administration issues, then the sexual integrity of
the victim is vindicated.
371. For instance, Maryland defines mentally incapacitated as: "a victim who, due
to the influence of a drug, narcotic or intoxicating substance,...is rendered substantially
incapable of either appraising the nature of his or her conduct, or resisting...." MD. ANN.
CODE of 1957, CRIMES & PUN. § 461(c) (2001). Wisconsin provides: "a person who is under
the influence of an intoxicant to a degree which renders that person incapable of appraising
the person's conduct, and the defendant knows of such condition." Wis. STAT.
§ 940.225(2)(cm) (2000).
20021
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helplessness provisions use the test of whether the victim is unconscious or unable
to communicate her unwillingness to act. Each of these approaches is inadequate
because it fails to emphasize the central inquiry-whether the victim is intoxicated
or drugged to the extent of not being able to give informed consent to the sexual
activity.
a. Eliminate Resistance Language
The use of resistance language in modem sexual assault provisions
dealing with intoxicants (e.g., the victim was prevented from resisting because of
an intoxicant) is particularly unfortunate because such language dates back to a
time when resistance to the utmost was an important hallmark of rape law. Now
that resistance is ceasing to be an important consideration in any other facet of
modem sexual offenses,372 encountering this language in provisions relating to
victim incapacitation due to intoxicants is confusing. Courts have had to construe
the resistance language in their jurisdiction's intoxication provisions to be
consistent with the remaining portions of their rape or sexual assault statutes.
An excellent example of a case in which the issue of resistance was
raised is the recent case of People v. Giardno,373 in which the jury requested
guidance on the meaning of resistance in California's rape statute.374 The appellate
court noted that normally jury instructions that track the statutory language are
sufficient unless the jury would have difficulty applying them, but the court went
on to hold that an additional instruction was required in the case because the
meaning of the phrase preventing resistance was not clear.375 In explaining that
resistance did not refer to physical resistance, but rather the victim's ability to
exercise judgment, the court held that the jury should have been instructed that "as
a result of her level of intoxication, the victim lacked the legal capacity to give
'consent' as that term is defined in section 261.6.' 376 In reversing the conviction,
372. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of
Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 799 (1988). Singer and La Fond observe that the
majority of states no longer have a resistance requirement. RICHARD G. SINGER & JOHN Q.
LA FOND, CRIMINAL LAw: EXAMPLES AND ExPLANATIoNs 199 (2d ed. 2001). Similarly, La
Fave reports that thirty states have no resistance language in their rape statutes and that six
states have explicitly provided that physical resistance is no longer required, although he
cautions that resistance may still play a tacit role in some jurisdictions. See LAFAVE, supra
note 28, at 773. Dressier writes: "Although many states retain the resistance requirement,
the trend is to reduce the significance of the rule or abolish it entirely." DRESSLER, supra
note 365, at 541.
373. 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315 (Ct. App. 2000); see also People v. Salazar, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (Ct. App. 1983) (discussing resistance requirement in rape-by-drugs provision
although case involved the use of physical force; defendant argued that the continuance of
the resistance requirement in rape-by-drug cases indicated that legislature also intended to
retain it in other rape provisions; the court rejected the argument).
374. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3) (West 2001).
375. See Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 324.
376. Id. California defines consent as follows: "positive cooperation in act or
attitude pursuant to the exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and
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the appellate court added: "We are sympathetic to the quandary in which the trial
court was placed. Its reluctance to vary from the statutory language or the standard
jury instructions is understandable, particularly in light of the absence of any prior
case law directly interpreting the phrase at issue."3 7 Thus, resistance apparently is
not really resistance, but is a question of consent, under California's rape law.
Similarly, in Elliott v. State,3 78 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had
to decipher the meaning of "physically unable to resist" in the state's sexual
assault statute. Reviewing the history of the resistance requirement in Texas rape
law, the court concluded, "the notion that the amount of compulsion necessary to
constitute sexual assault should be measured by the degree of resistance to be
expected under the circumstances was dropped from the statutory scheme. 3 79 Like
Giardino, the Elliot court interpreted its resistance provision in terms of consent,
holding "that where assent in fact has not been given, and the actor knows that the
victim's physical impairment is such that resistance is not reasonably to be
expected, sexual intercourse is 'without consent' under the sexual assault
statute." 380 Thus, resistance language misdirects the inquiry of interest; the
question is not whether a victim resisted but whether she or he consented.38'
b. Replace or Modify Appraise/Understand or Control Conduct Language
Sexual assault statutes that utilize tests of incapacity based on the victim's
inability to either appraise or understand her conduct or to control her conduct are
less objectionable than the resistance provisions because they do not invite inquiry
into a question that is no longer legally relevant in rape cases. The principal
shortcoming with these tests is their emphasis, like the resistance provisions, on
the victim's conduct rather than focusing more directly on-her ability to consent.
These provisions are couched in language remarkably reminiscent of the tvo most
common tests for an insanity defense, the M'Naghten 82 and the Model Penal Code
standards, 383 and for an involuntary intoxication defense.384 When the defendant's
have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved." CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6
(West 2001).
377. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 325.
378. 858 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
379. Id. at 485.
380. Id.; see also Horowitz v. State, No. 01-93-01022-CR, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS
1080, at *22-*23 (Tex. App. Mar. 7, 1996) (reaffirming the standard).
381. In discussing the resistance requirement in general, the dissenting judge in
Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev'd 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981),
vrote: "Thus it is that the focus is almost entirely on the extent of resistance-the victim's
acts, rather than those of her assailant. Attention is directed not to the wrongful stimulus,
but to the victim's reactions to it." Id. at 629 (Wilner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
382. MWaghten provides a defense if the actor, because of a mental defect or
disease, did "not know the nature or quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718,
722 (1843).
383. The Model Penal Code test provides: "A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct
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production of criminal conduct is that which is of interest, tests designed to assess
the actor's cognition (understand or appreciate) or volition (control) with respect to
that conduct are critical in determining culpability. However, in the sexual assault
context, the victim's conduct is not the primary focus of attention; like all other
crimes, it is the defendant's conduct and mental state that continue to be pivotal in
determining criminal liability. The victim's conduct is only legally relevant as a
proxy or indicator of consent or, perhaps more accurately in this instance, her
capacity to consent. Not only does the focus on the victim's conduct direct the
inquiry away from the defendant (where it should be) to the victim, such focus also
tends to obfuscate the critical connection that the victim's conduct has to her
capacity to consent. One example of a provision that makes an explicit connection
between consent and the victim's ability to appraise or control her conduct is
California's definition of consent, which provides that "'consent' shall be defined
to mean positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to the exercise of free will.
The person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the
act or transaction involved."3"5 Thus, tests phrased in terms of conduct should be
modified to draw an explicit connection between the conduct and the victim's
capacity to give consent. Or, alternatively, the test should be written simply in
terms of consent.
c. Utilize Lack of Capacity to Give Informed, Knowing, or Reasoned
Consent
lacks judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or
sexual penetration
386
Consent is no defense if it is given by...one, who, by reason of
immaturity, insanity, intoxication or use of drugs is unable and
known by the actor to be unable to exercise a reasonablejudgrnent
as to the harm involved. 8 7
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1)
(1962).
384. For example, the Model Penal Code provides: "Intoxication that (a) is not
self-induced or (b) is pathological is an affrmative defense if by reason of such intoxication
the actor at the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its
criminality [wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.08(4) (1962).
385. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2001).
386. MINN. STAT. § 609.341(7) (2000) (emphasis added) (in definition of mentally
incapacitated).
387. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 626.6 (2000) (emphasis added) (in consent
provision); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-211(2)(b) (2000) (This consent-as-a-defense
statute provides: "Consent is ineffective if:...it is given by a person who by reason of youth,
mental disease or defect, or intoxication is unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the
nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense."); OHO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.02 (Anderson 2001) ("substantially impairs the other person's judgment or
control").
HeinOnline  -- 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 198 2002
20021 RAPE BY DRUGS 199
incapable of making an informed consent to sexual intercourse388
unable to give knowing consent389
incapable, through any unsoundness of mind, whether temporary or
permanent, of giving legal consent 9
"consent" shall be defined to mean positive cooperation in act or
attitude pursuant to the exercise of free will. The person must act
freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or
transaction involved.391
The victim is incapable of consent by reason of mental disorder,
mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep or any other similar impairment
of cognition
392
unable to withhold consent or to withdraw consent because of a
physical condition, or...unable to communicate nonconsent
393
substantially incapable of appraising the nature of the contact
involved or of understanding that the person has the right to deny or
withdraw consent
3 94
The operative incapacity language of the intoxication provisions in
sexual assault statutes should focus directly on consent because, after all, sexual
offenses protect citizens from unwanted, nonconsensual sexual activity. As the
statutes excerpted above indicate, a number of jurisdictions have already crafted
their provisions to emphasize consent. Some of these provisions require that
consent be reasoned, informed, knowing, or legal. Others stress the importance of
various cognitive or volitional abilities in the context of assessing consent.
California's definition emphasizes two important considerations in arriving at a
notion of informed or knowing consent. First, to make a reasoned choice to
participate in the proposed activity, the person must have sufficient information
(knowledge) about the proposed activity, including the type of sexual contact
involved, the identity of her sexual partner, and, perhaps even, information about
the HIV-status of her partner. Second, that choice must be the product of her free
will and not the result of various forms of coercion; California's statute captures
388. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 566.030(1), .060(1) (2000) (emphasis added) (in
definition of forcible compulsion).
389. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13(a)(2) (2001) (emphasis added) (in criminal
sexual assault provision).
390. IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(2) (Michie 2000) (emphasis added) (in rape statute);
see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ l111(A)(2), 1114(A)(2) (2000); 33 P.R. LAWS ANN.
§§ 4061(b), 4067(c) (1998).
391. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2001) (emphasis added).
392. Aaiz. REV. STAT. § 13-1401(5)(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
393. MINN. STAT. § 609.341(9) (2000) (emphasis added) (in definition of
physically helpless); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(5) (Michie 2001) ("physically
unable to communicate lack of consent").
394. ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(l)(C) (West 2001) (emphasis added)
(in mental disability provision).
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this notion in the use of voluntariness. Minnesota's tripartite formulation-
withhold consent, withdraw it, or communicate nonconsent-is helpful because it
emphasizes that consent is a continuing activity not a one-time event.
395
Furthermore, the emphasis on consent is not very different from the types
of questions that must be addressed in cases of mentally ill or disabled victims (or
physically helpless persons), where an inquiry into whether the person is capable
of giving consent to the sexual intercourse is also necessary. As LaFave notes:
Here, the "critical issue is to define the degree of mental disease or
deficiency that suffices to make noncoercive intercourse a crime,"
for the statute should not be so broad as to cover persons suffering
from only a relatively slight mental deficiency, nor so narrow as to
protect only those in state of absolute imbecility.
396
In many other facets of law, the question of informed and/or knowing consent is
examined with great care, for example in the contexts of waiver of rights397 and
consent to medical treatment, 398 and should be in the law of rape as well. As some
commentators have argued, the law of rape has an impoverished sense of
consent. 99 Crafting the intoxication provisions in terms of consent will advance
the development of a meaningful notion of consent in rape law.
Thus, every jurisdiction should explicitly prohibit sexual conduct with
persons who are so intoxicated that they are incapable of giving informed consent
to the sexual activity. This position is in line with a minority of jurisdictions doing
so already and the statutory trend in the direction of expanding coverage in this
fashion. This approach also accords with the common law approach of analogizing
sexual contact with drunken or drugged victims to mentally ill or physically
helpless persons. Rape law should protect all those who have been deprived of
capacity to make informed choices about engaging in sexual acts, whether by their
own intoxication or by drugs administered to them.
The first part of this reform can be achieved with a minimum of statutory
amendment. Following the lead of such diverse jurisdictions as California,400
395. Lois Pineau proposes a notion of communicative sexuality that "sees consent
as something more like an ongoing cooperation than the one-shot agreement which we are
inclined to see it as on the contract model." Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8
LAW & PHIL. 217, 242 (1989).
396. LAFAVE, supra note 28, at 777 (footnotes omitted).
397. See Lucy Reed Harris, Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of
Rape, 43 U. CIE. L. REv. 613 (1976).
398. See Joel Feinberg, Victims' Excuses: The Case of Fraudulently Procured
Consent, 96 ETIcs 330 (1986).
399. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 397, at 645.
400. Califomia's previous statutes read: "where a person is prevented from
resisting by any intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance,
administered by or with the privity of the accused." CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3)
(amended 1994). Its current statute provides: "Where a person is prevented from resisting
by any intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance, and this condition
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South Dakota,40' Kansas, 40 2 and possibly Arkansas,40 3 states should simply omit
the administration language common to most explicit rape by drug provisions. The
second reform regarding the description of the victim's incapacity to consent may
require some additional amendment. The statutes' descriptions of victim
incapacitation should be written in terms of the inability of the victim to give
informed or knowing consent to the sexual act rather than her inability to resist, to
appraise or control her conduct, or to understand the nature or consequences of the
act. In jurisdictions like California, which have consent definitions for their sexual
was known, or reasonably should have been known by the accused." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 261(a)(3) (West 2001).
401. South Dakota's previous statute read: "Where she is prevented from resisting
by any intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic agent administered by or with privity of the
accused." S.D. CODIFD LAWVS § 22-22-1(4) (amended 1985). Its current statute reads:
"Where the victim is incapable of giving consent because of any intoxicating
narcotic... agent, or hypnosis." S.D. CODIED LAws § 22-22-1(4) (Michie 2001).
402. Kansas's 1969 rape statute read:
When the woman's resistance is prevented by the effect of any alcoholic
liquor, narcotic, drug or other substance administered to the woman by
the man or another for the purpose of preventing the woman's resistance,
unless the woman voluntarily consumes or allows the administration of
the substance with knowledge of its nature.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(l)(d) (1969) (quoted in State v. Chaney, 5 P.3d 492, 495 (Kan.
2000)). The 1992 statute read:
When the victim is incapable of giving consent because of the effect of
any alcoholic liquor, narcotic, drug or other substance administered to
the victim by the offender, or by another person with the offender's
knowledge, unless the victim voluntarily consumes or allows the
administration of the substance with knowledge of its nature.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(l)(d) (amended 1993). Its current provision reads:
when the victim is incapable of giving consent because of mental
deficiency or disease, or when the victim is incapable of giving consent
because of the effect of any alcoholic liquor, narcotic, drug or other
substance, which condition was known by the offender or was
reasonably apparent to the offender.
KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 21-3502(C) (2000).
403. Arkansas's previous statute provided: 'Mentally incapacitated' means that a
person is temporarily incapable of appreciating or controlling the person's conduct as a
result of the influence of a controlled or intoxicating substance administered to the person
without the person's consent." ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(4) (Michie amended 2000). Its
current statute provides: 'Mentally incapacitated' means that a person is temporarily
incapable of appreciating or controlling the person's conduct as a result of the influence of a
controlled or intoxicating substance: (A) Administered to the person without the person's
consent; or (B) Which renders the person unaware the sexual act is occurring."' ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-14-101(4)(A)-(B) (Michie 2001). Although Arkansas's new statute is ambiguous,
it appears that the legislature has provided an alternative to administration by the defendant.
However, the scope of this alternative is unclear. Does it include self-intoxicated victims? If
so, must self-intoxicated victims meet a higher standard of victim incapacity (unawareness
of the sexual act) rather than being incapable of appreciating or controlling their conduct?
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offenses, consent already has an established meaning and no additional description
is required. In addition, some jurisdictions define consent for purposes of all of
their criminal statutes, often employing language based on Model Penal Code §
2.11, which provides that
assent does not constitute consent if:...(b) it is given by a person
who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is
manifestly unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a
reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct
charged to constitute the offense...
404
In jurisdictions that provide neither a global criminal-offense definition
nor a sexual-offense definition of consent, the use of descriptive words such as
informed, knowing, or reasoned, in characterizing the nature of the consent
required in sexual assault cases, may be advisable.
Finally, these provisions should include a mens rea requirement, currently
used in many incapacitation provisions, that the defendant knew or should have
known of the victim's incapacity to consent. Thus, at least criminal defendants
who are not negligent with respect to the victim's capacity to consent will be able
to raise a defense. The mens rea requirement in these provisions will ameliorate
the potential harshness of a rule based on consent alone.
3. Punishing the Administration of an Intoxicant as a Prelude to Sexual
Assault: Two Possible Approaches
In the foregoing section, I argued that all jurisdictions should have a
sexual offense category that outlaws sexual conduct with an intoxicated victim,
regardless of whether the perpetrator drugged the victim or whether she ingested
the intoxicants, which would eliminate the administration requirement from the
basic sexual offense. The next question is how to punish defendants who also
administered the intoxicants before engaging in nonconsensual conduct with their
victims. Two possible approaches exist. The first is to punish the administration of
intoxicants as a prelude to sexual assault as an aggravated form of sexual assault,
thus combining administration and nonconsensual sexual conduct in a higher grade
of sexual offense. The second is to punish drug administration as a separate
criminal offense in addition to the underlying sexual crime.
Examples of these approaches exist in current statutory schemes. For
instance, Louisiana, adopting the first approach, criminalizes both simple and
forcible rape. Simple rape occurs:
When the victim is incapable of resisting or of understanding the
nature of the act by reason of a stupor or abnormal condition of
mind produced by an intoxicating agent or any cause, other than the
administration by the offender, and without the knowledge of the
victim, of any narcotic or anesthetic agent or other controlled
404. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3)(b) (1962).
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dangerous substance and the offender knew or should have known
of the victim's incapacity.
405
Forcible rape covers the instance:
When the victim is incapable of resisting or of understanding the
nature of the act by reason of stupor or abnormal condition of the
mind produced by a narcotic or anesthetic agent or other controlled
dangerous substance administered by the offender and without the
knowledge of the vietin.
4 6
The sentence for simple rape is up to twenty-five years and for forcible rape is up
to forty years.407 Thus, under Louisiana's two-part scheme, rape involving
defendant administration of the intoxicant is a more serious and heinous crime and
merits a higher penalty.408
On the other hand, Arkansas's statutory scheme demonstrates the second
approach. Arkansas defines mentally incapacitated as "temporarily incapable of
appreciating or controlling the person's conduct as a result of the influence of a
controlled or intoxicating substance: (A) Administered to the person without the
person's consent; or (B) Which renders the person unaware the sexual act is
occurring.'409 The state then incorporates the phrase "mentally incapacitated" into
its rape41° and sexual assault provisions.4 1 Arkansas has a separate crime of
introducing controlled substances into the body of another either by injection,
inhalation, or otherwise.412 Arkansas's statute also provides that criminal liability
for drugging is in addition to any other criminal liability,413 and grades the
drugging crime more severely if it was done in contemplation of committing a
sexual offense.414 Thus, in Arkansas, citizens' sexual autonomy is protected by the
sexual offense statute and their bodily integrity is protected by the separate
drugging statute.
Treating the administration of intoxicants as an aggravated from of sexual
assault is in line with a host of sexual offense provisions that divide the once-
unitary concept of rape into higher and lesser degrees depending on the existence
of various circumstances, such as the use of physical force, the participation of
multiple perpetrators, or severe physical injury to the victim. Moreover, this notion
of including forcible rape and non-forcible rape under an umbrella sexual offense
405. LA. RPv. STAT. ANN. § 14:43(A)(1) (West 2001).
406. Id. § 14:42.1(A)(2).
407. Seeid. §§ 14:42.1(B), :43(C).
408. Other states also punish, often less severely, sexual contact with a mentally
disabled or physically helpless person without the criminal actor having administered the
drug itself. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3003, -3005 (2001); 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT.
5/12-13(a)(2),-15(a)(2) (2001).
409. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(4)(A)-(B) (Michie 2001).
410. Id. § 5-14-103(a)(1)(B).
411. Id. § 5-14-125(a)(2).
412. See id. § 5-13-210(a)(1)-(2).
413. Seeid. § 5-13-210(d).
414. See id. § 5-13-210(e).
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provision may be likened to punishing both robbery and larceny as two different
types of theft offenses. Adopting this approach will ensure that those defendants
who drug and assault their victims are punished to a greater extent than those who
opportunistically take advantage of drunken or drugged persons to sexually exploit
them. Despite these very cogent arguments, I argue for the separate treatment of
drugging in the following section.
4. Drugging as a Separate Crime
Many of the difficulties victims face in the aftermath of these
assaults are due to the effects of the drugs given by offenders. The
surreptitious drugging of a victim is, in and of itself, a cruel and
criminal violation of the person. Some victims describe this aspect
of the trauma as "mind rape." The drugging should be recognized as
a separate and distinct act of victimization in addition to any other
acts of abuse and degradation to which the victim is subjected.415
Although both approaches to the treatment of defendants who intoxicate
their victims as a prelude to committing a sexual offense have merit, the separate-
crime approach is preferable for a number of reasons, which are explained in more
detail below. First, the nonconsensual administration of drugs is a substantial
invasion of bodily integrity, in addition to the harm of the sexual offense, which
poses a significant threat to the health and safety of human beings. Second, a host
of criminal statutes already exist, outside the sexual offenses categories, that
outlaw nonconsensual drugging, illustrating that legislatures have already judged
this offense worthy of separate punishment. 416 In numerous cases, defendants have
been prosecuted for both crimes.417 Third, subsuming drugging in the sexual
offense provisions, even as an aggravated form of the crime, perpetuates the
hegemony of the force requirement in traditional rape law rather recognizing that
modem rape law punishes many forms of non-forcible, nonconsensual sexual
assault.
First, by altering both the physical functioning of the body and the
person's consciousness, the nonconsensual administration of street, prescription, or
rape drugs represents a significant invasion of a person's bodily integrity in all
circumstances, not just in those associated with the subsequent commission of a
sexual offense. Professor Sheldon Gelman makes a compelling argument that
when the state engages in nonconsensual biological alteration of its citizens,
including the administration of various types of drugs, strict scrutiny should be
applied to the state's action.418 Similarly, the law recognizes that doctors and other
415. Abarbanel, supra note 44, at 12.
416. See supra notes 256-305 and accompanying text.
417. See, e.g., Dubria v. Smith, 197 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1999), affd, 224 F.3d 995
(9th Cir. 2000); Sera v. State, 17 S.W.3d 61 (Ark. 2000).
418. See Sheldon Gelman, The Biological Alteration Cases, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1203 (1995).
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health workers must get informed consent before they administer drugs to their
patients.
The nonconsensual or non-therapeutic administration of drugs to another
person is a severe form of bodily invasion because drugging poses significant risks
to human life, safety, and health. The most extreme danger is death, and is
cogently illustrated by cases in which the victim died. For example, in Dubria v.
Smith, the defendant doctor used too much chloroform in subduing his victim,
killing her.419 Cobb, the male nurse, mixed a prescription drug with alcohol, and
the victim died from the lethal combination.420 Samantha Reid died after sipping a
drink spiked with a rape drug.421 In addition to the risk of death, many victims of
drug-induced sexual assaults reported significant residuary symptoms associated
with ingestion of the drugs.42 Also, as the quote at the beginning of this section
suggests, victims suffer psychological harm, "mind rape," from the drugging
aspect of the sexual assault.
423
On the whole, our society considers the dangers associated with certain
forms of drugs so serious that we have a plethora of legislative enactments that
prohibit the possession, ingestion, distribution, and manufacture of so-called
controlled substances. The United States has been waging a war on drugs for
decades. Even the medicinal use of narcotics is heavily regulated. Thus, if the self-
administration of a variety of drugs is illegal because of the dangers the drugs
pose, it likewise should be illegal to administer them to others without their
knowledge or consent.
The dangers to life, safety, and health posed by the administration of
drugs are not the types of harm normally protected by sexual offense categories.
Sexual crimes protect against incursions to a victim's sexual autonomy. The
dangers of drugging are of a different order because they relate to the victim's
overall bodily integrity. Thus, when a victim is drugged and then sexually
assaulted, she has been harmed in more than one way. First, drugs or intoxicants
have been administered against her will violating her overall bodily integrity, and
secondly, her sexual autonomy has been severely violated. Punishing these two
harms as separate crimes make this difference crystal clear. Offenders who drug
and sexually assault their victims should be convicted of two crimes, not one.
419. See Dubria, 197 F.3d at 394.
420. See Regina v. Cobb, [2002] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 19 (Crim. App. 2001).
421. See Cannon, supra note 38, at 73.
422. See Abarbanel, supra note 44, at 12.
423. As the same author noted:
Because [victims of drug-facilitated rapes] cannot recall what happened
during a significant time period, they have to cope with a gap in their
memory. They experience the horror, powerlessness, and humiliation of
not knowing what was done to them. They can only imagine what
happened. One victim said, 'I would rather have the nightmare.'
Abarbanel, supra note 44, at 12.
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The notion of punishing the administration of drugs as a separate criminal
offense is not new. Today, approximately one-half of American jurisdictions
outlaw drugging as a separate criminal offense. 4 Five states make drugging a
separate offense when done for the purposes of committing a sexual offense,425 and
nine make it a separate crime to drug a person for the purpose of committing a
felony.426 Ten jurisdictions outlaw non-therapeutic drugging427 and fourteen
prohibit various forms of poisoning.428 Under traditional criminal law, the
administration of a poison or drug was considered a form of battery.429 Thus,
recognition already exists for the proposition that the administration of drugs
without consent constitutes a separate harm from the sexual assault of a drugged
victim. A considerable number of the cases considered in Part II were prosecuted
under the dual offenses. Finally, it is important to note that fifteen states have
statutes that require that the drugging be done for the purpose of committing
another crime.430 In other words, these statutes contemplate the imposition of
punishment for more than one substantive offense.
The separate-crime approach is also preferable because it continues to
move rape law away from its over-reliance on force as an indispensable element of
all forms of the crime. Including the administration of drugs within the sexual
offense perpetuates the notion that only the forcible sexual exploitation of victims
matters, rather than asserting that nonconsensual sexual contact is the real harm
and that force is merely one of many mechanisms to achieve that harm. Forcible
rape is really two crimes: rape and battery (physical force) or assault (threat of
force). Because early conceptions of rape law covered only cases of forcible rape,
the force requirement became subsumed into the sexual offense when actually
force represented a completely different type of harm from the sexual battery.
In light of the serious dangers posed by the unlawful administration of
intoxicants and the fact that drugging statutes already exist, disaggregating
drugging from sexual assault is a good starting place for thinking about the crime
of sexual assault separate from the force with which the assault is brought about.
The rape-by-drug cases make the severity of the two separate harms abundantly
clear and have important implications for thinking about all types of sexual
offenses. Perhaps we should confine sexual assault to instances of sexual battery
and separately punish offenders who use force in accomplishing their sexual
424. See supra notes 256-313 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 260-73 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 274-85 and accompanying text.
427. See supra notes 286-305 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 306-11 and accompanying text.
429. In describing the means of perpetrating a battery, Perkdns and Boyce
comment: "Force may be applied to the person of another in many ways,...It may be
committed by administering a poison or other deleterious substance, by applying a caustic
chemical, or by communicating a disease." PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 30, at 153
(footnotes omitted); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 cmt. at 187-88 (1980); LA FAVE,
supra note 28, at 738 ("So too a battery may be committed by administering a poison or by
infecting with a disease.").
430. See supra notes 260-85 and accompanying text.
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crimes. Other examples of separately condemning multiple harms are found in
statutes that punish kidnapping for the purpose of securing sexual intercourse as
well as for the underlying sexual crime.431 The division of offenses will make clear
that the harm victims experience in all sexual offenses is the harm against having
sexual relations thrust upon them against their will or without their consent. Some
methods of achieving nonconsensual sexual contact are far more morally
blameworthy because they also involve physical violence. But we could take into
account this added degree of moral blameworthiness by separately punishing those
who beat or batter or threaten their victims into compliance.
Thus, in addition to enacting intoxication provisions that do not require
administration, states should either enact (or utilize already existing) drugging
statutes to punish the administration of an intoxicant as a prelude to a sexual
assault. Alternatively, states should bifurcate their sexual assault provisions and
should grade cases in which the defendant administers the intoxicant as an
aggravated form of sexual assault while treating the opportunistic variety of
offense as a lower form of sexual crime. States that use the separate-treatment
approach should ensure that defendants who commit both the sexual offense and
the drugging offense do not receive concurrent sentences, but are punished for
each of the wrongs they have committed against their victims.
432
C. Possession and Distribution of Rape Drugs
The problems discussed in this Article may be alleviated by more states
enacting legislation that punishes the possession and/or distribution of various
types of drugs commonly used to render victims unconscious and facilitate the
commission of sexual offenses. In this way, the legislation may act as a
prophylactic measure. Making possession of these substances illegal may
discourage offenders from acquiring them. Also, if a defendant is found in
possession of these substances before using them, law enforcement officials can
prevent sexual assaults.433
D. Provide Additional Punishment for Aggravating Factors
Finally, legislative enactments dealing with the phenomena of sexual
assault by drugs or other intoxicants should explicitly treat certain circumstances
431. See, e.g., Sera v. State, 17 S.W.3d 61 (Ark. 2000) (discussing defendant's
kidnapping as well as drugging and raping his victims); State v. Lombardi, 229 N.E.2d 206
(N.Y. 1967) (dissent discussing kidnapping and drugging and sexual assault).
432. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(d) (Michie 2001) (specifying separate
punishment for the drugging offense).
433. See, e.g., United States v. Gore, No. 00 CR 77, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6304
(N.D. Ill. May 14, 2001) (prosecution for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute rape
drugs); Oakley v. State, 457 So. 2d 459 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (assault prosecution based
on the injection of ketamine); State v. Sansotta, 769 A.2d 1108 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001) (prosecution for possession of GHB and possession with intent to distribute); Morris
v. Commonwealth, No. 1141-98-4, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 629 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1999)
(prosecution for distribution of Rohypnol to a minor).
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surrounding the commission of these offenses as sentence enhancement, or more
broadly, sentencing factors. As noted above, many jurisdictions already have
sentence enhancement provisions;434 a growing number are passing sentencing
guidelines like those in the federal system. The cases reviewed in Part II reveal
that victims suffer multiple harms during their sexual assaults in addition to the
two central harms to sexual autonomy and bodily integrity (in cases involving the
administration of intoxicants). These other circumstances, perhaps not worthy of
treatment in separate criminal statutes, should nonetheless be considered as
bearing on the moral culpability of the criminal actor and taken into account at
sentencing. The list of such factors might be quite long, for instance, abuse of a
family relationship, degree of physical injury to the victim, psychological damage,
multiple perpetrators, 435 and serial rapists. This section focuses on two factors, (1)
videotaping or photographing the sexual assault and (2) the abuse of a position of
professional trust, which seem particularly egregious and are not adequately
considered in extant statutory schemes, unlike the factors listed above.
1. Videotaping or Photographing the Victim or the Sexual Assault
In the most egregious cases of administering drugs for the purposes of
committing sexual assault, defendants not only drug and rape the victims but also
make photographic or videotaped records of their assaults.436 The harms that
accrue from videotaping are of a different order of magnitude from those
experienced by victims in the usual cases. At least two additional types of harm
befall the victims in these cases. First, offenders have invaded the privacy of the
victims by making sexually explicit recordings of them without their consent, a
radical invasion of privacy under any circumstances. This harm is so significant
that at least ten states criminalize the photographing or videotaping of a person
who has an expectation of privacy.437 For instance, West Virginia's statute
434. See supra notes 319-26 and accompanying test.
435. Florida has a special statute, entitled "sexual battery by multiple
perpetrators," which provides:
The legislature finds that an act of sexual battery, when committed by
more than one person, presents a great danger to the public and is
extremely offensive to civilized society. It is therefore the intent of the
Legislature to reclassify offenses for acts of sexual battery committed by
more than one person.
FLA. STAT. ch. 794.023 (2000); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-70(a)(3) (2001)
(commission is aided by two or more persons actually present); IOWA CODE § 709.3(3)
(2001) (person aided and abetted by one or more persons); MICH. COMP. LAws
§ 750.520b(1)(d) (2000) (same).
436. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
437. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-16-101 (Michie 2000) (Video voyeurism-
unlawful to videotape person in residence and elsewhere where person has reasonable
expectation of privacy and has not consented); CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2001)
(disorderly conduct-videotape another under or through clothing without consent with
intent to gratify sexual desires and invade person's privacy); COLO. R.Ev. STAT. § 18-3-404
(2000) (unlawful sexual contact); GA. CODE AN. § 16-11-61 (2000) (peeping tom statute);
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provides that "[ilt is unlawful for a person to knowingly visually portray another
person without that person's knowledge, while that other person is fully or
partially nude and is in a place where a reasonable person would have an
expectation of privacy.' '438 Colorado's provision makes this behavior a type of
unlawful sexual contact:
Any person who knowingly observes or takes a photograph of
another's intimate parts without that person's consent, in a situation
where the person observed has a reasonable expectation or privacy,
for the purpose of the observer's own sexual gratification, commits
unlawful sexual contact. For purposes of this subsection (1.7),
"photograph" includes any photograph, motion picture, videotape,
print, negative, slide, or other mechanically, electronically, or
chemically reproduced visual material.
439
The fact that victims are depicted in the worst possible light-when they are
unconscious or severely impaired or subjected to degrading acts4---makes this
invasion of privacy all the more heinous.
Secondly, victims may also experience harm from the transmission or
circulation of the recorded images of their sexual assaults. The ready accessibility
of the Internet makes the possibility of quickly transmitting these photographic or
videotaped images to a wider audience very real. The fact that a photographic
recording was made and circulated will be a constant source of harm, in some
senses the most enduring harm, those victims may experience. As the Court in
New York v. Ferber quoted in relation to child pornography:
[P]ornography poses an even greater threat to the child victim than
does sexual abuse or prostitution. Because the child's actions are
reduced to a recording, the pornography may haunt him in future
years, long after the original misdeed took place. A child who has
posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the recording
is circulating within the mass distribution system for child
pornography.441
720 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 5/26-4 (2001) (unauthorized videotaping-illegal to videotape person
in restroom and other like places, residence, or under or through clothing); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4001 (2000) (eavesdropping-same as California's statute); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 511 (West 1999) (violation of privacy-illegal to install photographing or
listening devices in or outside private place); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-7470 (Law. Co-op.
2001) (unlawful voyeurism etc.--illegal to video record another person without consent
while person is in place where she has expectation of privacy and aggravated voyeurism to
sell or distribute such images); WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.115 (2001) (voyeurism-same as
South Carolina's statute); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-28(b)-(c) (2001).
438. W. VA. CODE § 61-8-28(b) (2001).
439. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-3404 (2000).
440. See Sera v. State, 17 S.W.3d 61 (Ark. 2000).
441. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 n.10 (1982) (quoting Shouvlin,
Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
535, 545 (1981)).
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West Virginia's statute, excerpted above, also prohibits circulation: "Any person
who displays or distributes visual images of another person with knowledge that
said visual images were obtained in violation of subsection (b) of this section is
guilty of a misdemeanor..... '442 Although the remaining states should strongly
consider enacting provisions dealing with these types of criminal invasions of
privacy, at a bare minimum sentencing courts should give special consideration to
offenders who make photographic or videotaped records of their sexual assaults
and/or broadcast those images.
2. Abuse of a Professional Relationship
The cases in which health-care professionals are the perpetrators of rape
by drugs are especially egregious because they involve not only sexual assault and
drugging but also the additional factors of the abuse of a professional relationship
and the exploitation of exceptionally vulnerable victims. Doctors, dentists, and
nurses violate their ethical and professional duties toward patients by exploiting
those patients for their own sexual gratification.443 The professionals gain access to
their victim's bodies through the office of their profession. They breach the basic
trust that members of the public have a right to expect in their dealings with
health-care professionals. The more global problem of sexual assault committed by
health-care and mental-health professionals has already been recognized in the
plethora of sexual offense statutes criminalizing sexual conduct between these
professionals and their patients or clients.444 For instance, Michigan outlaws sexual
contact "[w]hen the actor engages in medical treatment or examination of the
victim in a manner or for purposes which are medically recognized as unethical or
unacceptable." 445 When drugging as a prelude to the sexual assault occurs in these
contexts, the sexual offenses and drugging statutes vindicate the sexual integrity
and bodily integrity harms, but not the harm deriving from the abuse of a
professional trust.
Secondly, victims who encounter their assailants in professional contexts
are especially vulnerable to attack because they trust in the health-care givers to
provide professional services at a time of need. Many citizens view their health-
care professionals with a certain awe and respect not generally afforded other
members of the community. Moreover, these patients consent to the administration
of the drugs they are given believing that the administration is for medically
necessary reasons. Two states explicitly invalidate consent given in the context of
medical treatment.446 Therefore, courts should give special consideration in
442. W. VA. CODE § 61-8-28(b)-(c) (2001).
443. See supra notes 114-33 and accompanying text.
444. See Falk, supra note 16, for a discussion of these statutes.
445. MICH. COMp. LAws § 750.520b(l)(f)(iv) (2001).
446. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.17-A, § 253(3) (West 2001) ("It is a
defense...that the other person voluntarily consumed or allowed administration of the
substance with knowledge of its nature, except that it is no defense when the other person is
a patient of the actor and has a reasonable belief that the actor is administering the substance
for medical or dental examination or treatment."); Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.05
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sentencing to persons who use their professional offices for the purposes of
committing sexual assault.
V. CONCLUSION
Although most jurisdictions in the United States explicitly mention drugs
or other intoxicants in at least one of their sexual assault or rape provisions, these
statutory enactments vary widely in terms of approach, language, and coverage.
The single biggest deficit of these statutes, en masse, is their failure to explicitly
cover cases in which the victim voluntarily ingested alcohol or drugs and then was
sexually assaulted. Modem sexual offenses should protect this class of victim from
the harm of nonconsensual sexual activity. The second biggest deficiency of the
existing statutory law in the United States is the language used to describe the
degree of incapacitation required for protection of intoxicated victims against
sexual assault. These provisions should focus attention on the central inquiry in all
rape cases-whether the victim actively consented, not whether she resisted or
failed to appraise or control her conduct. Many states already have definitions of
consent that provide guidance on the legally relevant contours of consent. Third,
states should criminalize those who administer drugs as a prelude to sexual assault
either as an aggravated form of sexual assault or as a separate crime in addition to
the underlying offense. Fourth, states should follow Congress's lead by more
strictly regulating common rape drugs. Finally, videotaping of sexual assaults and
abusing a professional relationship for the purpose of committing rape should be
aggravating sentencing factors.
The foregoing analysis of statutory enactments criminalizing rape by
drugs is not only interesting in its own right-under what circumstances should
sexual conduct with intoxicated persons be subject to criminal punishment-but
also for the window this variation of nonconsensual sexual crime provides into
rape law in general. Rape by drug prosecutions provide an opportunity for thinking
about whether sexual offense provisions are the best place to outlaw and punish
not only the sexual harm lying at the heart of all such offenses but the various
mechanisms through which that harm is achieved. Given the longstanding
existence of statutes that make drugging a crime when done in contemplation of
committing another offense or under other circumstances, it is possible to
disaggregate the sexual harm from the drugging harm in rape by drug cases
involving administration. The extent of the bodily invasion that drugs entail, the
significant danger they pose, and their handiness in committing any number of
offenses, have underscored the need to consider separate criminal liability for one
mechanism to accomplish rape. Perhaps these statutes, then, also provide an
opportunity for thinking about other mechanisms, equally dangerous and abhorrent
to human life, as separate harms in accomplishing nonconsensual sexual
intercourse as well. For instance, is the force inherent in traditional rape doctrine
(Anderson 2001) ("The offender knows that the judgment or control of the other person or
one of the other persons is substantially impaired as a result of the influence of any drug or
intoxicant administered to the other person with the other person's consent for the purpose
of any kind of medical or dental examination, treatment, or surgery.").
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really part and parcel of the crime of rape-or is force in the form of a beating,
battery, or threat, assault, really another form of harm worthy of separate
punishment? Perhaps in a more modem era, when unitary concepts of forcible rape
have given way to a plethora of sexual assault offenses, only some of which retain
the force requirement, is a good time to begin thinking about separately
criminalizing the various harms inherent in obtaining sexual intercourse by
mechanisms punishable in their own right. This is one lesson we might learn from
studying cases and statutes involving rape by drugs.
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